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1. 
SECTION 1. 
CHAPTER 1. 
FROM PRE-HISTORY TO GERMAN RULE 
The Bonde1swarts tribe inhabited the extreme south of South West Africa, 
in an area centering on the town of Warmbad1 which Freis1ich describes 
as being: 
"a harsh, arid land of stony plains, sand-dunes, naked outcrops 
of white limestone and ·barren rocky mountains. The vegetation 
is sparse and xerophytic, the typical product of a land of pro-
longed droughts alternating with torrential downpours which 
drain away rapidly along the many stormwater channels into the 
perenniany flowing Orange River"2 . 
The mean annual rainfall for the area is 5.13 inches (approximately 
258 mi11imetres) per annum3. 
The Bonde1swarts are of the Nama . or Hottentot people. The Nama called 
themse 1 ves the "khoi khoi" meani ng "men of men". There were several Khoi 
clusters, the Cape Khoi, the Namaqua, the Koranna, the Einiqua, and, in the 
nineteenth century, the half-caste Griquas. 
R.H. E1phick postulates that the "San" or Bushmen and the "Khoi " or 
Hottentots were not two distinct races. He says that the Khoi diverged 
from the San by becoming herders of cattle, and with improved and more 
reliable sources of nutrition, they became physically different from the 
San. 
1. Warmbad was so named because of the warm springs there. 
2. Freis1ich, R. The Last Tribal War. (Cape Town, 1964.) p.l, 
3. Wellington, J.H. South West Africa and its Human Issues. 
(London, 1967 . ) p.34. 
2. 
El phi ck suggests that the Lake NgaJlliarea in present-day Botswana was 
the origin of the migrations of the Khoisan peoples southwards. They 
moved down the Orange River until they reached the sea, where they again 
split, some gOing north into what is present-day South West Africa, and 
others into the area today known as the "Little Namaqualand". The other 
Khoisan groups split into two, one group moving down the Fish River into 
the eastern-Cape, where they later encountered and intermingled with the 
Bantu-speaking tribes there, while the other group, the ancestors of the 
Cape Khoi, moved into the western Cape. 4 
Wellington states that in the sixteenth century the Nama probably ranged 
over the whole of South West Africa up to the Etosha pan. 5 They had pre-
dominantly boskopoid features, with dainty limbs. Steatopygia or "the 
excessive development of fatty tissues in the buttocks", especially in 
the females, and hypertrophy, or the "excessi ve 1 engtheni ng of the 1 abi a 
, 
minora the so-called "Hottentots' apron" in the female were also dis-
tinguishing physical characteristics of the Khoisan peoples. So too was 
the sparseness, or complete lack of facial and body hair. 6 
4. Elphick, R.H. "The Cape Khoi and the first phase of South African 
Race Relations". (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1972). 
pp. 42-45. Cory Library l'licrofilm . . 
Little is known for certain about the origins or direction of the 
Khoisan migrations, but Elphick's hypothesis does seem to be the 
most likely to date. Today the "pure" Khoi is seldom seen, thanks 
to extensive intermingling with other races, black and white, and, 
in the case of the Bonde 1 swarts, with the 1 ater wave of "Or 1 ams" 
from the Cape. See p./r. 
5. Wellington, p.139 . 
6. ibid; . pp 131-132. 
3. 
The Bonde1swarts Nama were a nomadic. pastoral people practising 
transhumance7. To aid mObi1ity8 they designed 'beehive-shaped huts. 
constructed of a framework of pliable wooden stakes. bent inwards and 
fastened at the top. and covered with rush mats which shrank in dry 
weather. allowing air to circulate and expanded in wet weather to form 
a waterproof covering9 The Bonde1 swarts , diet consisted of milk from 
their cows. supplemented largely by game and wild herbs. fruits. roots 
and vegetab1es. 10 
Vedder holds that the first Khoi to settle permanently in present-day 
South West Africa were the tribe known as the "Awa-Khoi" or "Red Nation" 11. 
They considered themselves overlords of the other Khoi tribes which arrived 
later. as well as over the indigenous ' San and Bergdamara' peoples. The 
Red Nation tribe was followed by the "Ve1dschoen dragers" and "Fransman 
Hottentots". The last two Nama groups to arrive were the "Topnaars" and 
the Bonde 1 swarts. The 1 a tter ca lled themselves the "Kami gou". " or ".'Gami-
:\:Nu~;' 12. 
7. "Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into 
of the Bonde1zwarts". (U.G. 16 - 23) p.l. para ll. 
referred to as the N.A.C. Repor!}. 
the Rebe 11 i on 
(8ereafter 
8. Vedder. H. "The Nama" in Hahn. C.H.L .• Vedder. H .• and Fourie. L.. 
The Native Tribes of South West Africa. (London. 1966) p.111. 
9. This type of hut is still often used today. except that sacks and 
'corrugated iron frequently replace rush mats. 
10. Wellington. p.138. 
11. Vedder. H. South West Africa in Early Times. Translated by C.G. Hall 
(London. 1938) . p.126. The Red Nation were also known as the "Gei-
J]khaun" or "Great Defenders". 
12. Vedder. Early Times. p. ·25. "Gami" means "bundle". "mu" means black -
hence the name "Bondelswarts". 
4. 
Neither of these last two Nama tribes acknowledged the Red Nations' 
suzerai nty, and they mai ntai ned a strong traditi on .of fi erce independence. 
The Topnaars settled near present-day Walvis Bay, while the Bondelswarts 
pursued a nomadic existence in the south along the Orange River, until 
they were settled at Warmbad by missionaries . 
. At the turn of the nineteenth century there occurred further incursions 
into the Nama peoples' area. These were the Hottentot tribes from the 
Cape Colony, mostly of mixed blood, who had adjusted to European tech-
nplogy, dress and manners to varying degrees. Some were Christians,and 
. . 
their language was Dutch. They moved north to get land, freedom and 
perhaps to escape from the law. These people are known as the "Orlams" 
Hottentots, distinguishing them from the older inhabitants of S.W.A., 
the Nama13 . 
The Bondelswarts lay in the path of these migrations, and each wave of 
Orl ams left some members beh i nd, 1 eadi ng to an i ntermi ngl ing of Nama 
tribal traditions with the elements of white culture picked up by the 
Orlams . The Nama, fiercely independent and hardy, with a tradition of blood 
feuds 14, also learned from the Orlams a proficiency in the use of the horse 
and rifle in warfare15 . 
13. ibid . pp 128-171. 
14. Freislich, pp 2-4. 
15. "Report on the Na ti ves of South Wes t Afri ca and thei r treatment by 
Germany". (C.D. 9146 - 1918) . p.70 . CBereafter referred to as t he 
Gorges Report). 
5. 
As a result of their superior military technology the Orlams soon overthrew 
the overlordships of the old Nama Red Nation tribe . . But the Bondelswarts 
retained their independence. The total Khoi population of the S.W.A. area 
in 1890 has been estimated at between 20,000 and 25,000 . The strongest and 
. most influential Nama and Orlams chiefs at that time were Hendrik Witbooi, 
. <, 
Willem Christian (Bondelswarts), Joseph Fredericks and Simon Kooper16 . 
The diary kept by Hendrik Witbooi reveals some friction towards the end 
of the nineteenth century between himself and an alliance of the old Nama 
tri bes, namely the 1I e 1 dschoendragers ,Bethani ~ Hottentots, Red Nat i on· and the 
Bondelswarts17 . But, on the whole, the Bondelswarts remained aloof from 
internal Nama disputes, and their position in the extreme south made the 
bitter Herero-Nama conflict in the north only a distant threat18 . 
The Bandel swarts , system of government consisted of a council and a 
hereditary chieftainship. The chief, or Captain as he was later called, 
commanded great respect and influence, but was bound to act in terms of the 
~dvice and resolutions of hi s councillors. These councillers were chosen 
by the married men of the tribe19 . In the councilor "Raad" the chiefs' 
expressed opinion probably carried considerable weight, but it was the 
Raad's decision which prevailed, and only the Raad could authorise the 
Chief to make war, peace, treaties and laws and regulations 20 . 
16. ibid. p.71. 
17. Die Dagboek van Hendrik Witbooi. (Van Riebeeck Society with S. W.A. 
Scientific Society. 1929). Vo1.9. p.63. 
18 . Vedder, .Early Times, p.334. 
19. Gorges Report, p.72. 
20. ibid. p.73 . 
6. 
The chief had to rely on popular approval and the support of the Raad rather 
than on his royal prerogatives 21 . It was the Raad which exercised judicial 
and administrative functions 22 • In times of peace the powers of the chief 
were very limited 23 , and with a weak chief, the Raad could dominate a 
situation. Thus, to conclude an agreement with the Bondelswarts it was 
necessary to convince both chief and Raad. The chief could not do anything 
to which his people, speaking through their Raad, were opposed. 
The Bondelswarts' first contacts with whites were with the occasional 
hunters, traders, explorers, prospectors ~nd fugitives . A notable fugitive 
was H.J. Wikar, a Swedish soldier of the Dutch East India Company who, 
after contracting debts, fled from the Cape to the Orange River in 1778, 
staying there for two years until his pardon by Governor, van Plettenberg 
(1771-1785). In his report to the Governor, Wikar mentioned coming into 
contact with a nomadic Nama group called the Gami-Nun living on the high 
ground near what was to be Warmbad 25 . 
Later, as the territory above the Orange River opened up, missionaries 
began their work. By 1805 the London Missionary Society had already 
started a station and settled some of the nomadic Bondelswarts at Warm bad 26 
21. Strauss, T. 
and 1878-9". 
"The Korana and the Northern Border Wars of 1868-9 
(Unpublished B.A. Hons. Thesis, U.C.T. 1977) . p.12. 
22. N.A.C. Report, p.2, para. 9. 
23. Vedder, The Nama, p.143 . 
24. A.W. Roberts Papers. _ "Draftings for official Report" (N.A.C. Report) . 
MS 14 787/A/iii. Draft A. p.2. (Bereafter referred to as R.P.N.A.C. 
Report Draft~. 
25. The Journal of Wikar. ed. E.E. Mossop. (Van Riebeeck Society, Cape 
Town, 1935) . Vol. 15. This provides interesting reading, and is 
accurate and factual in its descriptions of the lifestyle and culture 
of the Khoi and San peoples. 
26. Vedder, The Nama, p.146 . 
7. 
The L.M.S. station at Warmbad (formerly known as Nisbeth's bath), founded 
by the Rev. Schme1en, was taken over by the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary 
Society. and in 1833 Rev. Edward Cook arrived there. By 1842 he reported that 
he had "over a thousand" Bonde1swarts converts . In 1865 the Rhenish 
Missionary Society took over the station27 . The Roman Catholic missionaries 
of the Congregation of the Oblate of St. Francis de Sales, who had been 
working in Little Namaqua1and in the Cape Colony for some time, extended 
their field of operations into S.W.A. when they bought the farm Heirachab i s 
in the Warmbad district in 189628 , and established a mission station there 
in 189829 , although it was only after 1907 that they made any substantial 
progress .in converting the Bonde1swarts to Catho1icism30 . 
Meanwhile, copper was foundin Little Namaqua1and in the Cape Colony, and a 
"copper-rush" ensued. In 1854 a trader, Fielding, leased a large part of 
the Bonde1swarts territory for mineral concessions for a considerable sum31 . 
The boundaries of the Bonde1swarts' territory were the Orange and Fish (S.W.A.) 
rivers. Their capital was at Warmbad. Their chief, Wi11em Christian, 
negotiated a treaty on 31 January 1870, with the approval of his Raad, with 
the Cape Government which was represented by the Acting Resident Magistrate 
27. Wellington, pp . 159-161. 
28. Bishop Simon. Bishop for the Hottentots . Translated by A. Bouchard 
(New York, 1959) . p.114. 
29. ibid . p. 1l8. 
30. ibid. p.208. (See also be10w}'.17.) 
31 . Vedder, Early Times, p.282 . 
8. 
of Namaqualand, G.A . Reynolds. In return for an annual allowance Willem 
agreed to aid the Cape Government to preserve "peace along the Orange 
River, as the mountains along the area were an ideal shelter for half-caste 
or Kora bandits32 . These were plaguing the traders and miners 33 , and on 
16 November 1868 Willem had sent ",albeit reluctantly, fifty-seven Bondel-
swarts to assist the colonists in Little Namaqualand to defeat some of 
these marauders 34. Strauss says that 
"The situation was extremely volatile, and the eventual 
success of the colonial forces must be attributed in large 
part to Christian's support35. 
. 
In 1876 the Bondelswarts accepted a magistrate from .the Cape in Warmbad . 
Willem was paid £50.00 p.a . to keep the San and. Kora under contro1 36 In 
1877 Col. J.T. Eustace~ the Civil Commissioner for Namaqualand, visited the 
Bondelswarts. He praised them highly for their loyalty to the Cape Govern-
ment, and for their power in their area, and, in consequence, the Cape 
Government sent them a gift of 100 rifles37 . 
32. Private and Semi-Official Documents of the Administrator of S.W.A . 
Windhoek Archives. CBereafter referred to as "W.A. Private and Semi-
Off. Docs" J Unnumbered File "Bondel zwarts". South Africa - Cape and 
Adjacent Territories. 1883-6. Vol. 39.p.99. No . 39. "Treaty with the 
Chlef of the Bondelzwarts" . 
33. Esterhuyse, J.H. South West Africa 1880-1894. (Cape Town, 1968.) p.16. 
34. Strauss, pp.43-44. 
35. ibid. p.100. 
36. Vedder, Early Times, p.434. 
37. Esterhuyse, p. 7l 
9. 
In 1879 Eustace reported that Willem had helped defeat rebels on the 
38 
northern border of the Cape Colony Willem had sent 150 men under the 
command of the sub-captain, Timotheus Schneewe, in May 1879 to subdue the 
Afrikaner tribe, who were supposed to be under the Bondelswarts' suzerainty, 
but who had attached the Colony from Bondelswarts territory, obliging Willem 
under the terms of his treaty with the Cape to take action39 . 
Eustace was instructed to visit ; Willem Christian in November, 1883 by 
J. Rose-Innes, the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs in the Cape Colony40 
Eustace was to get 
"a formal confirmation of such amicable arrangements as he 
(WillemJ may be disposed to enter into with the GovernmeQt, and 
to a complete ratification of the cession of his territory to 
the Colonial Government upon such terms as may be agreed upon" . 
An invitation was also to be extended to Willem and his sub-captain, 
T.Schneewe, to visit Cape Town 41. 
Wi 11 em requested £25 worth of gunpowder and £25 worth of yari.ous cartri:dges 
to protect his people against raids by bandits 42 . But the agreement was 
38. W.A. Private and Semi-Off. Docs. Letter No. 138. 
39. Strauss, p.102 . 
40. Ca e of Good Ho to 
t e 
Cape of Good 
41. A5- '85. p.6. Enclosure A in No.3 . Rose-Innes to Eustace, 11 Nov.1884. 
No . 1/ 962. 
42. ~J.A. Private and Semi-Off. Docs. Letter No. 138. 
10. 
not to be, because Germany annexed S.W.A., and Rose-Innes wrote to Eustace 
cancelling the invitation to Willem to visit Cape Town43 The letter 
arrived too late to prevent Eustace from sending W.F. Bergh to visit Willem . 
Willem's Raad agreed that he should visit Cape Town, and . Willem wrote to the 
other Nama chiefs warning them not to make treaties with the Germans, and 
advocating an alliance with the Cape44 . Bergh seems to have been somewhat 
carried away by his enthusiasm for his mission, and instructed a local 
man in Warmbad, J.W. Herridge, to use his influence to persuade all Nama 
chiefs to ally with the Cape Government, and thus to forestall Germany's 
advances into the south of S. W. A. An agreement was to be made with the 
chiefs whereby they would make an alliance with the Cape and promise not 
to make treaties with a "foreign power" or to cede or sell any of their 
lands "without first consulting Her tlajesty' s Colonial Governmen£45. 
When he heard of this, the Governor and High Commissioner at the Cape, 
Sir Hercules Robinson, immediately instructed the Minister of Native 
Affairs to cancel all agreements Herridge might have made, and withdrew 
the invitation to Wil1em Christian to visit Cape Town46 . Rose-Innes 
in turn wrote to Eustace saying that Bergh had exceeded his instructions, 
that he and Herridge should be recalled, and that 
43 . 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
"no further steps should be taken twards extending Colonial 
,relations with the Namaqua chiefs"4/. 
A5-'85 No.6. Letter D.p.8.10 Dec . 1884. No. 1/1 093 . 
A5-' 85. pp16-l8. Enclosure C in No.9, Eustace to Bergh. 2 Jan. 
A5-' 85. p. 19. Bergh to Herridge (copy). 16 Dec. 1884. 
A5- ' 85. p.20. No. ll. Mi nute No. 4. Cape Town. 2 Jan. 1885. 
A5-' 85. p.21. No . 12. Rose-Innes to Eustace. No. 1/107. 30 Jan. 
1885. 
1885. 
11. 
Wi 11em' s all i ance with the Cape Government had gi ven ·him considerab1 e prestige 
as well as valuable arms and ammunition48 . But it also engendered in the 
Bonde1swarts a deep and lasting admiration and almost pathetic belief 
in the justness of the "English Government.. Their highly-valued indepen-
dence had been left untampered with during their alliance with the Cape, and 
had indeed been reinforced with arms and ammunition. It was this sustaining 
desire for British rule which grew , with the real ity of the years of German 
rule that were to follow. Wi11em Christian was to repeatedly request that 
his territory be placed under a British protectorate, but to no avai1 49 . 
On 1 May 1883 Hei nri ch Voge 1 sang, on beha 1 f of Adolf LUderitz, ' bought P,ngra 
Pequena 50 bay and its hinterland for five miles inland from the Bethanie 
Hottentots' Captain, Joseph Fredericks, and the German flag was hoisted 
there on 12 May 188451 . In August of the same year Fredericks sold to 
LUderitz the whole coastline from the Orange River to the 26 0 South latitude 
line, with a twenty mile hinter1and 52 . On 19 August 1884 LUderitz acquired, 
from the impoverished Topnaar tribe of Walvis Bay, the coastal belt from 
260S to Cape Fri 0 except for Wa 1 vi s Bay itself. 
48. R.P. "Exhibits and Annexures to the Evidence", (for N.A .C. Report). 
MS 14 787/ A/(i). (Bereafter referred to as R.P.N.A.C. Report Exhibits 
and Annexuref). AN . 1. p.1. 
49. Gorges Report, p.78. 
50. Today known as Luderitz. 
51. Esterhuyse, pp . 39-47. 
52. Wellington, p.167. 
12. 
As Wellington points out: 
"So far as the rights of the Topnaar captain to this area were 
concerned it has been justly remarked that he might with equal 
validity have sold Australia to Uideritz" .53. 
Meanwhile Luderitz, an ardent colonialist had been to Berlin to ask for 
protection for his possessions in S. W.A . , in the fact of protests from 
the Briti sh -and Cape merchants 54. As a -result, Germany annexed "Luderitz-
land" on 29 May 188455. This protection was formally extended over most 
of the rest of present day S. W.A. in June 189056 , except for Walvis Bay, 
which had been annexed by Britain together with a fifteen mile hinterland on 
6 March 187857 . 
In 1885 Dr Karl Gotthilf Buttner, a former Rhenish missionary, was asked 
to negotiate treaties for Germany with the South West African tribes 58 . 
Willem Christian and his Raad refused to sign a treaty with Germany because 
they held that they were already treaty-bound to the Cape 59 . But soon the 
Bondelswarts began to realize that the long hoped for British protectorate 
over their t erritory would not materialize, and so, on 21 August 1890, the 
53 . i bi d. p. 168. 
54. Esterhuyse, pp. 39-47. 
55. Wellington, p.168. 
56 . i bi d. p.172. 
57. Vedder, Earl~ Times, p.435. 
58. Esterhuyse, p. 100. 
59. ibid. p. 10 l. 
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13. 
Bondelswarts chief and Raad signed a treaty with the German representative, 
Dr. G . 60 d oen ng , an the German f1 ag was raised at Warmbad. The Bonde 1 swarts 
were the last tribe to sign a treaty with the Germans 61 . 
U~fortunately, as it turned out the German authorities did not keep to 
all their undertakings in the treaty62. 
Meanwhile in 1889 the British Karaskoma Syndicate63 had acquired by 
purchase the whole of the Bondelswarts', Veldschoendragers' and Swart-
modder Hottentots' lands64. This concession was reduced to 12,8000 square 
kilometres by the German authorities however, and certain conditions 
were attached . 
60. Father of the notorious Herman Goering . Levinson" O. The Ageless Land. 
(Cape Town, 1'961). p.69. 
61. Esterhuyse, . p.160. 
62. In terms of the treaty the Bondels' chief undertook to allow German 
subjects unrestricted trade in his territory, and to protect the 
lives and property of German subjects. The German Emperor's juris-
diction over Europeans and disputes between Europeans and blacks was 
acknowledged, and no land or mineral concessions were to be made with 
any other powers or subjects of other powers without the permission of 
the German Government. The Bondel s chi ef had to preserve the peace, 
and had to use the German authorities as mediators in inter-tribal 
disputes. In return, the German lmperor via his representatives, under-
took to protect the Bondels chief and his people, and to recognise 
and support the chief's jurisdiction and control OYer the Bondels people. 
The Emperor also undertook the ensure that Europeans respected the laws, 
customs and usages of the Bondels, and paid the usual taxes. 
Gorges Report, p.32. 
63. See p.35'. 
64. See Map A. 
14. 
But, as Wellington points out: 
"The Syndicate's selection of the best farm land and the 
acquisition of the best watering places was considered one 
of the deepest causes of the Bonde1swarts 0904-6J rebellion" .65 
It was not long before the Bonde1swarts began to feel their loss of inde-
pendence and pride. Abraham Kaffir, a senior member of their Raad, said 
later 
"every German Officer, sargeant and soldier, every policeman and 
every German farmer seemed to be the 'Government'. By this we mean 
that every German seemed able to do towards us just what he p1eased~66 
Shortly before the Bonde1swarts revolted in 1904 the Governor of German 
South West Africa, Major Theodor Leutwein67 , found great difficulty in 
effecting concitiation between Europeans and blacks, and relations between 
the two remained strained68. The Bonde1swarts found themselves ousted 
from their central territori es by a 1 arge number of European farmers 
and bywoners 69. 
The breaking point came on 25 October 1903. The whole of the black 
population of G.S.W. A. was in a state of acute unrest at the time. It 
appears that the Bonde1swarts chief, now Jan Abraham Christian, had taken 
a goat from a passing Herero to use for medicinal purposes. The Herero _. 
complained to the local German Divisional Commander, Lt. Jobst, who sent a 
mes sage demanding redress from the chief . The chief sent 18s . as compen-
sation for the goat in reply, but Lt. Jobst ordered him to come and see 
65 . Wellington, pp.214-215. 
66. Gorges Report, p. 90. 
67. Major Leutwein was Landeshauptmann in G.S . W.A. from 1894-1898, and 
Governor from 1898-1905. B1ey, H., "Social Discord in S.W.A. 1894-
1904" in P. Gifford and W.M. R. Louis (eds.), Britain and Germany in 
Afri ca . (Newhaven. 1967) . p. 607. 
68. Gorges Report, p. 33. 
69. B1ey , H. South-West Africa under -German Rule 1894-1914. Translated 
and ed. by H. Ridley. (London, 1971 ) . p. 133. 
15. 
him personally. Instead, Jan Abraham sent six councillors as his repre-
sentatives, whom Lt. Jobst promptly imprisoned, a breach of faith which 
increased tensions . The chief sent to a~k for their releas/O, pointing 
out that he had given fair compensation and that under clause 4 of the 1890 
treaty with Dr Goering he was entitled to govern in his own area. 
But Lt. Jobst, determined to assert his authority, went with eight to ten 
soldiers to go and arrest the chief, a great indignity for the Bondelswarts. 
·The chief when arrested tried to break loose, and what followed is not quite 
clear. The Germans held that the Bondelswarts opened fire first, while the 
Bondelswarts claimed that Lt. Jobst had fired first and shot and killed the 
chief when the latter tried to break loose71 • The end result was that when 
the firing ceased, Jan Abraham Christian, Lt. Jobst and two other German 
soldiers lay dead, and the Bondelswarts rebellion had begun. The new chief 
was the"weak-minded" Johannes Christian, but the revolt was led by the very 
able and almost legendary Jacob Marengo 72 
Marengo, assisted by the brothers Morris, skilfully pursued guerilla tactics. 
The Bondelswarts were later joined in the revolt by the Witbooi Orlams tribe 73 . 
The German soldi ers, i nexperi enced in guerri lla warfare and the unfami 1 iar 
terrain, and freshly brought in from Germany suffered heavy losses. 
70. Gorges Report, p.92 . 
7l. Gorges Report, p.92. 
Bley, German Rule, p.144. 
72. Gorges Report, pp.93-4. 
73 . N.A.C. Report, pp.2-3, para. 12. 
16. 
Col. Pri nslo074 later said that: 
"in those most inaccessible desert mountains there are places 
where there is one big grave, wherein there are buried whole 
German sguadrons, annihilated after having been ambushed by the 
Bondels~'75. . 
However, in the end the superior weaponry, equipment and numbers of the 
German soldiers proved decisive. Johannes Christian wanted peace, and in 
January 1904 Leutwein offered it76 . Joahnnes handed over 289 rifles at 
Kalkfontein-South 77. There were Bondelswarts diehards who did not want 
peace, amongst them Marengo and his adjudant, Abraham Morris, and they 
took refuge in the Orange river mountains to regroup78. 
In July 1904 Marengo and Morris came out of hiding and started the rebellion 
.again. It dragged on for two more years79 
In the gorges of the Fish and Orange rivers Johannes Christian held out 
until October 1906, when he made overtures for peace80 
74. See p.q .. ff. 
75. Central Archives. File No. A106. (Retro-active). "Mr Barlow, Anti-
Slavery Society Comments by Col. Prinsloo." (8ereafter referred to 
as C.A.File A106(Retro-active)]. Col. Prinsloo's obituary for 
Judge "Toon" van der Heever. p.2. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
78. 
79. 
Gorges Report, p.94. 
lbid. p.94 
(Kalkfontein-South is today known as Karasberg). 
Gorges Report, p.94. 
ibid. p.96 
80. Wellington, p.2ll. 
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Marengo, Morris and some other Bondelswarts, together with Simon Kooper 
and some of his followers, fled into the Union81 . Among them was a member 
of the Bondelswarts royal family and a potential heir to the chieftainship, 
Jacobus Christian. They refused to return to G.S.W.A. even though the 
Germans offered them amnesty82.An informant, Isaak Witbooi, claims that 
they did not want to return because they refused to surrender and make 
peace with the Germans83. In 190B Marengo was shot by the Cape police 
while refusing to surrender to themB4. The Bondelswarts in exile, about 
600 of them, were ill and weak after years of hardship in the field, and 
so they were sent to the Matjieskloof Roman Catholic Mission for medical 
attention, and here they were all converted to Catholicism, ending the 
supremacy of the Rhenish missionaries among the BondelswartsB5 • The exiles 
in the Uni on found work on the copper-mines and European farms in Little 
Namaqualand, and some found work at the fisheries in Port No llotb . The 
Germans therefore outlawed their leader, Morris, and placed a price on his 
headB6 
Bl. Gorges Report, p.96. 
82. N.A.C. Report, p.3, para. 12 . 
83. Interview with Izaak Witbooi at Warmbad, S.W.A. ,20 July 1977. 
(See appendix A.) 
84. Gorges Report, p.96. 
85. ~'ishop Simon, p.201. 
86. N.A.C. Report, p.3, para. 12. 
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The peace treaty was signed on 21 December 190687 • Fr.Ma1inowsky of the 
Roman Catholic mission at Heirachabis played a major role in conducting the 
peace negotiations88. The treaty was signed at Ukamas with Johannes 
Christian representing the Bonde1swarts. The terms of the treaty confined 
the Bonde1swarts to a Reserve of 175,000 hectares89 , as compared with 
their former territory of 40,OOOsq. km. 90 . The boundaries were fixed by 
a commission of three German officials and three .Bonde1swarts representatives, 
and were drawn upon a sketch map91 The Bonde1swarts were prohibited from 
selling or leasing any part of their Reserve, and were placed under German 
1aw92 . The.v promised to be faithful and obedient subjects of the German 
Government, and surrendered all their arms and ammunition, which, from hence-
forth they would not be allowed to possess. They now had to carry passes to 
leave their Reserve93 . They were also given 1,500 goats, ten for each head 
of a family, and while these could not be sold or slaughtered, their offspring 
would become Bonde1swarts property. The under-captains' got 300 sheep, and 
Johannes Christian was given a span of oxen and an ox-wagon, which was to be 
87. Wellington, p.211. 
88. Bishop Simon, pp.171 ff. 
89. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence.MS 14787/A/(i),p.240. 
Oet. Sgt. Charles Christian Pietersen, S.W.A. C.LO . , gave a copy 
of the 1906 treaty to the N.A.C. He had also taken statements and 
formulated evidence to prosecute Bonde1swarts rebels after the1922 
revolt, and made a synopsis of these for the N.A.C. See p.d-d.7. 
90. Wellington, p.214. 
91. N.A. C. Report, p.8 . , para. 28. 
92. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence, p.240. Oet. Sgt. C.C. Pietersen , 
93. ibid. p.240. 
19. 
paid off gradually. Rations were supplied until the Bondelswarts were 
self-sufficient again94. 
These terms were, on the whole remarkably humane, and sensible in the 
safeguards against Bondelswarts profligacy. Leutwein came under much 
criticism from the German settlers for his enlightened handling of the 
1906 Bondelswarts treaty . But he hoped to induce the Bondelswarts in exile 
to return, and he wished for a speedy end to hostilities in the south so 
that he could concentrate on the far more serious threat of the Herero 
rebellion in the north95 . 
The boundari es of the Reserve were set out in a separate treaty on 27 March 
1907. Beacons .1-9 were stone beacons, and 10-11 were recognizable trees. 
Non-Bondelswarts travelling through the Reserve would be subject to the 
laws within the Reserve 96 . . Another treaty of 2 May 1907 divided the town 
of Warmbad into white and Bondelswarts areas, with the river-bed as the 
dividing line97 , as is still the case today. 
But the Bondelswarts' spirit was by no means broken. Form 1906 onwards 
they were determined to regain their former tribal status98 , and many 
of them hi d thei r rifl es ins tead of handi ng them over99. and kept in 
94. ibid.p.240. 
95. ·Goldblatt, 1. History of SouthWest Africa from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. (Cape Town, 1971 ). p.143. 
96 . 
97. 
98. 
99. 
R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.243. Det.Sgt. Pietersen. 
ibid. p.244. 
N.A.C. Report, p.14,para.55a. 
R.P.N .A.C . Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.534. Lt. Edgar John Brinton, 
sub-inspector of S.A. Police in Little Namaqualand. 
20. 
Constant touch with their leaders lOO . 
German rule became increasingly oppressive. The economic independence 
of the black peoples was broken forever. Every black had to register 
himself at the nearest police station, whereupon the police would select 
an employer for them and fix thei r wages lOl . According to a local 
farmer who had been in the G.S.WA. police for three years, all blacks 
with less that 125 goats and 10 cattle had to find employmentl02 • The 
Bondelswarts were put under a Native Commissionerl03 , but if an employer 
wanted his employee punished, he could send him to the nearest police 
station with a note. Since the police were legally empowered to administer 
floggings without recourse to a court of law, abuses were inevitable 104. 
Another local farmer was to tell the N.A.C. in 1922 that the Bondelswarts 
had "undoubted ly" suffered i ll-trea tment at the hands of the German pol i ce 105. 
-lOO. Transvaal Archives. Department of Justice. Vol.106. File No.2/1221/11. 
"Unsett l ed conditions in southern portion of G.S. W.A." (!lereafter refer-
red to as T.A. Dept. Justice. Vol.106.File2/1221/11] Secretary for the 
Interior to Secretary for Justice, Cape Town. 4 Feb. 1913. 
101. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.7. Major John Frederick 
Herbst, Secretary for the S.W.A. Protectorate from Dec . 1916. 
102. ibid. p.342. Frederick van Reenen Coetzee, farmer on farm "Waterval" 
in Warmbad district since 1917. 
103. ibid. p.502. Charles We idner, farmer and trader at Goodhouse. 
104. ibid. p.283. Major Herbst. 
105. ibid. p.502. C. Weidner. 
21. 
A law promulgated in 1907 forbade blacks in German S. W. A.to own either 
large stock or riding animals,for economic and strategic reasons, although 
this was later relaxed and then rescinded l06 . On 23 February 1907 a 
dog tax of 30 marks or fl. lOs was levied, in urban areas only, on each 
dog, plus a further lOs on each additional dOg l07 . Under a law of 
15 February 1909, amended on 4 October 1910, the trapping of animals was 
prohibited, and blacks were only allowed to shoot game within their reserves 
and had to have a permit for shot-guns l08 
There were some mitigating factors for the German presence. There was little 
malnutrition amongst the Bondelswarts l09 , because of the present of large 
military garrisons, which provided alternative employment and which gave 
pauper rations on the same scale as those issued to German soldiers llO . 
But, master - servant relations were generally poor, and there were cases 
of appalling abuses inflicting on blacks lll , which was inevitable in view 
106. Gorges Report, p. l11 . 
.107. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. EX.l.p.10. "Memorandum on 
Native Affairs in the Protectorate of S.W.A.". 1916. (Serial No. 5099-
14/18/16 -450) ffiereafter referred to as N.A.M]. 
108. ibid. p.10. 
109. R.P.N.A.C . Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.316 . Colonel Matthys Johan 
de Jager. He was on the Union Permanent Staff when the First Work War 
broke out. Until 1919 he was the officer commanding the S.W.A. Police . 
He retired and became chairman of the S.W.A. Land ·Board. He was al so 
chairman of the central executive of the "Zuid-Hest Afrika Vereeniging " , 
a society which claimed to be. non-party and which aimed to promote 
German-Afrikaner cooperation in S.W.A. after the First World War. 
See be low p. 1'lI4· 
110. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Drafts. Draft C. (General Lemmer's Draft). p.5. 
111. Gorges Report. pass im. 
22. 
of the wide powers of both police and settlers, and an unsympathetic 
legal system. 
Finally, although the whole system of administration lent itself towards 
abuses of power of the worst kind, resulting in a legacy of embittered 
race -relations, the accusations of dtrocities levelled at the German 
Government after the First World War were often greatly exaggerated for 
propaganda purposesl1 2 
With the outbreak of the First World War and the invasion of German South 
West Africa by the Union, the Bondel swarts , hopes for a restoration of their 
tribal status and lands soared, as they remembered the "golden days" of their 
alliance with the Cape Government. 
112. A good example of this is the Union's Gorges Report. 
- - - 000 
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CHAPTER 2. 
UNION RULE AND BONDELSWARTS DISILLUSIONMENT 
The Bonde1swarts held great hopes for the redress of their grievances and 
the end of German rule with the outbreak of the First World War and the 
Union invasion of German South West Africa on 14 September 1914. The 
long-awaited British rule seemed to be within sight, and some Bonde1swarts 
in exile, notably Abraham Morris, took service with the Union forces as 
guides or scouts 1. Morris acquitted himself very well, and was mentioned 
in dispatches and admired for his shrewdness in matters mi1itary2. 
But for those Bonde1swarts still living in G.S.W.A. the war was economically 
disastrous . As the Germans retreated northwards they took most of the 
Bonde1swarts tribe and some other blacks with them, and when the Germans 
surrendered in the north3 about 2,000 Bonde1swarts were found camped twenty-
five miles outside .0tav;4. Wi11em Christian, a grandson of the old Bonde1-
swarts chief, said later that: 
"When the war broke out in 1914 the Germans did not trust us. 
They thought we would rise and help the English. So they collec-
ted our tribe and sent us to Tsumeb in the extreme north of this 
country" 5. 
Thus the Union military administration was left with the problem of 
1. N.A.C. Report, p.3. para . 12. 
2. Trew, Lt. Col. H.F.Botha Treks. (Glasgow, 1936). pp.15-16 
3. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex.1. p.5. N.A.M. 
See also R.P.N.A.C. Report Minutes of Evidence. p.90. Major 
Charles Nicholas Manning. (Major Manning was appointed Resident 
Commissioner of Ovambo1and in October 1915, after being officer 
in charge of Native Affairs at Okahandja and Windhoek from 7 May 1915. 
In January 1921 he was appointed Commissioner for Native Affairs for 
the Protectorate of S.W.A., and was also a member of the Administrators' 
Advi sory Board.) 
4. W.A. Administrators' Department. Vol. 50. "Correspondence 1915-1920". 
Files 592/7 - 599/-. File No. 599. Part 1 - Bondelswarts Settlements -
Administration of. (8ereafter referred to as W.A. Actm. Vol.5D. File 59~. 
Extract from Minute from DrJorison at Omaruru . .l3 July 1925. 
5. Gorges Report, p.llS. 
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resettling them6. This was eventually done in August 19157, and a Native 
Affairs Officer was appointed at Ka1kfontein-South to supervise the resett1e-
. ment, issue rations and control the finances provided by the sale of 
Bonde1swarts stock at Tsumeb by the Union military authorities8. Wi11em 
Christian echoed the Bonde1swarts' feelings when he said: 
"We lost all our small stock, and when the British troops released 
us at Tsumeb, we had again been reduced to poverty. The British 
government sent us back to our place at Warmbad and had to feed us 
to keep us alive. The British government collected some stock for 
us and distributed it, but we had not yet recovered half of what we 
originally possessed in 1914. We cannot say what the Germans did 
with our stock"9. 
Wi11em's last remarks about compensation reveal the roots of the first 
disillusionment of the Bonde1swarts after the First World War. What com-
pensation there was was to be insufficient in their eyes, and bureaucratic 
tardiness in implementing it greatly increased their bitterness . Life under 
Union rule was not as rosy as had been expected. 
Before they were sent back to Warmbad the Bonde1swarts asked the military 
authorities to sell the 400 cattle which they had had in their possession 
at Tsumeb, and to transmit the proceeds to Warmbad10 
The cattle had been given to the Bonde1swarts to provide milk for rations 11 , 
as they had lost most of their stock in the enforced trek to the · north12 . 
6. R.P.N .A.C. Report . Minutes of Evidence. p.90 . Major Manning. 
7. W.A. Adm. Vol. 50 . File 599. The Bondelswarts were sent straight to 
Warmbad instead of via Usakos as other blacks were. Telegram from 
Capt. Liefeldt, Acting Native Commissioner to Windhoek. 24 August.1915. 
8. R. P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.9l. Major Manni.ng. 
9. Gorges Report, p.118. 
10. W.A. Adm. Vol. 50 . File 599. Telegram from Maj. Leisk at Dtavi to 
Maj . Pritcharil at Windhoek. 21 July 1915. 
11. W.A . Adm. Vol. 50. File 599. Telegram Captain Leife1dt at Tsumeb. 
24 July 1915 . 
12. ibid. RT. 192/15. Report of Lt. Kendrick, OIC Native Affairs Department 
Keetmanshoop, after visit to Warmbad sent to Native Commissioner, 
Windhoek. 22 September 1915. 
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The Bonde1swarts requested that the proceeds of the sale of the stock 
be returned to them in cattle, not cash, at Warmbad13 . 
The Bonde1swarts stock losses were estimated at about 15,227 head of 
small stock (sheep and goats), and about 123 cattle, the latter being 
few in number largely because of the German law prohibiting blacks from 
owning stock without a permit from the Governor14• 
The sale of the Tsumeb stock realized £2,00015 . From this sum £300 was 
deducted when it was found that some of the cattle had been requisitioned 
from a farmer, Roeder, and this money was paid to him as compensation. It 
was decided by. the authorities that the remaining £1,700 was to be used to 
buy small stock, not cattle as the Bonde1swarts had requested, to provide 
them with a 1ivelihood 6 In addition, the cost of rations issued to 
indigent Bonde1swarts in Warmbad after the issuing of ra t ions' had 
been stopped was deducted from the £1,700. 
Eventually, almost a year after the sale of the stock at Tsumeb, the 
military magistrate at Warmbad reported that, in accordance with instruc-
tions, on 16 August 1916, 2,960 goats had been divided amongst 333 Bonde1-
swarts, each getting his share in the presence of two witnesses with a receipt 
signed by them17. 
The effects of this were 10ng-1asting18 . The Native Commissioner for S . ~~ .A . 
13. ibid . Telegram from Lt. Kendrick, Kalkfontein-South, to Native Com-
missioner, 18 Sept. 1915, Windhoek. 
14. ibid. Military magistrate, Warmbad, to Secretary for S.W.A. Protec-
torate, 24 June 1916. See alsop.:;)./. 
15. ibid. Military magistrate to Secretary for the Protectorate. 27 Marc~ 191f 
16 . ibid. Deputy Secretary for Protectorate to Military magistrate, Warm-
bad. 19 July, 1916. 
17. ibid . Military magistrate, Warmbad, to Secretary for Protectorate. 
No . 2/35/16 . 
18. For full account of the bureaucratic b1underings involved in this 
affair, see Section 2. pp .14'i: -1$"0. 
26. 
Maj or Manni ng, after a vi s it to the Bonde 1 swarts Reserve in 1921, found 
widespread. poverty amongst them. He attribut~d part of the cause of this 
poverty as bein9 due to the fact that the Bondelswarts had lost "most of 
their stock as a result of the war,,19. 
For a while the resettled Bondelswarts were given ratio~s20. But even in 
August 1915 the Native Conunissioner there reported a shortage of and 
difficulty in distributing rations, and only indigent Bondelswarts received 
free rations 21 . In 1921, Father Isenring of the Roman Catholic Mission 
at Gabis informed Major Manning that some Bondelswarts were badly in need 
of pauper relief22 . 
During the period of German rule the Bondelswarts in exile in the Union 
had kept in close touch with their compatriots across the Orange River. 
In 1913, for instance, the German Consul-General visited the Union minister 
for the Interior and asked him to control the contacts and movements of 
the Union Nama people along the Orange River with those across the river23 
19. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An.l. "Report of the 
Administrator on the Bondelzwarts Rising". (UG 30-'22). ffiereafter 
referred to as the A.R.B~ p.8 . Report of Major Manning, 1921. 
20. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.24. Det.-Sgt. Pietersen . 
21. W.A. Adm. Vol. 50. File 599. Captain Manning, Acting Native Conunissioner, 
to Keetmanshoop Native Commissioner, Lt. Kendrick. 
22. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. AN.l. A.R.B.p.7. Major 
Manning's Report on Bondelswarts unrest, 1921. 
In December 1915 rations were issued on the scale of seven pounds of 
mealiemeal and one pound of meat per adult per week, half this for 
children. W.A. Adm. Vol. 50. File 599. Native Affairs Department, 
Keetmanshoop, to Native Conunissioner, Windhoek. 14 December 1915 . 
By 1917 this had been altered to three pounds of mealie-meal per adult 
per week but with no meat ration at all. R.P.N.A .C. Report . Exhibitions 
and Annexures. Ex . 2 p.3 . Report from Magistrates office, Windhoek, to 
Secretary for Protectorate, dated 6 March 1917, re: reorted Bondel-
swartz unrest. erea ter .referre to as t e Ea ie repor 
23. T.A. Department Justice. Vol. 106 . File 2/1221/11. Secretary for the 
Interior, Cape Town, to Secretary for Justice, Cape Town. 4 Feb. 1913 . 
27. 
The magistrate at Springbok had, however, written to the Chief Commissioner 
of the South African Police in February 1913 pointing out that there were 
many Nama refugees from G.S.W.A. in his district who kept in touch across 
the river, and that interchange between the two groups was inevitable and 
unavoidable, "especially as the natives on both sides of the river @fteti) 
belong to the same families,,24. 
The Bondelswarts wanted to reconstitute their old captaincy system once 
German rule had gone. In 1917 the Warmbad military magistrate reported that 
they were asking for the appointment of a Captain25 . He said that the 
Bondelswarts felt that if the Government did not do something about this 
it would imply a non-recognition ' of the Bondelswarts' tribal status and 
a lack of interest in their affairs 26 . The strength of the Bondelswarts' 
desire for a Captain is reflected by the suggestion from the Warmbad military 
magistrate to the Secretary of the Protectorate that 
"if the native know that they cannot have a Captain unless they 
remove to the reserve they will readily change their residence 
in spite of any sacrifice they may have to make"27. 
Many ,Bondelswarts had long wanted the member of the royal family in exile 
in the Union, Jacobus Christian, to be allowed to return to S.W.A . and to be 
officially recognised by the Government as the Bondelswarts' Captain. As 
soonas the Germans were defeated the Bondelswarts made representations on 
behalf of Jacobus Christian to this effect. These were refused, because, 
24. ibid . Springbok magistrate, Mr D.C. Giddy, to Chief Commissioner, 
South African Police, Cape Town . 28 February. 1913. 
25. W.A. Adm. Dept. Vol. 51. 1915-1920. Files 599/1-624/2. File 599/2. 
Administration of Bondelzwarts tribe. (Bereafter referred to as 
w. A. Adm. Vol. 51 Flle 599!fJ. Bondelswarts deputation to Hajor 
J . F. Herbst, Secretary for the S.W.A. Protectorate. 
26. ibid . Military magistrate, Warmbad, to Secretary for the Protectorate. 
11 Jan. 1918. 
27. ibid. Military magistrate, Warmbad to Secretary for the Protectorate. 
21 March 1918. 
28. 
according to Major Herbst, (the Secretary for the Protectorate), of uncer-
28 tainty over the future status of S. W.A. . As a result, in 1916 Adam 
Christian, (alias Pienaar), a Bondelswart led agitation for the instalment 
of Jacobus Christian as the Bondelswarts' captain 29 • 
The military magistrate of Warmbad, Capt. Wentzel, reported in February, 
1919 that the Bondelswarts elders wanted Jacobus to be captain, because "Hij 
was met ons as een leider in die Hottentots Oorlog" 0904-0.30 
In 1918 the Bondelswarts were allowed to have a Captain, but the Government 
appointed Willem Christian. .He was the son Qf Johannes Christian, 
who had been the captain from 1903 to 1910. But Willem died in December 
1919 31, leaving two adult claimants in the royal family for the Captaincy. 
One, JacobusChristian, was still in exile, and the other claimant, Willem 
Christian, the son of the Captain whose death had sparked off the 1905-6 
b 11 ' J Ab h C h . t' 1 d d d . t 32 J b C h . t' re e lon, an ra am rls lan, was 0 an ecrepl. aco us rls lan 
was the eldest son of the second wife of the famous Captain Willem Christian 
who had died in 189633 . The appointment of Captain Willem Christian, who 
died in 1919, had not satisfied the Bondelswarts' aspirations, since, as 
the local military magistrate privately pointed out, Willem had been 
"a harmless idiot who was incapable of influencing his people 
in any way or even showing any interest in them"34. 
28. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.12. Major Herbst. 
29. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 2. Eadie Report. 
p.5. 6 March 1917. 
30. W.A. Adm. Vol. 51. File 599/2. Copy of Report from Lt . H. van der 
Made, O/C Det. 1st. M.C., Police district No. 18a from Keetmans-
hoop to Adjudant, Lt. Regt. M.C., Keetmanshoop. 23 Feb. 1919. 
31. N.A.C. Report, p.5, para 18. 
32. W.A. Adm. Vol. 51. File 599/2. Military magistrate, Warmbad, to 
Secretary for the Protectorate. 11 Jan. 1918. 
33. See appendix.C. 
34. W.A. Adm. Vol. 51. File 599/2. Military magistrate to Secretary for 
Protectorate. 3 Dec. 1918. 
The s itua ti on became tenser with the arri va 1 of Jacobus Chri st ian and hi s 
followers in S.W.A. in 1919. Jacobus had made repeated applications to be 
allowed to return, but all were refused. Thus in July 1919 he left the 
Cape Provi nce and entered S. W. A. wi th about 50 fo 11 owers, sayi ng that he 
was entitled to return now that peace had been signed35. He also told the 
N.A.C. that they had returned because there was no work available in the 
Union, and that the Port Nolloth magistrate, Mr Taylor, had told him that 
he could cross into S.W.A. 36 : 
The copper mines in the Union in Little Namaqualand, where many Bondelswarts 
exiles had found work, were going through an economic recession at the 
time. The Namaqua Copper Company closed down in May 1918, followed by the 
Cape Copper Company in April 1919 . The latter dismissed about 1,000 workers, 
although it reopened operations on a. small scale in 192037 . 
Trooper A.A. Roux was sta ti oned a lone at Ha i b when the ·r eturni ng Bonde 1 swarts 
arrived in August 1919. The thirsty cattle came to drink at the waterhole 
there first, and Roux noticed that the packs on their backs were tied on 
with fresh Gemsbok reins. Roux caught the cattle and held them, until two 
Bondelswarts came to claim them . Roux alleged that they told him that the 
police had no right to hold Bondelswarts cattle on Bondel swarts ground, and 
had no authority over the Bondelswarts people there, and so Roux arrested 
them and sent for their officers. When these did not appear he watered 
35. 
36. 
37. 
N.A. C. Report, p.5, para . 19. 
R. P. N.A . C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . p.455. Jacobus Christian. 
Smalberger, J.M. · As~ects of the history of C6Herrilining ·in 
Namaqua 1 and. 1846- I 3 I . . (Cape Town, 19 75) . p. 2. 
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the cattle and released the men. Later -more Bondelswarts arrived for 
water, and he again arrested them and sent for their leaders, to no avail. 
The next day Trooper Roux and a Native Constable rode to where Jacobus and 
his men were camped and asked him to collect his men in order that their 
names might be taken and their numbers counted. According to Roux Jacobus 
refused, saying that the police had "nothing to do or say on his ground", 
- 38 
and so Roux was only able to get the names of six of those who had crossed . 
Roux reported the incident to Lt. Jordaan at -Warmbad, saying that Jacobus 
Christian had crossed with 300 armed followers and that they had refused 
to hand over any permits they might have had. Lt. Jordaan informed his 
headquarters at Keetman~hoopand was instructed by Capt. Hofman to go to 
Haib with fourteen police and ask Jacobus if he had an entry permit. 
In addition, Lt. Jordaan received a telegram from Mr Taylor to the effect 
that amongst Jacobus's followers were four Bondelswarts for whom he had 
warrants of arrest on charges of stock theft39 
On recei ving the ne,fS Lt. Jordaan posted pi ckets around l'Jarmbad and on tne 
Haib ana f<amansarift roads to forestall any attempted attack, and on Tuesday, 
S August he went with three N.C.O's, and eleven men- to Haib. On the following 
day they reached Jacobus's camp. According to Lt. Jordaan, he had orderea his 
men not to excite the Bo~delswarts, but on their arrival some armed ~ondelswarts 
r an _ ana took cover. 
Lt. Jordaan went to meet Jacobus, and told him why he had come. The police 
were surrounded by armed Bondelswarts aiming rifles at them, and they refused 
3B. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An 12. Correspondence re : 
entering Protectorate by Christian and others (hereafter referred to 
as An 13). Statement by trooper A.A. Raux. The names he got were those 
of Jacobus Christian, Jacobus Christian junior (the Captain's nephew), 
Frederik Joseph, Jan Hendrik, Dirk Willems and David Christian. 
39 . R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . pp.608-609. Lt. M.J. Jordaan. 
, , 
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to come out of the bush even when ,Jacobus himself called them. After a 
while most came out, and they told Lt. Jordaan that they had returned from 
the Union, but had no permits for either themselves or their stock to enter 
S.W. A., since they were returning to their own land and the war was over. 
When Lt. Jordaan told Jacobus that they had broken the law by doing this, 
the Bondelswarts again took : cover. Lt . Jordaan asked Jacobus to accompany 
him to Warmbad, but the latter refused, saying that he was ill, and offered 
to send some of his ,headmen instead . 
Lt. Jordaan then left with his men and went to Haib and waited, Four headmen 
were sent to Warmbad by Jacobus, namely Jan Hendriks, David Frederick, Jan 
Christian and Dirk Willems. When they reached Haib Lt. Jordaan, in an inex-
cusable breach of faith, promptly arrested, imprisoned and charged them, and 
sent out a message for Jacobus to come to Haib. Not surprisingly, Jacobus 
refused either to come or to hand over the Bondelswarts' arms and ammunition, 
although he said he would go to Warmbad himself40 . 
On heari.ng of the arrest of the four headmen the Admi nistrator immediately 
ordered their release41 . But the damage was done. Lt . Jordaan reported that 
Jacobus had crossed into S.W.A. with sixt~ men, seventy to eighty women and 
children, 1,400 sheep and goats, a hundred cattle, and eight donkeys and two 
horses. 42 
In addition to the tharges of illegally entering S.W.A. with stock and firearms, 
Mr C.J. Viljoen, a local farmer, charged the Bondelswarts with trespassing on 
his farm while on their way to the Reserve, and said that they had been shooting 
game. 43 
40. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An. 12. pp.7-9. Lt. Jordaa n 
to Acting mi litary magistrate, Warmbad . Report on "Native Unrest~ 
8 Aug. 1919. 
41. N.A.C. Report, p.5, para. 20. 
42. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An.12 . pp.7-9. Lt . Jordaan to 
Acting military magistrate, Warmbad. Report on "Native Unrest". 8 Aug. 1919. 
43. ibid. An. 12. p. 5. Evidence of J.J. Rocher. 
See alsopso. 
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Special Commissioner Drew went to investigate the- inci.dent. 
He met Jacobus and his followers, describing some of them later as being 
old and decrepit. Jacobus hantleC; over -ni roe fi ream,s anci some ammuni t i on, 
and Drewi nformed ther:i of the charges agains tthem : Jacobus repli eo that 
that they did not want trouble and had merely wanted to return to their 
home and live peacefully. He said most of them had been working for the 
Cape Copper Company at O'okiep and Nababeep, or on the railway at Port 
No 11 c:ith whi ch carri ed the copper ore, and that when these had closed the 
Bondeiswarts were left "destitute". He claimed that Mr Taylor, the 
magistrate, had given them the option of going by sea to Cape Town to get 
work or leaving Port Nolloth within twenty four hours to find work. Taylor 
had refused to give them permist to enter S.W.A. and had stopped their ration 
supply. The Bondelswarts had decided that as it was peacetime they could 
return to their own country. 
As for trespassing on Mr Viljoen's farm, Jacobus said he had asked the 
farmer's permission to water stock there, and that while they were there 
Viljoen had made no complaints or demands for compensation to him. After 
four days without water the Bondelswarts cattle had stampeded to the Haib 
police-post waterhole, reaching it before Jacobus's two messengers could 
arrive to inform the police of the Bondelswarts' arrival. Jacobus denied 
that the messengers were insolent, and took "strong exception" to Trooper 
Roux denying the cattle access to water. 
Three days later, said Jacobus, the Bondelswarts were "suddenly confronted" 
by a body of police with fixed bayonets. Some of his people took fright 
and fled, covering the police with their rifles since they thought they were 
going to be attacked. Jacobus said he had refused to surrender his firearms 
and go with Lt . Jordaan to Warmbad because he did not trust him. Instead, he 
had written a letter to the Warmbad magistrate, and had given it to the four 
33. 
headmen who had been arrested and imprisoned44 
In the letter, Jacobus stressed that the Bonde1swarts came in peace and had 
made no secret of their arrival. He was angry that .Roux had refused them 
water ~ breaking an unwritten law of that dry area 45 . 
Drew in his report said that he felt the Bonde1swarts had come in peace and 
strongly condemned the action of the police, feeling that they had been 
"entirely misled" by Trooper Roux and Mr Vi1joen' s messenger, J.J. Rocher . 
The matter was not a police affair, ' Drew said, and the magistrate had not 
even been consulted . Lt. Jordaan's action in arresting the four headmen 
was an "unwarrantable breach of faith" and Taylor had shown "apparent 
apathy" in not communicating the Bonde1swarts desire to return to the 
S. W.A. Administrator. He recommended that the Bondelswarts should not be 
prosecuted, or if they were they should only get a light penalty for 
bringing in firearms 46 . 
Christian'~ arrival in the Reserve caused much European panic in Warmbad, 
with exaggerated reports of an impendi ng large-scale invasion of the town47 . 
Jacobus Christian surrendered himself to the Warmbad magistrate, and was 
given a suspended sentence of a fine of £100 and 12 months imprisonment for 
illegal entry into S. W. A., for possessing r i fles without permits, and for 
bringing in stock without permits. The Bonde1swarts who had crossed with Ja-
cobus were allowed to stay because ' the Uni on r ef used to a 11 ow thei r st ock 
.' 48 
t ·o r,ecross the Orange Ri ver, for fear of spreading s tock dlseases. In addition 
Jacobus had to promise not to intefere with the administration of the tribe 
or the Captaincy di spute, 
44. R.P.N.A. C. Report . Exhibitions and Annexures . An 12. p. 17. Special 
Commissioner Drew at Warmbad to Secretary for Protectorate. 16 Aug.1919. 
45. ibid. Jacobus Christian to Warmbad magistrate from Haib. 8 Aug. 1919. 
46. R. P. N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An12. p.17. Special Commis-
sioner Drew, Warmbad, to Secretary for Protectorate. 16 Aug . 1919. 
47 . N. A.C. Report, p.5., para 20. See a1sop,I'I:I.. 
48. ibid. p.6, para 21. 
34. 
and all firearms had to be surrendered49 • 
After Willem Christian's death in 1919, Hendrik Schneeuwe was appointed the 
Bondelswarts Captain50 . However, he was deposed by the tribe on 11 March 
1920 for having "defalcated tribal moneys", and Timotheus Beukes was 
appointed in his place 51 . Beukes in turn resigned in April 1921, leaving 
the Bondelswarts without an officially recognised Captain 52 But, as Major 
Manning pointed out . in 1921 : 
"Although we gave no recognition to Jacobus Christian as a chief 
and he did not assert this, there was no doubt that all the people, 
including a sprinkling of other nationalities amongst what was after 
a small gathering of people (scarcely 50 men) regard him as hereditary 
and actual foreman and spokesman"53. 
The Government remained inflexible despite continual Bondelswarts peti-
ti ons for Jacobus to be made Capta in from the moment he arri ved in 1919 54 . 
It was a bitter pill for the Bondelswarts tribe to swallow. 
Jacobus Christian's return was followed by a constant trickle of Bondels-
warts exiles returning to their traditional lands. Some came in legally, as 
when in October 1921 sixty eight men arid eighty-four women with a large 
number of small stock were allowed in from Kakamas in the Union with per-
mission from F.S. Malan, the acting Prime Minister at the time55 . Others 
came in illegally and in 1920 there were fifty cases of Namas crossing the 
49. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.13. Major Herbst on A.R.B. 
50. N.A.C . Report, p.5, para. 18. 
51 . R.P.N.A.C. Report .. Minutes of Evidence. p.227. Det. Sgt. Pietersen 
presents evid·ence of Sgt. Naude. 
52. ibid. p.20. Major Herbst. 
53. Iv.A . Adm. File A388/1. liondelswarts r ebe llion, General Part. CBereafter 
referred to as Iv.A .. Adm. File A388/ D.p.6. Report of Major t·lanning to 
Secretary for Protectorate re: . Bondelswarts unrest due to dog tax. 
29 t1ay 1921. 
54. R.P . N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.227. Det . Sgt. Pietersen 
presents evi dence of Sgt. Naude. 
55 . ibid. p.17. Major Herbst on A.R.B. 
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Orange River without permits 56 • and others may have got through without 
being noticed 57. The Secretary for the Protectorate had no objection to 
their returning as long as their stock was disease-free and they accepted 
that they had to comply with the labour regulations 58 . In 1921 a procla-
mation was made in S.W.A. to the effect that no black could enter the terri-
tory except to take up employment59 . 
~~e of the Bondelswarts' greatest hopes for British rule had been that their 
traditional tribal lands would be returned to them. There were sorely 
disappointed when their hopes failed to materialize60 . , 
Nuch of the Bondel swarts , land had been obtained under concession by the 
British Karaskoma Company6l. The syndicate had been allowed 128 farms of 
10.000 Cape morgen each by the German authorities. on condition they built 
a railway line to Angra Pequena. If this was done. after five years they 
would be given another 128 farms of the same size. and after fifteen years 
another 256 farms. In September 1895 the rights of the British Karaskama 
Company were transferred to the S.A. Territories Company62. The new Company 
got the mineral rights on Bondelswarts land until 1917. and the right to 
pick out 150 farms against a payment of £50 p.a. to the Bondelswarts tribe. 
In 1910 the German Governmentlaid claim to this money. but the German courts 
56. ibid . p.8l9. Sgt. Johannes Wichardt Naude. S.W.A. Police. Warmbad. 
57. An informant. Isaak Witbooi. said that many Bondelswarts exiles came 
across to S. W.A. following their Captain. Jacobus Christian. Inter-
view with Isaak Witbooi at Warmbad on 20 July 1977. See Appendixl\ . 
58. W.A. Adm. Vol. 51. File 599/2. Secretary for Protectorate to military 
magistrate. Warmbad. 13 July 1918. See p.lj.O. 
59. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.50. Major Herbst. 
60. ibid. p.307. Col. de Jager. 
61. See p-I?> , 
62. Goldblatt. pp . 117-118. 
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decided in favour of the Bondelswarts63 . S.A. , Territories Ltd. promptly 
stopped paying the Bondelswarts their yearly instalments. In addition, 
a Keetmanshoop farm, "Daheb", had been sold by the Bondelswarts to a 
Mr Smit, but the purchase price was confiscated by the Germans in 1906. 
In a petition to General Smuts in April 1920 the Bondelswarts asked, 
unsuccessfully, for payment for this farm64. 
Not only did the Bondelswarts not receive their lands back when the Union 
took over, but the Land Settlement Act of 1912, amended in 1917 and 1920 
was extended to S.W.A. by a proclamation in 1920. This Act extended a 
system of government loans controlled by a land board which enabled white 
settlers to obtain farms with very little capital, encouraging white settle-
65 ment in S.W.A. . 
In 1920 a Land Board was set up in S.W.A. in accordance with the Act, 
with four members and a chairman. The southern areas of S. W.A. were 
surveyed and in 1920 "some 80 farms" in the Warmtiad and Keetmanshoop 
districts were advertised. 
63. W.A. Adm. Vol. 106. "Correspondence 1915-1920': Files 3343/- to 
3360/-. File 3353. Hottentots: Bondelzwarts. Re orted 
Qlereafter referred to as W.A. m. Vo. 06. File 335 
magistrate to Secretary for S.W.A . 13 Sept. 1920. 
64. ibid. Warmbad magistrate to Secretary for S.W.A .. 14 April 1920. 
65. Land Settlement Act, No. 12 of 1912 from Statutes of the Union of 
South Africa . 4/2. (Cape Town, 1915). pp. 150 ff . 
Land Settlement Amendment Act of 1917. 4/7. 1920. 
Proclamation No. 14 of 1920 . 3/2. From Official Gazette of the 
Protectorate of S. W.A. No. 29. 5 March 1920. 
37. 
Wellington says: 
"With the almost irrrnediate allotment of these fanns a new period 
of land settlement was inaugurated. By the end of 1923 there had 
been a total of 730 allotments of land in S.W.A., covering a total 
area of 5 million hectares~66. 
The Bondelswarts watched their tribal lands irrevocably ·being divided up 
and settled by whites on an unprecedented scale. And as the pressure on 
the land grew, so did the pressure on the borders of the Bondelswarts Reserve. 
The Bonde 1 swarts were d i ssa ti s fi ed wi th the boundari es of thei r Reserve under 
Union rule. The 1906 German-Bondelswarts treaty demarcating the reserve 
was recognized and adopted by the Union Government when it took over67 . 
Almost immediately Bondelswarts complaints of encroachment on the Reserve 
boundaries started, and in 1917 they complained about Government stock 
grazing 68 on their Reserve • . But the trouble really started when in 1918 
the Secretary for the Protectorate instructed the military magistrate to 
"gently" move those Bondelswarts living on crown lands adjoining the 
Reserve into the Reserve, using the lure of a promise to appoint a Bondels-
warts captain as an inducement69 . 
The 1906 boundary cut off parts of some farms, notably Uitschot, \1elgelegen, 
Plankieskop70 and Aroab7l . Ouring Union rule these fanns were allotted for 
European settlement, and so Bondelswarts squatting on them had to be moved 
into the Reserve. But the Bondelswarts complained that according to them 
66. Well ington, p.2l5. 
67. _R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.9. Major Herbst . 
68. W.A . Adm. Vol. 51 . File 599/2. Military magistrate, Wannbad, to Sec-
retary for Protectorate. 28 Dec. 1917. 
69 . ibid. Military magistrate, Warmbad to Secretary for Protectorate. 
21 March 1918. 
70. N.A.C. Report, p.8, para.28. 
71 . R.P.N . A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.384. George Frederick 
Fleck, magistrate for Ivarmbad distr i ct from 11 July 1920 . 
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these areas were within the 1906 boundary lines, and they held their 
northern boundary line to be much further north that the Government said 
it was 72. In'October 1921 the Bondelswarts took their Reserve Superinten-
dent, Mr · Noothout and showed him what they held was the Reserve boundary 
line. They held that73 Uitschot, Welgelegen and Plankieskop fell within 
thei r ~ eserve and poi nted out a marked tree as bei ng one of the beacon/4. 
The Surveyor-Genera 1 of S. W. A., t~r A. G. Landsberg, i nves ti ga ted and found 
that his survey and co-ordinates compared with those set out in the 
German survey showed a negligible difference of, at mos~ 0,65 of a metre, 
and so the Bondelswarts claims were groundles/5. Noothout. was instructed 
to inform the Bondelswarts that the question was closed and no further 
correspondence on the matter would be considered76 . 
But the Bondelswarts remained convinced that their boundary was further 
north, and felt increasingly dissatisfied about it. 
Gradually disillusionment among the 80ndelswarts began to turn into 
frustation and anger, and this was aggravated by the imposition by the 
Union administration of new and stricter laws interfering Hith the last 
vestiges of Bondelswarts independence even within the boundaries of their 
Reserve. The Bondelswarts, already badly hit by the stock losses of World 
War I, found their economic independence being steadily eroded away, and 
their poverty increased their anger. 
72. N.A.C. Report, p.8, para. 28. See mapD. 
73. R. P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.420. Johan Noothout to 
Native Commissioner for S.W. A. 7 Oct. 1921. Noothout had been officer 
in charge of Native Affairs in Keetmanshoop during the period of Union 
military rule. In 1920 he became the Bondelswarts' Reserve Superin-
tendent. 
74. ibid. pp. 420-421. See alsop.lb~ . 
75. ibid. Surveyor-General to Native Commissioner for S.W.A. 3 Dec . 1921. 
76 . ibid. Fleck to Noothout. 27 Feb. 1922. 
39. 
S.W.A. was hit by a drought which lasted three years, starting in 191777 , 
and which forced the Bondels to sell or slaughter some of their stock at a 
time when the market was depressed78. The Native Reserves Commission in 
1921 attested to the detrimental effects of the drought on the southern 
79 areas of S. ~J.A. . At the same time there was a world-wide post-~/ar 
economic depression80• As already noted, the closing of the Little Nama-
qualand coppermines dried up a major source of employment for Bondelswarts 
in exile, and acted as a catalyst for their return to S.W.A . , as in the case 
of Jacobus Christian in 191981 . In S. W.A. itself the end of military occu-
.pation in 1920 meant that less money was circulating and fewer jobs were 
available82 , while inflation too left its mark83 . 
The labour conditions of the Bondelswarts left much to be desired. The 
N.R.C. noted that while the Bondelswarts complied with labour regulations, 
they had a poor relationship with their European employers on the whole, 
alleging that they were ill-treated. The white ·employers on the other 
hand complained that the Bondelswarts were not worth their wages~4 . 
77. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 865. Lt. Col. Jacobus 
Andries Diederik Kruger, D.S.O. , a member of the Native Reserves 
Comm ission, (See p.5-5 Mol f\1'l3l and a farmer at Uhabis. 
78. R.P . N.A.C . Report. Exhibits and Annexures . An 1. p. 7. A.R . B. Major 
Manning's Report on Bondel swarts unrest, 1921. 
79 . R.P . N.A.C. Report. Minutes Of Evidence. p.844. Lt.Col . Kruger on N.R.C. 
80. N.A . C. Report, p.ll, para. 44. 
81. R.P.N.A . C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures . An 12 . p.17. Special 
Commissioner Drew to Secret ary for Protectorate re : arrival of Jacobus 
Chri s tian. 16 Aug. 1917. 
82 . R.P . N.A . C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.865 . Lt. Col. Kruger. 
83. ibid. p.949. Lt. Hendrik Frederik Prinslou(sub-inspector in S.v!.A . 
Police from 19l5~ 
84. N.A.C. Report, p.ll, para. 42. 
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and the farmers suffered from a labour shortage85 • 
The Bondel swarts , labour opportunities were restricted by insufficient 
education and a dearth of local industries86 . Major Manning pointed 
out that disease and want of proper food disabled many Bondelswarts from 
working and reduced their productivity when they did87 . 
Some Bondelswarts complained of being beaten by their employers and of not 
b . ·d th . 88 el ng pa 1 el r wages Major Herbst, the Secretary for S.W.A., said 
that if a complaint of ill-treatment by an employer was lodged action was 
taken by the Administration89 . The employer would be summonsed and "pro-
bably sentenced to £5 or a months·" imprisonment", and such cases were 
. db· d 90 
·reVlewe Y a JU ge . 
The Bondelswarts were subject to a number of pass and work laws in S.W.A. 
under Union administration. The German Imperial Government's ordinance 
of 18 August 1907 had provided that all blacks over seven years old had 
. 91 
to carry a pass, except the Rehoboth Basters . In addition, every black 
had to be in employment unless he had visible means of support92 . The Union 
Government retained this system but limited the carrying of passes to males 
over fourteen years old, and to females over fourteen years old living in 
urban areas. "Visible means of support" was re-defined as owning more that 
ten large or fifty small stock, and then only the head of the family and as 
many as were needed to maintain the property were allowed exemption, and 
85. ibid, p.10, para. 40. 
86. ibid, p.32, para. 23 . 
87. R. P.N . A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. AnJ.p.7. A.R.B. Major 
Mannings ' Report on Bondelswarts unrest . 1921 . 
88. R. P.N . A.C . Report . Minutes of Evidence. p.754 . John Brown. His father 
was an Englishman, his mother a Bondelswarts. 
89 . ibid. p.27. Major Herbst. 
90 . ibid . p. 29 . Major Herbst . 
91. Gorges Report, p. l11. 
92. N.A.C. Report, p.4, para. 7. 
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they had ' to carry certificates of exemption. The old or infirm were ex-
cluded from labour requirements93 . 
Passes had to be obtained for unemployed blacks to seek work94 , and these 
served as both passes and service contracts. When leaving his place of 
emp 1 oyment a black had to get a pass from hi s employer, or if trave 11 i ng 
for his employer, a special travelling pass had to be obtained from the 
employer. If travelling for his own purposes a travelling pass had to be 
obtained from the police, with the recommendation of the employer95 • No 
fee was charged for these passes96 . Under the Native Administration Pro-
clamation No. 11 of 1922, all non-Europeans, with certain exceptions, were 
proh i bited from entering or leaving th~ territory without a permit, which 
had to be shown on demand to a police offider, failure to do so making the 
1 1 1 t ' 97 offende r liab e to ~ga prosecu lon 
The Eurfew Regulations Proclamation No. 33 of 1922 empowered local authori-
ties to place a curfew on blacks in all streets or public places in urban 
areas, except in locations, between 9p.m. and 4a.m., unless they had a 
permit from their employer or a "proper officer" to be there98 . 
Under the Vagrancy Law of 1920 any black found wandering with no or in-
sufficient visible means of support, or found tr~spassing or loitering, could 
be imprisoned or fined99 . The cohtroversial provision was that a first offen-
der , ~mder , this law had to be sentenced by the magistrate to a term of ser-
vice on public works or with a private person other than the complainant, 
at a wage deemed fair by the magistrate. Farmers in need of labour thus 
93. N.A.C. Report, p.4, para. 7. 
94. R.P.N.A .C. Report. Exhi bi t s and Annexures . Ex . 1. p.6. N.A. M. 
95. ibid. p.7. 
96 . ibid. p.7. 
97. Wellington, p. 283. 
98. ibid. p.283. 
99 . ibid. p.283. (Proclamation No. 25 of 1920). 
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waited at court for such offenders. However, no black could be prosecuted 
as a vagrant if work was unobtainable in thatarea lOO • 
Master-servant relations were also regulated. Under Union law the old 
GenTIan powers of indiscriminate flogging were reduced, and only a magistrate 
was allowed to mete out punishmentlOl Servants' wages had to be paid in 
cash 102, and all contracts were now only valid i.f. drawn up in writing before 
and approved by an officer in charge of Native Affairs, or the police. The 
local magistrates were to draw up schedules of wages and check the fair-
ness of contracts l03 . 
The GenTIan masters, and servants law· was modified. Wages had to be paid and 
the master could no longer remove the servants' assets. Fines or imprison-
ment were substituted for flogging in cases where servants contravened their 
contracts, and police could no longer flog or chain blacks upon the lodging 
of a complaint by a masterl04 . 
Under the Masters and Servants Proclamation No. 34 of 1920 a servant became 
liable to legal penalties if he caused his master a loss by neglect, 
breach of duty or drunkenness or, if he was a herdsman, by failure to 
report the death or loss of stock. Desertion from service incurred legal 
penalties as well, and smaller penalties were provided for being late 
for work, absenteeism, intoxication, impertinence, and failure to obey a 
lawful command. The master incurred legal penalties if he withheld wages 
or dismissed the servant without lawful cause. More serious penalties were 
provided for threats or acts of violence by masters to servants l05 • 
100. R.P.N . A.C. Report . Exhibits and Annexures . Ex. 1. p. 6. N.A.M . 
101. N.A.C. Report, p.3, para. 14. 
102. R. P. N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures . Ex.l.p.3. Circular from 
Administrator to magistrates and officers in charge of Native Affairs. 
23 Oct. 1916. 567/2. 
103. R. P.N.A.C. Report . Exhibits and Annexures . p.7. N.A.M . Sect. 5 of Pro-
clamation No . 2. of 1916 . 
104, ibid. p.g. 
105. Wellington, p. 283. 
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But, even so, for those Bondelswarts who did work there was often much 
dissatisfaction over their wages, which were low , and often, illegally, 
paid in kind and not cash lOfi . As early as 1915 the local Native Commis-
sioner at Keetmanshoop reported that he had found : 
"several instances ,which have come to my notice, where farmers 
engage boys at 15/- per month and when paying them off they give 
them the equivalent in stock . The equivalent of a goat usually 
being 15/-, and in most cases, the Native goes away satisfied. 
I need not point out that 15/- is much in excess of the value of an 
an ordinary breeding goat, which is worth from 5/- to 10/- according 
to s i zeo: 107. 
White farmers excused themselves by replying ' that drought and depression 
h d d th t t h· h ' h lOB d th t th a rna e em 00 poor 0 pay 19 er or cas. wages , an a e 
Bondelswarts were bad workers and did not deserve more pay anywayl09. 
The average wage was estimated at from 15/- to £1 per month, plus 100 lbs. 
of meat, four pounds of coffee, four pounds of sugar, half a pound of tea , 
a half-roll of tobacco, and cast-off clothing 110 . In 1921 the N.R.C. 
recommended a minimum wage of 15/- per month with food for adult male blacks, 
10/- per month for adult female blacks, and 5/- per month for black males 
and females under sixteen Years old, but no standard ration was recommended 111. 
By the time of the Bondelswarts revolt in 1922 these recommendations had 
not been impl emented. 
The effect of this, as Major Manning (Native Commissioner for S.W.A), pointed 
out, was to make the Bondelswarts even more disinclined to work for the 
farmers 112. 
The Bondelswarts had great difficulty in raising ready cash for dog and other 
taxes. 
106. 
107. 
lOB. 
109 . 
110. 
lll. 
112. 
In June 1921 the Warmbad magistrate reported that the Bondelswarts 
N.A.C . Report, p.ll, para. 42. 
W.A . Adm. Vol. 50. File 599 . Officer in charge of Native Affairs, 
Keetmanshoop, to Native Commissioner, Windhoek. 25 Nov. 1915 . 
N.A.C. Report, p. ll, para. 44. 
R.P . N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . p.343. F. van R. Coetzee. 
ibid . p. B5. Major Herbst . 
'ibid. B62 p. . Lt. Col. Kruger on N.R.C. 
ibid. pp. 115-116. Major Manning. 
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could not pay their dog tax owing to the "unreasonable prices offered by 
shopkeepers who preferred bartering." 113 But the Bondelswarts had to 
sell their stock in Warmbad because of the strict stock disease controls l14 . 
and transport problems. The traders' high prices for goods were also a source 
of Bondelswarts discontent l15 . Mr Humphreys, Reserves Superintendent in 
Little Namaqualand in the Union found traders there over-charging and 
keeping the Nama in perpetual debt by 
at high interest rates, like those in 
allowing almost 
116 S.W.A. . The 
un 1 imited credit 
extreme poverty and 
low wages in the Richtersveld area of Little Namaqualand provided a fertile 
field for unrestll ? 
This lack of ready cash, aggravated by some farmers paying wages in kind 
and not cash, put the Bondelswarts in something of a quandary, for the 
Administration would only accept tax payments in cash, and would only 
allow barter in exceptional cases and then only for whites l18 The 
Bondelswarts did manage to raise cash by other means, however, by making 
and selling lime, and cutting firewood, or bundles of grass, the latter 
selling at 2/-per 100 bundles delivered at Kalkfontein-South. 119 . But 
their anger at having to pay high taxes was aggravated by frustt'ation in 
trying to raise ready cash. 
113. ibid. p.34. ~1ajor Herbst on A.R.B .. Telegram from Warmbad magistrate. 
2nd June 1921. 
114. ibid. p.102. Major Manning. 
115. ibid . p. 843. Lt. Col. Kruger on N.R.C. 
116. ibid. p. 624. Stephen Edkins Humphreys, Senior Superintendent of 
Communal Reserves and Inspector of Native Labourers for Namaqualand 
from May 1920. 
117. ibid. pp. 611-612. See p.b", . 
118. ibid. p.35. Major Herbst. 
119. W.A. Adm. Vol. 51. File 599/2. Deputation of Bondels meet Secretary 
for Protectorate. 30 June 1917. 
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Hit by high prices, their loss of stock during World War I, low wages, 
drought, depression and inflation, the Bondelswarts were poor. How poor 
is a matter of contention. 
The Admi ni stra tor, Gysbert Reitz Hofmeyr . poi nted out that in the south 
of S.W. A. the climate was unsuitable for any extensive form of 
cultivation, and therefore, the Bondelswarts had to live on meat and 
milk 120. 
Lt. Prinsloo summed. up the Governments' view as to the causes of Bondels-
warts poverty when he described them as "wastrel s" and poor stock breeders, 
with no eye for the futur~121. The N.R . C. in 1921 found the Bondelswarts 
"fast becoming impoverished both in numbers and stock", but condemned them 
for being "idle and lazy,,122. 
Major Manning on his visit to the Bondels Reserve in 1921 was deeply struck 
by their poverty. He found them "living chiefly on gum (acacia), goats 
123 
milk, etc. . He reported that 
"These people stated that in former years they had been able to 
earn by washing and other labour suff icient to live fairly com-
fortably but owing to the smallness of wages and rations now ob-
tainable in the district, high prices charged by the traders for 
even the smallest clothing requirements and loss of most of their 
stock as a result of the war, they were in distress . . 
.. . . . ,. . . . . . . 
The majority wer e somewhat aged, physically unfit and apparently in 
poor circumstances compared with most native elsewhere"124. 
120. R.P. "Memorandum by the Administrator of S.W.A. on the report 
of the Commission appointed to enquire into the Rebellion of the 
Bondelzwarts~ p. 2. 4 April 1923. CEereafter referred to as Hofmeyer's 
Memoranduijj). MS 14 787/AI (iv). 
121. R.P.N.A. C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.849 . Lt. Prinsloo's report 
on his part in the military operations against the Bondelswarts in 
the 1922 revolt . 
122. ibid. p.848. Lt. Col. Kruger on N.R.C. 
123. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures . An.l . p. 7. A.R.B. Major 
Manning's report on Bondelswarts unrest, 1921. 
124. ibid . . p.8. 
, 
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However, the numbers of stock captured after the 1922 rebellion seemed 
to belie this poverty. In all, in 1922. 715 donkeys, 853 cattle. 12.693 
goats and sheep and 15 horses were captured from the Bondels125. Nonethe-
less. it seems clear that there was poverty. arid that poverty bred discon-
tent. 
It appears that the Union's administration of S.W.A. disillusioned the 
Bondelswarts of any hopes they had cherished for British rule. In the 
course of evidence later given to the N.A.C. of inquiry into the 1922 
rebellion there are reference from Bondels witnesses to the "unjust". 
"boeren" government. while there is a consi stently expressed vague wi sh 
for the liberties which they believed an "English" government would have 
provided126 
From this is can be deduced that the transfer from German to Union rule was 
not all the Bondelswarts had hoped it would be . By contrast. there were 
those ·whites who felt that the changeover had been too dramatic. from 
".slavery" to "licentiousness" in the words of General Lemmer. a member of 
127 the N.A.C. . Other whites felt that the sudden reduction in police 
powers had encouraged black disparagement of the S.W.A. police128 
The pass and work laws restricted the Bondelswarts' freedom of action and 
impinged on their pride and independence. But it was the strict tax and 
other laws imposed by the Union Government which eroded their economic inde-
125. R. P. N.A.C. Report. ~1inutes of Evidence. p.261. Det. Sgt . Pietersen. 
See p.ll,o. 
126 . R.P.N.A.C . Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.752. John Brown. 
ibid. p. 774 . Johannes Matroos. a Bondelswarts living at Gabis. 
ibid. p. 879. James William Haite. living at Bethanie. 
127. R.P.N . A.C . Report Drafts. Draft C. p.7. (General Lemmer's draft) . 
128. R. P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . p.29l. Col. de Jager. 
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pendence and interfered with their traditional way of life. which greatly 
embittered them, and turned frustra ti on into anger. 
Thus the Warmbad magistrate reported that there had been great difficulty 
in enforcing the compulsory di pping of small stock to prevent scab di sease. 
The Union law was much stricter than the German one, and the Bondelswarts 
resented it 129 . 
Bondelswarts opposition was also strong against the "Branding of Cattle 
Proclamation 130 131 of 1921" . The N.R.C. in 1921 had reconmended that the 
branding of large and small stock be made compulsory, with each reserve 
having its own brand. The Superintendent of the reserve was to retain 
the irons and supervise the branding 132 . The 1921 Proclamation put this 
into effect . 
Branding of large stock was made compulsory for white and blacks. Branding 
irons cost of uniform 30s, but only whites were allowed to retain them. 
Blacks had to have their cattle branded by an official, and the irons were 
to be kept by the magistrate. The aim was to eliminate stocktheft133 
and to prevent unfounded accusations of bl acks being stockthieves 134. 
When a black wanted his branding iron he had to bring proof of ownership 
129. R.P.N . A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 405 . Fleck. 
130. N.A.C. Report, p.9, para. 34. 
131. R.P . N.A.C. Report . Minutes of Evidence. p. 852. Lt. Col. Kruger presents 
report of N.R.C. to Secretary for Protectorate. 8 June 1921 . 
132. ibid. p.856. 
133. N.A.C. Report, p.9, para.34. 
134. ibid. p.9, para .  36. · 
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of his stock, and the Police or Superintendent would then brand the 
stock for him135• 
However, owing to the strength of the Bondel swarts , opposition, no prosecu-
tions to:Q,k place for contravention of the law136 . Nevertheless, it rankled, 
and was a major Bondelswarts grievance, contributing towards the build-up 
of dissatisfaction, frustration and tension. 
Even more resented that the branding law was the dog tax, and in this case 
the tax was strictly enforced. 
The Bondelswarts being primarily a pastoral people, extensively used dogs 
to protect their stock against vermin' like jackals,137 and used them to hunt 
game~38. This helped to provide them with a livelihood without having to 
slaughter their stock 139 . 
When the Union government took over the administration of S.W. A. it imposed 
a dog tax. Under German rule a dog tax of 30 marks for the first dog and 
135. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.39. Major Herbst. 
136 . R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An. 3. Proclamation No. 36 
of 1921. "Cattle Brands Proclamation. "Official Gazette No. 68 of S.W.A. , 
Windhoek. 6 September 1921 . Clause 6. "Brandlng lrons al lotted here-
under to natives shall be kept in the control and custody of the 
magistrate ,or such other person as the Administrator may designate, 
and the branding of cattle whereof a native is the owner shall be 
conducted under the direction of the magistrate or such other person 
and be subject to such conditions as the Administrator may from time 
to time prescribe by regulation framed in pursuance of section twenty 
hereof". Defines "native" as "non-European", but exempts registered 
black landowners. ' 
137. N.A.C. Report, p. 9, para. 33. 
138. ibid. p.8, para. 3l. 
139. ibid. p.8, para. 33. See also The Journal of ' Wikar. wherein Wikar 
describes the extensive use of dogs for huntlng. p.46. 
10 marks for each additional dog had been levied, but only in urban areas 140 . 
In 1917 the Administrator, Gorges, imposed a tax of 20s on the first dog 
and a new tax of 5s per dog on dogs in rural areas. Whites were allowed 
One dog free of tax as a watchdog, and this exemption was extended to blacks 
in 1919141 . The purpose of the tax was clear: 
"Complaints have been made of natives roaming about rural areas 
with a number of dogs .•.. . to supply them with food. When such 
cases are found the natives should be required immediately to destroy 
such dogs as the Magistrate shall find to be in excess of their actual 
needs, and may order the police to destroy them if the native fails to 
do so."142 
If the tax was not paid the police could capture the dog and inform the 
owner. If not claimed within a week the dog could be destroyed or sold 
by public auction143. 
When Hofmeyr became Administrator of S.W.A. in 1920 he toured the country 
and said he found "vast numbers of dogs" still in the possession of blacks 
and" a certai n cl ass of European squatter ·" whi ch were used to hunt game 
instead of earning a living by what Hofmeyr· called "honest labour,,144. 
Farmers, especially those in the South, pressurized Hofmeyr to increase 
the dog tax as an inducement for blacks to seek work145. 
In 1921, Hofmeyr therefore increased the dog tax by Proclamation No. 16. 
The new tax worked on a graduated scale, with £1 being levied for the first 
dog, £2.10 for two dogs, £4.10 for three dog~ £7 for four, £10 for 5 and so 
on146 . 
140. N.A.C. Report, p.B. para. 29. Law d. 23 Feb. 1907. 
141. ibid. p.B. para. 29. 
142. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 1. p.ll. N.A.M. 
143. ibid. p.ll. 
144. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp. 41-42. Major Herbst. 
145. ibid. p.332. F. van R. Coetzee. 
146. N.A.C. Report, p.B. para. 30. 
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Clause 12 of the proclamation stated that: 
"Any dog found after expiration of 3 months from the due date without 
a badge issued under Sec. 9. hereof shall be liable to seizure by 
the police and unless proof of payment of the tax in respect thereof 
be forthwith produced it may be immediately destroyed"147. 
The tax was a heavy one, and was greatly resented by the Bondelswarts. Their 
resentment, combined with their frustration at the unavailability of cash148 , 
made their mood explosive. 
Owing to consistent opposition the tax was reduced by 50% in i922. But pro-
secution of the Bondelswarts who failed to comply with the tax deadline 
began on 19 September 1921, and in the period up to 23 January 1922 there 
were 140 cases of non-payment of the tax heard by the Warmbad magistrate. 
There were 100 convi cti ons, with pena lti es averagi ng a £2 fi ne· or 14 days 
imprisonment149 Bondelswarts bitterness and disillusionment with the 
new regime increased correspondingly, and the dog tax can be seen as a 
contributory cause of the 1922 rebellion. 
Hunting had traditionally formed a mainstay of the Bondelswarts' diet, 
since they were loath. like any pastoral society, to kill their precious 
domesticated stock. The Bondelswarts were also described as being unusual 
. th · t·· · d 1 f h t· 150 ln elr spor lng lnstlncts an ove 0 un lng . Lt. Prinsloo said 
that for the Bondelswarts "in the absence of a rifle his dogs are his 
best friends,,151. 
147 . R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An.2. p.2. Dog Tax 
Proclamation No . 16 of 1921. 
148. See p.IS"'!. 
149. CA. Prime Minister's Office. L. N. 13/ 4. Vol. 6. "August - December 
1923". League of Nations. Permane,!! Mandates CommiSsion" . (8ereafter 
referred to as C. A. P. M.O. Vol. 6.j Permanent Mandates Commission 
Q>.M.CJ Report. p. 9. 
150. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.950. Lt. Prinsloo. 
151. ibid . p. 950. 
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Under a German law of 1909 and 1910 blacks were only allowed to hunt 
game within the confines of their Reserves. they were not allowed to use 
traps or fires to hunt, and had to have a permit to shoot with a shot-gun. 152 . 
To the Bondelswarts' disappointment, when the Union Government took over 
S.W.A. it continued these laws 153 . In fact, it enforced them more strictly, 
and it was a serious crime to be found in possession of big game skins 154 
The Bondelswarts resented this and saw it as depriving them of food 155 . 
In any case, the dog tax effectively limited the number of dogs available 
for hunting. Furthermore, the Bondelswarts were not allowed to own rifles. 
Under the terms of the 1906 treaty they had had to surrender all arms and 
ammunition. They could no longer possess rifles, but could borrow a rifle 
and a few rounds from a local official for a few days to hunt156 . Under 
Union administration even this stopped, and strict control was extended 
over the introduction of rifles into S.W.A. without a permit. Thus both 
the game and rifle laws often brought the Bondelswarts into conflict with 
the 1 aw 157. In additi on, vermi n cou 1 d not be effecti ve ly checked, and the 
N.R.C . found that one of the chief complaints of both black and white in 
the South of S.W. A. was that, owing to the drought, pasterage was being 
destroyed by large numbers of springbuck and ostriches. Thus the N.R.C. 
recommended that the Bondelswarts be allowed to borrow rifles from the 
Reserve Superintendant for a few days to shoot vermin158 
These laws served to increase the Bondelswarts' suspicion and hostility to 
the Government, and they felt increasingly aggrieved and exploited . 
000---
152. R.P .N. A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 1. p.10. N.A.M. ·Law d. 
15 Feb. 1909, amended 4 Oct . 1910. 
153. ibi d. p.10 
154. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.824. Sgt. Naude. 
155. ibid. p.457. Jacobus Christian. 
156 . ibid. p. 240. Det. Sgt. Pietersen presents 
157 . ibid. p.950 . Lt. Prinsloo . 
158. ibid. pp. 843-4 and p.8?3. Lt. Col. Kruger on N.R.C. Report. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
NATIVE POLICY AND BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS 
After the military occupation of South West Africa by the Union in ·1915 
a system of martial law was set up. In October 1915 the military.:Governor, 
General Beves, was replaced by a civil Administrator, E.H.L. Gorges (later 
. 1 2 Sir E.H.L. Gorges)) the former Secretary for the Interior in the Union. 
The aims of the new Administrator were to open up avenues of appeal for 
blacks and to limit the wide local powers of white officials, putting an 
end to indiscrimate floggings of blacks. These aims were clearly set out 
in Gorges "Memorandum on Native Affairs" of 3 August 19163• This provided 
for new masters and servants, pass and work 1aws 4. In a circular sent to 
magistrates and Natives Affairs Officers on 23 October 1916 the Administrator 
exempted blacks over fourteen years old who were in educational institutions 
from the requirement to work if they had no or insufficient visible 
means of supportS. 
After reports of police assaults on blacks in 1916 Gorges called a conference 
of seni or pO'l i ce offi cers and magi strates to impress on them the necess ity 
of abiding by the 1916 Memorandum6. Under Proclamation No.2 of 1916 
the old German masters and servants law Vias ame1iorated7. But, for the 
1. Swanson, M.W . "S. W.A. in Trust. 1915-1939" in Gifford, P. and 
Louis, W.M.R. (eds.). Britain and Germany in Africa (Connecticut, 
1967). p.647. 
2. Department of the Interior. "Annual Report for the calendar year 
1913". (U.G. 24-'14). 
3. R.p.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 1. N.A.M. 
4. See p.4011'. 
5. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 1. p.2. Circular from 
Administrator to Magistrates and Officers in charge of Native Affairs. 
23 Oct. 1916. 567/2. 
6. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp. 286-287. Col. de Jager. 
7. R.P.N . A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 1. p.11. N.A.M. 
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rest it was a matter of marking time until the future status of S.W.A. was 
settl ed. 
In 1920 S.W.A. was placed under South Africa's control as a "c" class man-
date by the League of Nations. The mandate was signed on 17 December 1920, 
and published in the South African Government Gazette on 17 June 1921, and 
martial law in S.W.A. ended on 1 January 1921B. Article 22 of the mandate 
stated that 
"The Mandatory shall have full powers of administration and 
legislation over the Territory, subject to the present mandate, 
as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply 
the laws of the Union of South Africa to the Territory. subject to . 
such local modifications and circumstances may require . The Mandate 
shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being of the 
inhabitants of the Territory subject to the present Mandate"9. 
A new Administrator, G.R. Hofmeyr , was appointed. He was advised, but 
not checked by an Advisory Council of nine whites, and held complete 
powers of legislation and administration. In October 1920 a Commission 
was appointed to enquire into the future form of Government for S.W.A.10 
It recommended that S.W.A. should move towards representative government 
as the fifth province of the Union, to avoid the emergence of a separate 
German state independent of South Africa ll . However, it concentrated 
exclusively on the German problem, and no mention was made of the question 
of native policy in S. W.A . The Commission recommended against full repre-
sentation until "at least 10,000 adult British males of European descent" 
had moved into S.W.A., in order to balance out the predominantly German 
white population in S.W.A.12. 
B. Goldblatt, p.20B. 
9. ibid, pp.207-20B. 
10 . "Interim and Final Reports of the Commission appointed to inquire 
into the question of the future form of Government in the South-
West Africa Protectorate" (UG24-'2l). 
11. ibid . p.3. 
12. ibid . p.4 . 
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Iiofmeyr fel t that the "sacred trust" of the mandate referred to the 
prevention of b!lcks from obtaining arms and ammunition or liquor, but 
did not exclude the extension of the Union native policy of segregation to 
S.W.A., which he feltwas 'in harmony with the terms of the mandate l3 . His 
arrival thus signalled a, new stage of administration for S.W.A. , with the 
extension of the ' Union's segr~sation policies there. 
In 1923 Hofmeyr wrote · ,to General J . C. Smuts, the Union Prime Minister, 
saying that he had encountered many difficulties in implementing his 
policies. Under martial law no fixed native administration system had been 
set up, to the confusion of both black and white, and no new reserves had 
been laid out other than those established by treaty in German times, in-
creasing racial friction and uncertainty due to black hopes for the restora-
tion of their old tribal lands and the influx of white settlers from the 
Union14 . Another complication was that many Germans had been allowed to 
remain in S.W.A .• and some would not co-ope rate with the Union administration . 
A completely new socio-economic and educational policy for the development 
of the territory had to be inaugurated , a difficult task indeed 15 . 
Wi th the increasing white settlement in S.W.A. Hofmeyr ' decided to set aside 
black reserves to prevent clashes with "white interests". This was compli-
cated by white "vested interests", the need for large areas for grazing 
as the soils were so poor, and by the dependence on the availabilitylof ," 
t 1· 16 wa er supp les . Hofmeyr' wished to remove "surplus" blacks from urban 
13 . R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp. 1,127-1,128. G.R . Hofmeyer . 
14. f .A. P.M.O. Vol. 6. Hof'meyr. · Windhoek, to Smuts . 30 Aug. 1923. p. 3. 
15. ibid. p.10. 
16 . R. P. Hofmeyr's Memorandum. p.2. 
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areas since he felt that they were an "immoral climate" for blacks, 
as well as causing friction with whites over' the use of commonages and 
water. Thus he decided in 1920 to settle matters with two main aims in 
mind 
"a) 
b) 
To secure contentment and welfare of the natives as far as 
possible and to establish certainty to the whites as to the 
permanent place of abode of the natives ; 
To tighten up Native Administration in order to prevent vagrancy 
and idleness"17. 
The latter provision was to hold many ~ unpleasant surprise for the Bondels-
warts. In accordance with his aims Hofmeyr . appointed a Native Reserves 
Commission of Inquiry. It was this Commission which set the tone and 
method of native policy in S.W.A. under Hofmeyr's . administration. It was 
appointed to enquire into and report on the administration, size and 
condition of native reserves and locations in S.W.A., the availability of 
native labour in S.W.A. for farm and domestic purposes, and the extent to 
which native labour was utilized and the methods employed in its distribu-
tion. The N.R.C. was to determine the extent to which female native labour 
was used for domestic and light farm work, and the reasons why the available 
labour was not fully utilized . It was to investigate the ownership and 
purposes served by the community cattle at the Or umbo Reserve, and it was 
to make recommendations on all these points 18 
The N.R,C. presented its report on 8 June 1921, and its recommendations 
were discussed by a committee consisting of Major t~ anning, Native Commissioner 
for S.W.A., A.G. Landsberg, the Surveyor-General for S.W.A., and Mr Schneider, 
the Senior Officer of the Lands Branch . 
17. ibid. p.2. 
18. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 837. Lt. Col. Kruger. 
Secretary for S.W. A. to Mr H. W. Drew, Inspecting Officer of the 
Administration of S.W.A. No. 0.231. 21 Dec. 1920. 
\ 
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The N. R. C. recanmenda ti ons formed the bas i s of liofmeyr' s, nati ve pol i cy. 
It advocated the extension of the policy of segregation19 to S.W.A., the 
removal of~lack settlements from white areas, -and the desirability of 
establishing "small isolated native reserves within white areas. " The 
leasing of land by whites to blacks, or, as the N.R.C. called it, "kaffir-
farming". was to be stopped. Blacks' living conditions were to be improved 
and better official control over reserves was recommended. The N.R.C. 
recommended the creation of reserves for all black~ and the closure of 
temporary reserves . It felt that reserves held under treaty (like that of 
the Bondelswarts) should be more closely defined, and suggested the creation 
of a "native area" where blacks would be permitted to purchase or hire land 
for their own use away from white areas 20 . 
'Hofmeyr agreed to these proposals but insisted that "the process should not 
be so hurried as to cause undue hardship to Europeans and natives,,21, especi-
ally, one suspects, for "Europeans" . He established a Native Affairs branch 
of the Administration, and appointed a Chief Native Commissioner22 . 
19. ~. P. -Hofmeyr's Memorandum . p.2. 
20 . The N.R. C. presented a ' table of proposals for black reserves 
1. Proposed reserves - 794,938 ) 
2. Reserves to be closed _ 139,288) 655,650 ha. 
3. Land for expansion of reserves for when _ proposed reserves prove 
unsuitable - 636,881 ha. 
4. Land held by blacks under German Treaty - 945,343 ha. 
5. Total area of land occupied or to be occupied as reserves -
2,237,874 ha. 
6. Scheduled native areas - 2,500,00 ha. 
(In the absence of any other indications, it would seem that the 
scheduled native areas were intended to be the ' area where blacks 
could buy or hire land. If this is so, the N.R . C. closely parallels 
the Union's 1916 Beaumont Commission). 
From R.P. ,Hofmeyr's Memorandum. p.3. 
21. ibid . p.3. 
22. CA . p . r~.o, . Vol. 6. p.12. Hofmeyr to Smuts. 30 Aug. 1923. See p_;J.3'.FootneR3 
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The Bondelswarts were given a Reserve Superintendent 23 In 1922 Hofmeyer 
promulgated a new Hasters and Servants law, Vagrancy law and pass law24 , 
as well as an Education law which put mission schools on an official basis 
and left the missionaries with direct control over them. The Administration 
paid the teachers and provided furniture, equipment and books free of charge25. 
Stricter Government and municipal control of black locations was instituted, 
and the recruitment of blacks for the mines and railways was placed under 
Government control. State hospitals were set up, where low fees were 
charged for blacks, or, in the case of paupers, free medical service was 
provided. The supplying of liquor to blacks was prohibited26 
In the Okavango area slavery was eradicated. Samuel Maherero, the Herero 
Paramount Chief, was allowed to return from exile, and, when he died later, 
to be buried at Okahandja with his forefathers. In the reserves headmen were 
paid salaries by the Gover nment27 . The Administration also drilled bore-
holes and erected free dipping tanks, windmills and reservoirs 28 . Blacks in 
reserves were only liable to pay customs duties, but no other government 
tax was levied apart from the dog tax 29 . 
23. ibid . p.13. 
24. ibid. p. 12 
25. R.P. Mofmeyr's, Memorandum. p.6. Table of Mission schools in S.W.A. 
in 1923. 
No. of Enrol- No. of 
schoo 1 s ment teachers 
Rhenish Mission Society 26 1,929 36 
Roman Catholic Missions 16 459 10 
Wes 1 eyan t~i ss ions 1 42 1 
26. LA.P.M.O. Vol. 6. p.13. Hofmeyer to Smuts. 30 Aug. 1923. 
27 . ibid. p.14. 
28. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.85. Major Herbst. 
29. ibid. p.85 . 
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Thus the general native policy in S.W.A. involved segregation and strict 
movement controls. The attitude of the Administration towards the 
Bondelswarts was that it was "their duty" to assist in the development of 
the terri tory by working for the whites '. However, in some respects the 
Administration did not develop a consistent policy. In particular, the 
return of the Bondelswarts in exile to S. W.A . caused much misunderstanding 31 . 
Under Sect . 5 of the 1916 Memorandum on Native Affairs the magistrate in each 
district, with some ex_ception~, wereplaced in control of all blacks in that 
district, subject to the authority of the Administrator. In rural areas the 
police acted as the magistrate's agents for native affairs, under his 
instruction32. Later, under the 'branding proclamation the magistrates 
were placed in control of black-owned branding irons, and supervised the 
branding through their agents 33 . The merging of native affairs and magi-
sterial duties was done for reasons of economy34. Major Herbst said that 
Hofmeyr , on his visit to the Bondelswarts Reserve in 1920, had told them 
that 
"The mag i strates and pol ice were there for that purpose (fo ensure 
good treatment and \'Iorki ng cond i ti ons for the Bonde 1 swarts] and if 
th,~y failed in .t ,1E!ir duty, he himself could be approached and would 
see that justice was done"35. 
However, there was often a difference between theory and practice. As early 
as 1917, as a result of reports of police flogging blacks and taking the law 
into their own hands, the Administrator called a conference of magistrates 
and senior police officals. 36 There it was po in ted out that it was not just 
the police who were at fault. but that there were also some magistrates whose 
30. ibid. p.25 
31. N.A.C. Report, p.29, para. 4. Seef·"3/t. 
32. R.P.N.A . C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex.l. p.7. N.A,.M. 
33. ibid. An.3. p.346. Proclamation No. 36 of 1921. 
34. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.52. Major Herbst. 
35. L.A.P.M.O. Vol. 6. Major Herbst's "Memorandum on the Bondelzwarts 
rising and its suppression! presented to the P.M.C . " 28 July 1923. (Bereafter referred to as 'Herbst's Memorandum'J. · p, 48. 
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incompetence in native affairs encouraged black defiance of the police, which, 
in turn, encouraged some police to take the law into their own hands37. 
This foreshadowed a major problem for the Administration of S.W.A.38. 
The relationship between the police and the Bonde1swarts was generally 
poor and strained. Authorities in the Administration held that this was 
because under German rule the police had had much wider powers to maintain 
law and order. They held that the transition from German to Union rule and 
the sudden reduction of police powers, like the withdrawal of their powers 
to flog, had made the police appear powerless and the blacks to become scorn-
ful and defiant39 • 
The Bonde1swarts were in constant conflict with the law, giving them a 
distorted concept of it40 . An extract from the books of the Warmbad charge 
office between 1 January 1920 and 1 August 1922 shows that there had been 
twenty-two people sentenced for stocktheft, fourteen for importing firearms 
without a permit, one hundred and seventy for failing to pay the dog tax, 
thirty-nine for entering S.W.A. without a permit, and eighteen for importing 
stock into S.W.A. without a permit41 
In addition, a major drawback of Native administration in S.W.A . was often the 
poor quality of officials. There was an acute shortage of suitably trained 
men avai1ab1e42 • which prompted Gorges to write in 1917 that: 
"The time has arri ved when the obvi ous 1y unsuitable or i n'competent 
among the temporary officials in the service of the Protectorate 
administration should be replaced by trained officials from the 
Union public service"43. 
37. ibid. pp.289-290. 
38. See ;p.I'io", 
39. R. P. N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.291. Co1.de Jager. 
40. ibid. p.950. Lt. Prins100 - report on military operations during 
1922 Bonde1swarts rebellion. 
41. R.P . N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures; Extracts of the Books of 
the Charge Office, Warmbad, as from 1 Jan . 1920 to I Aug . 1920 . 
Signed by Sgt. Naude, Post Commander. 
42. N.A.C. Report, p.29, para. 1. 
43. W.A. Adm. Vol. 106. File 3353. Gorges to Secretary fo r Defence . , Pre-
toria - Re port of Col . Kruger on Bonde1swa r ts unres t . 16 Jan. 1917 . D.4. 
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This sentiment was echoed by Col. de Jager in 1918 in his report to the 
Minister of Defence in the Union44. All the factors covered so far led to 
a build-up of Bondelswarts dissatisfaction. They had a long and fairly con-
sistent record of unrest which increased in intensity45, and which led some 
Government authorities to see the unrest as part of a concerted plot intended 
to lead up to war46 • 
The first sizeable incident of Bondelswarts unrest came in March 1917. 
Mr H.W. Eadie, the Inspecting magistrate for S. W.A., was instructed to go 
and investigate it47. He found that trouble had been brewing amongst the 
Bondelswarts for some time, led by Adam Pienaar (alias Adam Christian), 
who had headed a group of Bondelswarts in agitation for the return of 
Jacobus Christian from the Union and his recognition by the Government as 
hereditary Captain of the Bondelswarts tribe48 . Adam had been a notorious 
agitator under the German regime too. His rallying cry in 1916 was "payment 
f or grass and water" by the Government and neighbouring farmers who used 
part of the Bondelswarts ~eserve. However, he was not successful in arousing 
any widespread agitation49 . 
In May 1921 there. were reports of Bondelswarts unrest over the dog tax, and 
Major Manning was instructed to investigate 50. He found no defiance but 
44. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.289. Col. de Jager. Report 
to Minister of Defence, S.A. , on Native question, from O/C Union forces 
occupying S.W .A . 191B. 
45. R.P.N.A,C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.68. Major Herbst. 
46. ibid. p.823. Sgt. Naude. 
47. R.Y.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 2. Eadie Report. 
48. W.A. Adm. Vol. 50. File 599. pp.2-6. Enquiry into Bondelswarts rebel-
lion by Det. Christiansen 25 June 1917. See ('.'d../. 
49. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex.2. p.5. Eadie Report. 
50. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.31. Major Herbst. 
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widespread poverty and a shortage of cash to pay the tax 51 . Later in the 
same month, there was further unrest when the ·Government took a census, as, 
at first the Bondelswarts were suspicious of the motives of the census-takers 52. 
In June of that year, when the police started enforcing the dog tax regulations, 
there were further reports of Bondelswarts unrest and meetings of protest53 . 
On 10 August 1921 there were widespread rumours of Bondelswarts unrest and 
that Jacobus Christian had called in the tribe to meet at Haib 54 . 
Shortly before the 1922 rebellion itself a group of Bondelswarts, led by 
Jeremias Christian55 , forcibly released three prisoners who had been arrested 
on the Reserve by the police on 12 May 192256 . Nicholas Christian had 
entered S.W.A. without a permit and had evaded arrest, but his wife and some 
followers were arrested. It was they who were freed by Jeremias 57 , who was 
subsequently arrested and sentenced to four months imprisonment for his pains 58 . 
In the Little Namaqualand area of the Union t here were also rumours of unrest, 
and the assistant magistrate of the area, R.H. Chenoweth, felt that the Rich-
tersveld people were "undoubtedly" in sympathy with the Bondelswarts' griev-
ances 59 . 
51. See p.I~(l. 
52. R.P.N.A . C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.227. Det.-Sgt . Pietersen 
presents evidence of Sgt. Naude. 
53. ibid, p.228. 
54. ibid, p.349. Monsignor Stanislav Krolikowski, Prefect Apostolic of 
Great Namaqualand from 1908. 
55. I have been unable to ascertain his relationship,if any, to Jacobus 
Chri s ti an. 
56. W.A. Adm. File A 388/1. Warmbad Magistrate to Secretary for Protec-
torate. 12 May 1922. 
57. R. P.N.A.C. Report]rafts. Draft C. p.17. (General Lemmer's draft). 
58. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.229. Det. Sgt. Pietersen 
presents evidence of Sgt. Naude. 
59. ibid. p.710. Richard Henry Chenoweth, assistant magistrate for the 
Richtersveld from 1919. 
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The Ri chter~ve 1 d area was bounded by the Stei nkopf-Port Noll oth rai 1way, the 
Steinkopf reserve, the Orange River and the sea, about 700, 000 morgen of 
stoney, arid country 
the Bonde1swarts60 . 
inhabited by Basters and Namas, some of them related to 
In the 1916 census 
3-400 Bonde1swarts there, mostly exiles 
of the Richtersve1d there were 
since the 1904-6 rebe11ion61 . 
about 
The 
Richtersve1ders were mostly poor and backward, with no social welfare, no 
tQxes and minimal contact with the Government. Fugitives from the police 
fled into the inaccessible interior, and no effort was made to disturb them62 . 
The poverty-stricken Captain of the Richtersve1d was Zwartbooi Links, who 
led the "New Law Party" in the area, which supported the Government, as 
opposed to the "Old Law Party" led by the aspirant-captain Jasper C10ete, 
one of the wealthiest men in the area, and an adherent of ieFleur. 
Andries Stockenstroom Le Fleur was born in the eastern districts of the Cape, 
and was about fifty-four years old at the time of the 1922 Bonde1swarts 
rebe11ion64. He had been convicted and sentenced to fourteen years impri-
sonment for his part in the Griqua rebellion of 189865 . On his release he 
proceeded to found the Griqua Land Bank, Industries and Development Company, 
of which he was managing director. He also founded the Griqua Independent 
Church, and his religious and commercial schemes were closely interrelated. 
He gained great influence in the Richtersve1d66 , and his coloured agents 
travelled among the people there inviting them to take shares in the Company, 
60 . N.A.C. Report, p. 29, para. 137. 
61. R.P.N :A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.534. Lt. Edgar John Brinton, 
sub-inspector for S.A. Police in Little Namaqua1and. 
62 . N.A.C. Report, p.29, para. 138. 
63 . ibid. para. 139. 
64. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Ev i dence. p.1,038. Lt. Col. Harry Free-
man Trew, S.A. Poli ce, Western Division. 
65 . Le Fleur's father, Abraham Le Fleur, had been one of Adam Kok's 
fo 11 oViers. The 1898 revolt was an aborti ve and 1 imited one, confi ned 
mainly to attacks on isolated farms. Shephard, J. In the Shadow of 
the Drakensberg. (Durban, 1976). pp.44 and p.l37 . 
66. N.A.C. Report, p.26, para. 124. 
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join the church and contribute stock and money to his schemes. Le Fleur and 
his followers used a strange style of speaking and writing. His aim was to 
return to the days before the Mission Stations and Communal Reserves Act of 
1909 had been enacted (hence the "Old Law Party" under Jasper C10ete)67, and 
he was regarded as the new Moses who would lead his people to a promised land 
with their own government68. His prophecies had a mi11ennia1 tone: 
"Cape Town and Table Mountain made an insurrection against Le 
Fleur all were armed and he captured Cape Town and Table Mountain 
with five girls and five boys and a quince stick. The five girls 
and boys sang a hymn and ~hen the commando handed over their weapons 
to Le Fleur and united under him. Cape Town and Table Mountain today 
belong to Le Fleur and he is king over the whole land and his flag 
will fly as England's flag _ has flown, but it will be a yellow flag. 
The few people who remain on the reserve will melt away as snow after 
we have left" 69 
• 
Le Fleur purchased, on the instalment plan, three farms of 2,100 morgen 
each on the 01ifants River to which he called the people. By i923 over 
800 people had settled there with their stock in overcrowded conditions 70 . 
Le Fleur himself was based at Maitland in Cape Town71 . 
However, Humphreys, the Senior Superintendent of Communal Reserves in 
Little Namaqua1and, felt that Le F1eur's"sole aim" was to obtain money 
from the peop1e?2 To become a follower the people had to pay 2/- registra-
tion fee, and some said that those who did not join would be ejected from 
the Reserves. Many contributed stock, and at Kommaggas the whole Reserve was 
67. N.A.C. Report, p.26, para. 124. There is an interesting statement in 
the Minutes of Evidence by Paul Moos, a Union Nama, who said that Le 
Fleur's references to the "old law" referred to the Governor's law in 
Queen Victoria's time; remembered as the days of freedom for the Nama 
people. This has a similarity to the vaguely expressed wish of some 
Bonde1swarts witnesses to the N.A.C. for "British rUle". R.P.N.A.C . 
Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 703. Moos. " See ~-4b. 
68 . N.A.C. Report, p.26, para, 121. 
69. T.A. Dept. Justice. Vol. 106. File 2/122/11. "Bonde1zwarts Hottentots -
S. W.A. - Unrest. Correspondence from 117/1922. "Qiereafter referred to 
as Dept. Justice. Vol. 106. File 2/122/1D. Statement by Piet Fortuin. 
70. N.A.C. Report, p.26, para. 124. 
71. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 601. S.E. Humphreys. 
72. ibid. p.603. 
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registered as being Le Fleur adherents 73• 
Jasper Cloete had been a Corporal in the Richtersveld, but was demoted 
because he was a Baster. His ambitions led him to support Le Fleur and 
to contest with Zwartbooi Links for - leadership74. 
Some saw Le Fleur's influence behind the Bondelswarts rebellion across 
the Orange River. But there is little evidence of a direct link between 
the two movements 75 • although Le Fleur's followers were probably sympa-
thetic to the Bondelswarts' grievances 76 . Jacobus wrote to Le Fleur to 
ask for help with the Bondelswarts agitation against their oppression77 , 
and Le Fleur invited the Bondelswarts leaders to attend a conference to 
be held for the coloured people in July 192278. 
The Bondelswarts unrest was symptomatic of a general feeling of unrest among 
blacks throughout S. W.A .• Hofmeyr felt that in 1922 there was "considerable" 
unrest among blacks, especially those neighbours of the Bondelswarts, the 
KeetJ]lanshoop and Gibeon Nama, as well as those at Beersheba and Vaalgras 79 . 
He later said that he had received information that "convinced me of the possi-
bility, if not th e probability, of the whole country becoming ablaze,,80 . 
It was in this cl imate of mutual fear and suspicion _ that Abraham Morris 
retu r ned from exile. 
000 -
73. ibid. p.608. 
74. ibid . p.670. Zwartbooi Links (alias Paulus Links), hereditary Captain 
in Richtersveld, living at Kaboes. 
75. N.A.C. Report, p.13, para . 55a. 
76. ibid. p.27. para. 130 . 
77. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.246. Oet. - Sgt. Pietersen 
presents copy of letter, Jacobus Christian to Le Fleur, signed by 
Jacobus and fifty other Bondelswarts . 
-78. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex.6. Copy-Griqua Indepen-
dent Church to Jacobus Christian. 31 Oct. 1921. 
79. R.P . N. A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.56. Major Herbst on A.R.B. 
80. R.P . N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An. 1. p.5. A.R. B. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE BUILDUP TO REBELLION 
Abraham Morris had a Bondelswarts mother and a white father l . He had had 
a long and distinguished military career, beginning as a scout for the 
British in the Anglo-Boer War2, and in the 1904-6 Bondelswarts rebellion 
against the Germans he had been a rebel leader3. He was the adjudant for 
the famed and able Bondelswarts rebel leader, Mareng04, and together, through 
the clever use of guerrilla tactics, they had prolonged the rebellion until 
1906, when hardships forced them to flee to the Union. There Marengo 
was shot, but Abraham Morris, Jacobus Christian and others settled in the 
Steinkopf Reserve, keeping in close contact with their relatives and followers 
in G.S.W.A. 5. While in the Union Morris and about 600 Bondelswarts refugees 
were converted to Catholicism6. 
The Germans demanded the extraditio n of the exiles. The Cape Government, 
according to Major Herbst, refused to deport them because, they alleged, they 
had done this before and the Germans had merely shot the rebels. So the 
Bondelswarts in exile were left alone, and they found work on the copper 
mines of Little Namaqualand7. 
Morris' military abilities had made a deep impression on the Germans, however, I 
and in 1911 the Ge~lan authorities asked the Union Government to bring 
Jacobus Christian, Morris and other Bondelswarts exiles into settlements un der 
police control. By this time Morris was living at Narramap about twenty-
1. Vedder, "The_ Nama", p.123 . 
2. R. P.N.A . C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 1,003. Sgt. Jan Albert 
van Niekerk. 
3. ibid . p.4S5. Jacobus Christian. See p. IS". 
4. Gorges Report, p.94. See p.I£. 
5. Freislich, p.5. 
6. Bishop Simon, p.201. 
7. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp. 10-11. Major Herbst on 
the A.R.B. 
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four miles from Steinkopf, under police supervision8. 
When the First World War broke out and the Union invaded G.S.W.A., 
Morris jOined the Union Defence Force as a scout, and earned much praise 
for his military ability in Major van Zyl's commando9. 
On the whole, Morris was much admired by those who knew him . Mr Caplan, 
a merchant in Steinkopf for whom Morris had worked from November 1917 to 
April 1921. descri bed Morri s as "upri ght, 1 oya 1 and a born 1 eader of men". 1 0 
Mr Humphreys described him as being of "excellent character" and said he 
11 
was "thought a great deal of by Europeans and Natives", while a local 
farmer, Mr C. Weidner, described Morris as intelligent, reliable, cunning 
and plucky12 
In 1922 Morris,now living as a shepherd, decided to cross the Orange River 
and rejoin his people. He was about fifty years old at the time13 . It 
was a fateful decision indeed. 
It is difficult to say exactly what Morris's motives were in returning. 
One of his ostensible reasons was that he had been given notice to leave 
the Steinkopf Reserve by the Corporal of the Steinkopf Raad for failing to 
pay his bywoner dues of £1 per annum. But the Corporal denied this, and 
Morris had in fact paid his dues 14. Indeed. at a meeting of the Steinkopf 
Raad on 15 April 1921 Morris had applied for, and was granted, a piece of 
land on the Orange River for a garden, and his ri f le permit was renewed. He 
was reported to be well-behaved, and was not ordered off the Reserve15 . 
8. T. A. Dept. Justi ceo Vol. 106. Fi le 2/1221/11. Union Department of 
Native Affairs to Secretary for Justice, Pretoria . 4 Sept. 1911 . 
9. R. P.N.A .C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.12. Major Herbst on the A. R. B. 
10. ibid. p.575. Mr Caplan. 
11. See f'.4~, fooTI\O+e. /lb · 
12. N.A.C. Report, p.13, para. 52. 
13. Freislich, p.ll. 
14. N.A.C. Report, p.13, para. 53. 
15. R.P.N. A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.605. Humphreys. 
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Morris's other reason for his return was that he was merely coming back 
to his old home and land16 , because his wife had died on 24 May 1921, and 
he wished to live with his own people. He wrote a letter to Jacobus 
Christian saying that we was coming and, to try and avoid giving trouble, 
would seek approval for his return17 . This he did not do. He wrote 
"Mijn hart is warl ijk droog van die Bywonerskap. Naar my land 
of moeder's land (terug to komen) dat is mijn vast plan en ook 
mening. Maar om geen moelikheid te bringen za1 ik goedkeuring 
zoeken Dat het dan Here behaagd om zijn wi1 uit te voeren 
en hl!eft (Hij) de ziel van mijn dierbaren echtgenoot uit die leven 
weg geroepen (opde)24ste Mei: Zodat ik nu mijn 1even op aarde 
aHeen moet voortzetten"18. 
However, it would seem likely that Jacobus Christian, Tim Beukes or some 
other Bondelswarts had invited him to join their agitation for better 
conditions 19 . But he made no secret of his arrival, crossing the Orange 
River above Haibmund in the middle of April with some other Bondelswarts 
and their wives, children, rifles and stock. When he met Jacobus Christian 
he ~ad about 16 rifles and 18 men with him . 
The fact that the returning Bonde1swarts were armed led some authorities, 
like General Lemmer of the N.A.C . to allege that Morris, influenced by 
the memory of 1906, returned to lead the Bonde1swarts in revo1t 21 . 
16 . ibid . p.791. Jantje Prins. 
17. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 8. 
18. W.A. Adm. Vol. 158. "Correspondence 1915-1920" Files W50-W65. 
File W60. Bondelzwarts Rising. (Hereafter referred to as W.A . Adm. 
Vol. 158 . F, le W6Qj . Abraham Morris to Jacobus Christian, n.d.) 
19. N.A.C. Report, p.13, para. 54. Seep.'d..I7. 
20. ibid.p.13, para. 55. 
R.P.N.A.C. Report of Evidence. p.374. Jacobus Christian to Fleck . 
27 July 1922. The Administration was only informed that five, not 
sixteen, men had crossed with Morris. It is unclear whether or not 
Jacobus Christian deliberately misled the authorities by reporting 
that Morris had crossed with five men. Jacobus himsel f later claimed 
that he had been misled by Morris, who had said only five men had 
crossed with one rifle. Morris only handed over one rifle to Sgt . 
van N i ekerk. 
21. N.A.C. Report, p. 14, para. 55a. 
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A local farmer, Visser, was told by his herdboy that Morris had crossed 
into S.W.A., and informed the police at Ramansdrift of this on 24 Apri1 22 
Morris sent a message to Jacobus informing him of his arrival and asking 
for transport to be sent for the women and children. Jacobus called 
a meeting of the Bondelswarts tribe and informed them of Morris's homecoming. 
The told Jacobus to send transport and to tell Morris to report to the magi-
strate and not to stay in the mountains 23 . Thus Jacobus sent a councillo~ 
Adam Pienaar, to go to the Orange Ri ver with a wagon and oxen and a donkey-
cart to fetch Morris. They arrived at Haib on 28 May 192224 . 
On their arrival Jacobus sent a message to Mr Noothout, the Reserve Superin-
tendent, informing him of Norris'~ arrival and intention to report to the 
Warmbad magistrate, Mr Fleck. Jacobus reported that Morris had crossed on 
25 April, and promised to keep Noothout informed of further developments. 
r·10rri shad sai d that he was comi ng home and had on 12 Apri 1 bee'n gi ven 
seven days by the Steinkopf Raad to pay his bywoner dues, which he said he 
could not afford25 . 
On 29 April Noothout telegraphed the news to Fleck26 , and on the same day 
wrote to Morris telling him to report to the magistrate 27 . Fleck said he 
would not act until he had received Jacobus's letter28 . He received it, 
and on 5 t~ay 1922 sent Sgt . J.A. van Niekerk and Native Constable Gert Kraai 29 
22. ibid. para. 56. 
23. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.458-459. Jacobus Christian. 
24. ibid. p.253. Oet. Sgt. Pietersen presents evidence of Johannes Boyse. 
25. ibid. pp. 480-431. Noothout. Jacobus Christian to Noothout. 28 April 1922. 
26 . N.A.C. Report, p.14, para. 58. 
27. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.434. Noothout. 
28. N.A.C. Report, p.14, para. 58. 
29. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.l,OOO. Sgt. van Niekerk. 
(Kraai was a Herero). 
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to see if Morris and the others had the relevant permits. Meanwhile, 
Bonde1swarts from allover the Reserve began trekking to Haib to see their 
almost legendary her030. 
Sgt. van Niekerk was instructed to patrol the Bonde1swarts' reserve and to 
see if Morris and his followers had arrived, and whether Morris had brought 
a rifle with him and had the necessary permit for it or not. On 6 May 
van Niekerk and Kraai left for Haib . Their orders from the post commandant 
(Sgt. Naude) were that if the Bonde1swarts who had returned did not have a 
permit allowing them to return to S.W.A., they were to be arrested and brought 
back to Warmbad. 
When Sgt . van Niekerk and Native Constable Kraai arrived at Haib Morris 
"reluctantly" handed over a rifle and two cartridges and a Union rifle 
permit31 . van Niekerk and Kraai then went on to Us to examine and count 
the stock which the returning Bonde1swarts had brought with them32. He found. 
six male Bonde1swarts who had crossed with Morris, and that they had brought 
220 head of small stock, six dogs, five horses and thirty donkeys with them33 
The next day Sgt. van Niekerk and Native Constable Kraai went to Guruchas. 
When they arrived the Bonde1swarts were in church, and so they waited out-
side34. When the Bonde1swarts came out, Jacobus Christian asked van Niekerk 
if he had come to arrest Morris and the others who had crossed with him, and 
received a reply in the affirmative35. Sgt. van Niekerk told Jacobus to 
inspan a wagon for the trip to Warmbad36 , but Jacobus offered to bring Morris 
30. N.A.C. Report, p.14, para. 58. 
31. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.998. Sgt. van Niekerk. 
32. N.A.C. Report, p.14, para. 59 . . 
33. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.1 ,005-1 ,006. Sgt. van Niekerk 
Their names were Jan .8a1ie; Jacob Ba1ie;Hendrik Jonas; Koos Laber10t, 
Abraham Christian and Hendrik Joseph. Here again, Sgt. van Niekerk 
told the N.A.C. that six men had crossed with Morris, whereas in sub-
sequent negotiations there are only references to five men. 
34. ibid. p.379. Fleck. Jacobus Christian to Fleck. 27 July 1922. 
35. ibid. p.999. Sgt. van Niekerk. 
36. ibid. p.379. Fleck . ·Jacobus Christian to Fleck. 27 July 1922. 
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and the others to Warmbad himself. Morris agreed, and van Niekerk said that 
in that case it would not be necessary to arrest him, and told Jacobus that 
he would go ahead to Haib to spend the night, and that Jacobus should leave 
with Morris and the others early the next morning. He said he would wait 
on the road to Warmbad to see if they were coming, and if he saw them he 
would go ahead and tell the magistrate that they were coming vo1untari1y37. 
But at 8 a.m. on 8 May Sgt. van Niekerk received a message from Jacobus 
to the effect that although he was willing to bring Morris and the others in, 
the tribe would not allow him to do so. van Niekerk sent a reply saying 
that unless Morris was on his way to Warmbad within four hours, he would 
return to Guruchas and arrest him. The time limit elapsed, and so van 
Niekerk and Kraai returned to Guruchas. When they arrived Jacobus could not 
be found, and Morris denied being unwilling to go to Warmbad, and denied 
any knowledge of Jacobus's message38. Sgt. van Niekerk then instructed 
Stephanus : Christian to call all the foremen to Jacobus's hut. They had 
11 t d th h J b "d "th M "39 co ec e ere w en aco us arrlve Wl orrlS. 
Sgt. van Niekerk then placed his hand on Morris's shoulder and arrested him 
in the name of the King. A Bonde1swarts jumped between them and pushed 
them apart40 , and "threatening actions, gestures and words" followed. The 
tension mounted41 , and van Niekerk was surrounded. He appealed to the 
headmen by name to help hi m execute hi s d·uty, and then appealed to a 11 the 
Bondelswarts42 , but to no avail. 
37. R.P.N.A.C. Report. t1i nutes of Evi dence. p.999 . Sgt . van Niekerk. 
38. N.I\.C. Report, p.14. para 59. 
39 . R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 813. Native Constable Gert 
Kraai. 
40. ibi d. pp.813-814. 
4l. N.A.C. Report, p. 14. para. 59. 
42. R. P.N . A.C . Report. Mi nutes of Evidence. p.1 .001 . Sgt. van Niekerk . 
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Sgt. van Niekerk then told Morris that he was still under arrest, and told 
the foremen that they had committed a serious · crime. He said he would go 
to higher authorities and that they would come with a large force to arrest 
Morris and the others, because this . 43 was the second time that the Bondels-
warts had defied the police44 . Many Bondelswarts alleged later that van 
Niekerk has said that "Die lood van die Goevernement sal nou op julle 
smelt" but both Sgt. van Niekerk and Native Constable Kraai emphatically 
deny this45. van Niekerk then left Guruchas with Kraai 46. 
On the evening of Sgt. van Niekerk's departure on 8 May the Bondelswarts 
military appointments were made . Adam Pienaar was appointed war magistrate, 
Klaas Isaac (alias Babab), commandant and Johannes Laverlot, together with 
Hans Zwartbooi and Jacobus Christian (junior)47 were appointed Wachtmeisters 48 . 
The Bondelswarts said that Sgt. van Niekerk had said war would be declared 
on them, and some regarded his words as coming from the Administrator. 
Jacobus Christian stated that he had collected his people together to die 
together, and all the Bondelswarts were called into Guruchas 49 . Klaas Matt-
hebus, a Bondelswart, was later to say "Wat die Sergt ze het onsgejaag", 50 
and Jantje Prins said "Sergt van Niekerk nem die eerste stap naar oorlog,,51. 
43. The first time was the Jeremias Christian incident. See p.bd-.. 
44. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 1,002. Sgt. van Niekerk. 
45. N.A.C. Report, p.1S, para. 60. Unfortunately, Sgt. van Niekerk told 
the N.A.C., he had lost the record of events which had been written 
in his pocket-book. 
46. ibid. p.l,002. 
47. He was Captain Jacobus Christian's nephew. 
48. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.383. Fleck . Jacobus Chris-
tian to Fleck. 27 July 1922. 
49. ibid. p.350. Mgr. Krol ikowski. 
50. ibid. p.786. K. Matthebus. 
51. ibid. p.789. J. Prins. 
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Some authorities felt that the Bondelswarti decision to oppose the 
Government was only taken after Sgt . van Niekerk's visit. while other felt 
that Morris had intended to lead the tribe in open revolt all along 52 . 
The effect of the attempted arrest of Morris on the Bondelswarts is shown 
by a letter from Jacobus to Abram Watt. a Le Fleur agent. on 16 May 1922 . 
Jacobus gave a list of Bondelswarts grievances. and summend up their attitude 
to the attempted unrest by saying that they had decided to refuse to allow 
Morris to be arrested "since he has stolen nothing from anyone and he is 
not guilty". Jacobus also wrote that Sgt. van Niekerk had promised the 
Bondelswarts that they would be "exterminated,,53. 
Jacobus found that his people were tired of his acquiescence to Government 
demands. On 4 May 1922 Det. Sgt. Pietersen at Warmbad wrote to his superior 
in Windhoek 
"I am informed tha t there is a movement afoot among the members 
of the Bondelzwarts tribe. to depose their present chief GIacobus 
ChristiaQ) and to elect this Nicholas Christian in his stead, on the 
grounds that they consider him to be an "Old Woman" who is afraid 
to go against the Administration"54. 
Jacobus had given into the Gover nment on issues like the dog tax and brandi ng 
law, and now he found himself iwth the support of only three of the Raad 
members, namely Stephanus Chri st ia 11 Johannes Adam and No 1 s Ortman 55. The 
Capta i n had to obey the decision of the Raad 56 . The Bondelswarts were proud 
of Morris 57 • regarding him as their "Champion and Hero,,58 Thus several 
witnesses to the N.A.C. said that with the attempted arrest of Morris the 
52. N.A.C. Report, p.31, para's. 8 & 9a. 
53. ibid. p.15. para. 62. 
54. W.A. Adm . File A388/1. Det . Sgt. Pietersen to Officer Commanding, 
C. 1.0 .• Windhoek. 
55. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.385. Fleck. Jacobus Chris-
tian to Fleck. 27 July 1923. 
56. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft A. p.2. See p.5". 
57. R. P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.493. Timotheus Beukes. 
58. ibid . p.953. Lt. Prinsloo. 
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Bonde1swarts resolved to fight rather than to surrender him59 . 
There were three charges against Morris and those who had ~rossed with him. 
They fen under subsection 1 of Sect. 4. of Proclamation No. 11 of 1922, 
which prohibited the introduction of livestock into S.W.A. without a permit, 
Subsection 1 of Proclamation No. 10 of 1915, which prohibited the possession 
of unlicensed firearms, and subsection - of Sect. 4 of Proclamation No. 28 
of 1920, which prohibited the introduction of firearms into S.W.A. without 
the prescribed permit60• 
Meanwhile. Sgt. van Niekerk reported his failure to arrest Morris to Fleck. 
On 10 May. therefore. Fleck sent a message to Jacobus Christian asking him 
to come and see him61 . The messenger, Johannes Bezuidenhout, delivered 
the message. but remained with the Bonde1swarts and warned Jacobus that he 
wou1 d be arrested if he went to Warmbad62 , and sai d that "there was war on 
the other side,,63. As a result. Jacobus did not go to Warmbad64 . 
59. ibid. p.252. Det.-Sgt. Pietersen presents evidence of A. Matroos. 
ibid. p.253. Det.-Sgt. Pietersen presents evidence of J. Prins. 
ibid. p.254 . Det.-Sgt.Pietersen presents evidence of J. Boyse. 
ibid . p.256. Det.-Sgt. Pietersen presents evidence of H. Schneeuwe. 
60. N.A.C. Report, p. 17, para . 71. 
61. ibid. p. 15., para. 63. 
62 . R.P.N . A. C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.382. Fleck. Jacobus Christian 
to Fleck. 27 July 1922 . Freis1ich. p.16. 
63. R.P . N. A.C . Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.475. Stephanus Christian. 
64. ibid. p.462. Jacobus Christian. 
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On the same day (10 May) Fleck, warned by a local farmer that the Bonde1-
swarts were trekking to Haib, telegraphed Hofmeyr and told him about the 
attempted arrest, and asked for a strong police force to be sent65 . On 
11 May Hofmeyer called Major van Coller, head of the S.W.A . Police, and on 
12 May Major Van Coller left for Ka1kfontein-South66 . He was instructed, 
verbally, to ensure "that every possible care was exercised" and to explain 
the laws to the Bonde1swarts67 . He was to arrest Morris and the others on 
the three charges, peacefully if possible, and was not to use force before 
first consulting with Hofmeyr 68 Major Van Coller was accompanied by 
three details of S.W.A. Police, and was joined at Keetmanshoop by an N.C.O . 
and three more police, arriving at Ka1kfontein-South on 13 May 1922. 69 
The next day Major Van Coller went into action. He sent a message via 
Noothout asking Jacobus Christian and his headmen to come to Dr i ehoek to 
meet him to hear an important message from the Administrator. Jacobus 
replied the same day, refusing to attend, saying that his wife was ill and 
that he feared for his life, since Sgt. van Niekerk had said that the 
Bonde1swarts would be destroyed . The Bonde1swarts said Jacobus, wished to 
speak to Noothout and not the po1ice.70 
65. N. A. C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.382. Fleck. Jacobus Christian 
to Fleck. 27 July 1922. Freis1ich, p.16. 
66. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.123. Major Charles Andries 
Brink Van Coller. Divisional Inspector of S.W.A. Police from Jan. 
1920. Staff Officer in S. W.A. from 15 Nov. 1915. 
(Ka1kfontein-South is today known as Karasberg). 
67. R.P . N.A . C. Report . Minutes of Evidence. p.53. Major Herbst. 
68 . ibid. pp.124-125. Maj or Van Coller . 
69. ibid . p.127. 
70. N.A.C. Report, p.17, para . 72. 
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This led Fleck to telegraph Hofmeyr on 15 May to ask \ whether (in the 
light of Jacobus's reply) negotiations shouldconti·nue 71 . He pointed out 
that Jacobus had given no reason why his headmen could not attend the 
Driehoek meeting, even if he could not. The Native Constable who had 
delivered the message had reported that the Bondelswarts were well-armed and 
hostile, and if fo rce was to be used to arrest Morris, reinforcements were 
needed72. However, Hofmeyr· replied that negotiations should continue. 
Major Van Coller thus decided, as instructed by Hofmeyr to send Noothout 
and another white to see the Bondelswarts. The other white was Monsignor 
Krolikowski, head of the Catholic mission in the Bondelswarts area. Th ey 
went to visit the tribe on 17 May 192273 . 
Noothout as Superintendent had been appointed to work under and report to 
the Warmbad magistrate 74 . He had no authority to make any promises other 
that those he was instructed t07 5. He was to 1 d to inform the Bonde 1 swarts 
that the Government did not wish to shoot any body, or : 
"to interfere with any except persons who have broken laws of the 
country who must be brought before Magistrate for trial". 
This instruction was contained in Hofmeyr's telegram of 15 May76 
However, on their way to meet the Bondelswarts Mgr. Krolikowski said that he 
had asked Noothout what message the latter had for the Bondelswarts and 
said that Noothout told him that he 
71. ibid. p.17, para. 74. 
72. R.P.N.A.C. Report . Minutes of Evidence . 00 . 132-133. Major Van Coller. 
Telegram Fleck to fJ ofmeyr. 15 May 1922. 
73 . N.A.C. Report, p.17, para. 75. 
74. R.P.N . A.C . Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.93. Major Manning. 
75. ibid. p.145. Major Van Coller. 
76. R. P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures . An.l. p.ll. A.R.B. 
Major Van Coller's report on the Bondelswarts rebellion of 1922 to 
the Secretary for S.W.A . 
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"had received a telegram from the Administrator to the effect 
that Morris, with 6 or 5 men, should report at once to the magi-
strate at Warmbad, and everything would -be forgiven and forgotten 
that they would only be tried for being without a gass, and that 
there would be only an enquiry about the rifles".77. 
Noothout later denied telling Mgr. Krolikowski that he had received a 
telegram. He said that in fact he had told him that Major Van Coller had 
received a telegram from Hofmeyr, in which he, Noothout, had seen or 
construed the words "forgi ven and forgotten" 78 
When they arrived at Guruchas they met Jacobus, Tim Beukes and about 400 
Bondelswarts. On their arrival Jacobus called the headmen. _ Mgr. Krol i kow-
ski reported that Noothout was "very excited" and that "he began to weep", 
because the Bondelswarts were armed 79 . Noothout delivered the message as 
he had told Mgr. Krolikowski, but the Bondelswarts headmen objected because 
it was only "a word in the air ,, 80. They asked Mgr . Krol i kowski if he had 
seen the telegram containing Hofmeyer's message. Krolikowski said that he 
had not, but that he did believe there was such a telegram81 . 
Noothout told the N.A.C. later that he had told Jacobus that if Morris and 
the four men who had crossed with him reported to the magistrate "everythi ng 
would be forgiven and forgotten", but that "they should first come to the 
magistrate to get punished". He had also told them that he and Mgr. Krolikow-
ski would be present when Morris and the four men appeared before the magi-
strate, to see that justice was done. 
But said Noothout, Jacobus told him that Morris and the four men would not 
77. N.A.C. Report, p.1 8, para. 79. 
78. R. P. N. A. C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.44S. Noothout. 
79 . ibid. p.351. Mgr. Krolikowski. 
SO . N. A.C . Report, p.1S, para. 79. 
Sl. R. P.N . A. C. Report . Minutes of Evidence. p.354. Mgr. Krolikowski. 
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come "because van Niekerk had declared war on them'.' 'Noothout explained 
that they had misunderstood Sgt. van Niekerk, ·and that if Morris had a 
permit for his rifle and his people everything "would be in order", but, if 
not, they were to go to the magistrate for punishment. He denied making any 
promises of his own to them82 , and said he had impressed on them the serious-
ness of their failure to assist the police, and had told them that if it 
happened again "drastic measures could be expected,,83 Beukes then asked 
Noothout where the letter from Hofmeyr containing the assurance was, 
whereupon Noothout replied that Major Van Coller was a trusted emissary of 
the Administrator and had been sent to deliver the message. But Beukes said 
he would only believe written eVidence84. Mgr. Krolikowski then took the 
Bondelswarts headmen aside into a hut, leaving Noothout outside. He told them 
to bring their complaints before hofmeyr . , and offered to pay for Jacobus to 
go the Windhoek for this purpose, pointing out the futility of war against 
the Government. Jacobus replied that he did not want war, but that Sgt. Van 
Niekerk had declared war on them. Krolikowski said that he explained to the 
Bondelswarts that Sgt. van Niekerk could not do this, to which Jacobus replied 
that the Bondelswarts "do not see the Administrator, only the police and the 
mag is tra te" whom they had to obei5 
Mgr. Krolikowski then came out of the hut and rejoined Noothout. He told 
Noothout of the Bondelswarts' request for a letter from Hofmeyr , which they 
would promise to obey. However, Noothout said that he could not wire Hof-
meyr for a letter, since he was only empowered to deliver a message. He 
82. N.A.C. Report, p.18, para. 78. 
83. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.139. Major Van Coller - his 
report ~ Hofmeyr . on negotiations with the Bondelswarts. 
84. ibid. p.462. Jacobus Christian. 
85. ibid. p.355-356. Mgr. Krolikowski. 
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refused to allow Mgr. Krolikowski to wire, but instead offered to write out 
a telegram which Krolikowski could sign so that the Bondelswarts could believe 
it. Mgr. Krolikowski explained this to Jacobus but the latter was adamant 
and asked for a letter from Hofmeyr. 
At this, Mgr. Krolikowski said, Noothout "put his papers together and said 
there was nothing further to be done,,86. Krolikowski asked Noothout in English 
to wire for a letter, as the Bondelswarts did not understand that a wire 
was the same as a letter, and that if Noothout broke off now it would "very 
likely come to hostilities". Noothout then agreed to write out a letter for 
Jacobus to sign instead87 
Noothout wrote the letter and siad he was prepared to take it to Major 
Van Coller, even though those were not his instructions88 . The letter read 
"1, Jacobus Christian, declare herewith that the 5 men will immediately 
report themselves to the magistrate at Warmbad when 1 have received an 
assurance, in writing, from the Administrator at Windhoek, that if 
these men surrender everything will be forgiven and forgotten and that 
no further stels will be taken against my people, as told us by the 
Commissioner (J:joothouD. "89 
It was read out in Dutch and Nama "so tha t everyone woul d be able to under-
stand it". Morris agreed to the terms of the letter and then Jacobus and 
Beukes signed it. Noothout as ked Mgr. Kro 1 i kowski to sign it as witnes s to 
th . t 90 e slgna ures . 
Noothout 1 ater said that he had expected .Ho"fmeyr to accede to the Bondel s-
warts request for a letter91 . Jacobus Christian said he understood the 
86. ibi d, p.357-8. 
Or, in Noothout's own words, he said that he would "wash my hands of 
them". N.A.C. Report, p.18, para. 78. 
87. N. A.C. Report, p.18, para. 8l. 
88. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.446 . Noothout. 
89. N.A.C. Report, p.18, para. 77. 
90. N.A.C. Report, p.19, para. 8l. 
91. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.451 . Noothout. 
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terms of the letter as follows: 
"Ik dacht dat indien die 5 men zich rap~orteerden er .geen 
. verdere .stappen zonden genomen worden tegen het vo 1 k" . 92 
Mgr. Krolikowski wrote a letter to Noothout the day after their visit, on 
'18 May, since he felt apprehensive of a breach of faith on the part of either 
Noothout or .Hofmeyr. He wrote : 
"it is most important that when these 5 men have reported themselves 
to the magistrate they be let off without any fine or punishment" . 
He asked Noothout to wire this letter to Hofmeyr and to ask him to give the 
Warmbad magistrate the necessary instructions. This was done, and as a result 
Hofmeyr · wired back to Major Van Coller asking what promises had been made 
to the Bondelswarts93 . Major Van Coller replied that Noothout denied 
making any promises beyond that Hofmeyr was prepared to overlook the dis-
obedience of the Bondelswarts in failing to assist the police when called 
upon to do s094. But, said Major Van Coller, he doubted Noothout, since: 
H subsequent i nforma ti on imparted to me s i gnifi cant but not relevant 
to point at issue discloses the fact that certain particulars which 
shouldhave been conveyed to me by him have been withheld"9S. 
On 19 May Major Van Coller asked Mgr. Krolikowski to accompany him to visit 
Jacobus Christian, but Krolikowski refused96 . He wrote to Noothout saying 
this, and expressed surprise that Hofmeyr did not communicate directly with 
him if he desired his help. Hofmeyr replied in a telegram on 19 May ad-
monishing Krolikowski for expecti ng niceties considering the speed of events 
and made a special plea to him "to held me bring the Bondelzwarts to reason 
and save bloodshed". Morris and the others who had crossed with him wou l d 
92. ibid. p.463. Jacobus Christian . 
93. N.A.C. Report. pp . 19-20, para's. 84 & 85. 
94. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.141. Major Van Coller . 
95. ibid. p.142. 
96. N.A.C. Report. p.20, para 89. 
have to surrender and face trial, said Hofmeyr, but he would: 
"give every consideration to further clemency should they be 
convicted and will undertake not to bring to trial any othe·rs". 
He thus asked Mgr. Krolikowski to accompany Major Van Coller to deliver a 
message to the Bondelswarts97 . 
But Krolikowski refused, since, he said, Major Van Coller was head of the 
police and he did not wish to be identified with them by the Bondelswarts. 
Instead, he offered to go alone and deliver the message98 . But when he read 
the message, Mgr. Krol ikowski was astounded that Hofmeyr had not sent the 
letter of assurance asked for, but instead had sent a list of certain demands 
and conditions for a Bondelswarts surrender. Mgr. Krolikowski refused to 
prejudice either his church or himself by associating with the chief of police 
or the message. As a compromise, he was asked'. to go to Haib and tell the 
Bondelswarts that Hofmeyr - had not sent the assurance asked for, but had 
sent Major Van Coller with authority to sign and settle things on his behalf . 
Krolikowski was also to try and persaude Jacobus to meet Major Van Coller 
at Drie hoek , and a safe conduct was offered. If Jacobus r efused, then 
Hofmeyr himself had offered to meet Jacobus at a place selected by the 
Admi ni strator99 . 
Mgr. Krolikowski visited the Bondelswarts on 20 r~ay. They told him "Van 
Coller is een Oorlogsman en ons is bang'; .and t hus Krolikowski sent a message 
to Major Van Coller the same day, conveying the Bondelswarts' request to see 
Hofmeyr. If Hofmeyr · came, the Bondelswarts said, others could accom pany 
him, implying that Major Van Coller could come too. They promised not to 
do anything if the Government refraimed from action, citing their non-hin-
drance of whites with rifles passing t hrough their Reserve as evidence of 
their peaceful intentions. 
97. R. P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of tvidence. pp.l .47-l48. Major Van Coller. 
98. N.A.C. Report, p.20, para. 89. 
99. ib i d. p.20, para. 90. 
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Mgr. Krolikowski himself said that he did not think it advisable that either 
Major Van Coller Dr Fleck go to visit the Bondelswarts. After this visit 
Krolikowski went to Keetmanshoop and would have nothing more to do with 
the affair, and never did meet Hofmeyr 100. 
On 21 May, despite Mgr. Krolikowski's warning, Major Van Coller, Fleck and 
Noothout all went to visit the Bondelswarts to convey the message ' Mgr. Kro-
lik\OWSki had refused to deliver. On their way there they were stopped by 
Bondelswarts sentries, who were armed and who mounted the running-boards 
of the car and escorted them in,an act interpreted by Hofmeyr as a gross 
insult. It also showed that the Bondelswarts were acting as if ,a state of 
war already existed. 
On arrival, Major Van Coller announced that he had Hofmeyr's authority to 
, d 1<' d't' 101 slgn an rna e con 1 lons . He had been instructed by Hofmeyr to listen 
to the Bondel swarts' reply to Hofmeyr's demands, and to ask them_ if they 
would like to meet the Administrator at a place chosen by him before giving 
a final answer. Major Van Coller was to leave his police behind and was to 
clear up any confusion over the last visits of Noothout and Krolikowski l02 . 
In his message Hofmeyc' laid down several conditions. These were that the 
five men had to be delivered for trial before the magistrate, and that if 
this was done they would only be tried for the offences for which they had 
been originally charged, and no others desides the five would be liable for 
punishment. If the five were found guilty, clemency would be at the sole 
discretion of the Administrator. All arms and ammunition were to be sur-
rendered, and Hofmeyr urged Jacobus and Beukes to refrain from obstructing 
the police, for the sake of the tribe's future l03 . Hofmeyr declared himself 
100. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.364-5. Mgr. Krolikowski. 
101. N.A.C. Report, p.21, para. 91. 
102. ibid. para. 95. 
103. ibid. para. 92. 
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always ready to give "protection and relief" to the Bondelswarts, but 
said that wilful disobedience would be severelydealt with. He pointed out 
that Noothout had assured him earlier that year that the Bondelswarts were 
content, and said that any further resistance to the police would have 
serious consequences l04. He had received no petition of complaint from the 
Bondelswarts and thus found their attitude "inexplicable" . He warned the 
Bondelswarts' leaders that unless his conditions were met he would "reluctantly 
be compell ed to resort to extreme measures" 105. 
Major Van Coller also told the Bondelswarts that Sgt. van Niekerk was not 
. 106 
competent to declare war on behalf of the Government He stressed that 
all were equal before the law, and that the magistrate was there to hear 
grievances l 07 . The Bondelswarts were given two days in which to reply to 
Hofmeyr's conditions lOB . Fleck also offered Jacobus a free passage to 
Windhoek to .speak to Hofmeyr; and assured him that he would be allowed to 
return 109. 
But Major Van Coller privately reported to Hofmeyr that already by 19 May 
he was "satisfied" that the Bondelswarts intended to resist any attempt to 
arrest the five menl10 . 
On 22 May the Bondelswarts Raad met to discuss Hofmeyr' s . conditions 111 . 
They were divided over what to do, with J acobus Christian, Nols Ortman 
Johannes Adam and Stephanus Christian favouring giving in to the conditions, 
while Beukes, Morris and Pienaar wanted to reject them. The latter group won 
104. R.P.tLA.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.150. Major Van Coller. 
105. N.A.C. Report, p.21, para. 92 . 
106. ibid. para . 93. 
107. R. P.N.A . C. Report. Mi nutes of Evidence. p. 163. Major Van Coller . 
lOB. N.A.C. Report, p.22, para. 95. 
109. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 40B. Fleck. 
110. ibid. p.55. Major Herbst on the A. R. B. 
111. ibid. p.234. Det.-Sgt. Pietersen presents evidence of J. Prins. 
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the day~12 When Klaas Isaac, alias Babab, gave the letter containing the 
Bonde 1 swarts' reply to Hofmeyr's demands to the messenger to de 1 i ver to 
Noothout, he told him "This is the letter that will start the war,,1l3. 
The reply, signed by Jacobus and sent on 23 May, stated that the Bondels-
warts would not surrender their arms and ammunition since the five men 
had not sto 1 en anythi ng, and Morri s had already handed over hi s ri fl e to 
Sgt. van Niekerk, besides which the Bondelswarts had no rifles to hand over 
because the Government had failed to return the rifles handed over by 
Jacobus in 1919; which he now requested be returned l14 . 
On receipt of the letter Hofm~yr sent another invitation to Jacobus to 
meet him at Kalkfontein-South. or some place chosen by Jacobus and approved 
of by the Administrator. But this invitation, though delivered. was ignored l15 . 
Hofmeyr later said that he would have shown leniency if Morris had surrendered 
and might have given him a suspended sentencel16 . His instructions throughout 
the negotiations were to avoid conflict. However, he told Major Van Coller 
that if the situation demanded immediate action he could use force to effect 
the arrests, report on the results. and then wait for further instructions l17 . 
Hofmeyr said he wished for peace, and had tried hard for a peaceful settle-
ment1l8. 
112. ibid . p.465. Jacobus Christian. 
113. ibid . p.254. Oet.-Sgt. Pietersen presents evidence of J. Matroos. 
114. ibid. pp.165-l66. Major Van Coller. 
115. N.A.C. Report, p.22. para. 95. 
116. R.P.N . A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.12. Major Herbst. 
117. ibid. p.136. Major Van Coller. 
118. N.A.C. Report, p.22. para. 97. 
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But already on 15 May Hofmeyr had begun to prepare for the worst. In a 
telegram of that day to Fleck he had instructed all magistrates in th~ south 
to call for mounted volunteers, swear them in as special Constables, and 
place them at Major Van Coller's disposall1 9. 
On 18 May Major Herbst called Lt. Prinsloo and told him to go to Kalkfontein-
South and to get twenty armed Native Constables ready_ Lt. Prinsloo per-
suaded Hofmeyr' that in case of war Native Constables would not be much 
good, and was thus instructed to get ten white police and ten Native Con-
stables ready and fully equipped. They left Windhoek by train on 20 May, 
arriving at Kalkfontein-South the next day120. 
On 19 .May Hofmeyrc received Major Van Coller's report that he was satisfied 
that the Bondelswarts intended to resist any attempt to arrest the five men. 
Major Van 'Coller also reported that insufficient volunteers were coming 
forward and advocated martial law. Major Herbst later said that he felt 
vo 1 unteers were reluctant to come forward at fi rs t beca.use they wanted an 
experienced man to be appointed as the leader of the campaign121 
Hofmeyr. said he had received reports of unrest amongst blacks in the Keet-
manshoop and Gibeon districts, and had heard that some tribes, like those 
at Beersheba and Vaalgras, were ready to co-operate with the Bondelswarts in 
the event of war. In the ~Iarmbad distr"ict small parties of Bondelswarts were 
reportedly forcibly collecting arms from isolated white farmers, and a general 
white panic was approaching. Thus he called for volunteers in Windhoek and 
telegraphed magistrates in the south of S.W.A. to recruit volunteers. When 
119. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures , An 1. p.ll. A.R.B. Major 
Van Coller's report on the Bondelswarts rebellion of 1922 to the Secre-
tary for S. H. A . . 
120. R.P.N.A.C.Report.Hinutes of Evidence. pp.955-956. Lt. Prinsloo. 
121. ibid. pp.55-56. Major Herbst on the A.R.B. 
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he arrived at Kalkfontein-South on 23 May he had over 100 mounted men, 
wi th others from nei ghbouring di stri cts coming in rapi dl y. . Hofmeyr fe 1 t 
that delay would be fatal, and so took personal command122 With him at 
Kalkfontein-South were sixty volunteers who were civil servants from Wind-
hoek, and his private secretary and Major Herbst, the Secretary for the 
Proctectorate123 . 
Hofmeyr had decided to collect troops at Kalkfontein-South during negotia-
tions because he felt that it was obvious that Jacobus and the Bondelswarts 
tribe did not want to give up Morris unless he was allowed to go free124 . 
Major Herbst said that the Administration had had no alternative but to con-
vince Jacobus that he had to abide by the law125 , and Hofmeyr' said that 
the disarming of Noothout by the Bondelswarts at Driehoek on 26 May was the 
last straw as far as the Government was concerned126 . He felt that swift 
action was imperative to prevent the development of a long, drawn-out 
guerrilla war127 . 
By TI:iursda.l1 25 May nearly 400 troops were ready. and the Bondelswarts were 
still collected at Guruchas 128• 
The collecting of troops at Kalkfontein-South did influence the Bondelswarts. 
It did not help matters, and only increased the Bondelswarts' distrust of 
the Government. This distrust was shown by their insistence to Noothout 
and Mgr. Krolikowski for a letter from Hofmeyr . with his seal and signature129 
122. ibid . pp.56-58. 
123. ibid. p.53. 
124. ibid. p.60. 
125. ibid . p.61. 
126. ibid. p.63. 
127. R.P. Hofmeyr's Memorandum . p. 9. 
128. N.A.C . Report, p.23, para. 98. 
129. R.P.N . A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.352.Mgr . Krolikowski. 
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Their suspicion was increased by Bezuidenhout's defection. The seeds of 
distrust, sown over a long period of Bondelswarts-white relations had now 
borne frui t. 
Meanwhile, the Bondelswarts began to prepare themselves for the coming 
conflict. On 22 May they stole six horses from a local farmer, Mr Becker130 . 
On 23 May some Bondelswarts arrived at the farm of Mr Basson. Armed, but 
polite, they demanded tobacco, meat, bread and guns and asked Basson's wife 
to make them some coffee. They left taking three rifles 131 . On 24 May 
they stole provisions from the trader, Mr A. Viljoen, at Guruchas. Then, on 
25 May, they disarmed Noothout, and looted his house the next day132 But 
noneof these people were harmed. 
However, there was a case of overt violence with the murder of Mrs Lydia 
Sarah Coleman on the farm "Kubub" in the Liideritz district. Three armed 
Nama arrived at her house and asked for arms and ammunition. She refused 
and was shot and fatally wounded by them. The house was looted, but she 
survived until the police came. The Nama were tracked down, one of them 
being shot in the process, and the other two stood trial for murder ·133 
~ome blamed the murder on the Bondelswarts and felt that the same would 
have happened to other whites if .they had put up resistance134. Whatever the 
case, it whipped up stronger anti-Bondelswarts feelings amongst local whites 135 . 
o 0 0 - - -
130. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.234. Oet. -Sgt. Pietersen 
presents evidence of J. Prins. 
131. ibid . p.833. Jasper Nicholas Basson, farmer on farm "Grootplaats" . 
132. ibid. pp.235-236. Oet.-Sgt. Pietersen presents evide~ce of A. Viljoen, 
Noothout, and J. Prins. 
133. ibid. pp.953-954. Lt. Prinsloo. 
134. ibid.pp.954-955. 
135. Freislich, p.32. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SUPPRESSION. 
Hofmeyr decided to try and put down the rebellion ·without Union aid. Major 
Herbst told the N.A.C. that Hofmeyr did not want to ask Smuts for Union 
forces because he felt that the police and burghers had had enough after 
putting down the 1922 Witwatersrand rebellion. However, when he realized 
how small his forces were, he "reluctantly" called for some Union aid. 
He also felt that the settlers of S.W.A. should prove themselves worthy of 
the privileges they enjoyed by helping to suppress the revolt l . Freislich 
points out that Hofmeyr was probably also reluctant to involve the Union 
because S.W.A. was a mandated territory, and as such was in a delicate in-
ternation~l position2 
On 26 May 1922 two aeroplanes arrived from the Union at Kalkfontein-South. 
The Union 30vernment also provided two mountain guns and four Vjckers 
h " 3 mac lne-guns . 
Hofmeyr's plan was to strike quickly before the Bondelswarts revolt spread 
to the rest of S.W.A. and set the whole country ablaze4. A decisive blow 
had to be struck to cut off the Bondelswarts' retreat to the Fish or Orange 
R.iver mountains, and hence a strong force was needed5. Some people, like 
Sishop Simon in Little Namaqualand in the Union, felt that it was only the 
rapidity with which the Bondelswarts rebellion was crushed that prevented it from 
spreading to the Union Namas 6. 
l. R.P.N.A.C . Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.72. Major Herbst on the A.R.B . 
2. Freislich, p.1S. 
3. ibid. p.36 
4. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . p.72. Major Herbst on the A.R.B. 
5. ibid. Major Van Coller. p.16S. His report on military operations from 
26 May to S June 1922 for Hofmeyr. 
6. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An.7. p.2. Statement by 
Bishop Simon to Commissioner of Native Affairs, Upington. 1 Sept. 1922. 
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Hofmeyr's strategy was to deprive Abraham Morris of food and water, and 
he was nearly successful in this. He said he regretted having to use force, 
but once he realized that he had no alternative, he "was determined to inflict 
a severe and lasting lesson,,7. The entire Bondelswarts reserve was to be 
surrounded and the tribesmen driven into Guruchas and forced to surrender. 
In this arid country whoever controlled the waterholes controlled the surroun-
ding countryside. Thus it was decided to occupy the waterholes at Wortel, 
Driehoek, Dabigabis, Neufontein, Auputus and Norachas in order to deprive 
the Bondelswarts of water and to cut off their retreat. "C" Squadron with 
one machinegun was 
occupy Norachas 8. 
sent by train under Capt. J . C. Balt from Klein Karas to 
Lt. Jordaan led "D" Squadron also with a machinegun, and 
they went by lorry to occupy Wortel and Driehoek9. The crux of the plan was 
swift action. In Hofmeyr's own words: 
"if force is needed to effect the arrest the force used must be 
so overwhelming and so disposed that the retreat to the Orange 
River mount~ins is cut off".lB 
In accordance with this aim, Hofmeyr decided to take personal command of 
military operations, since he felt that delay would be fatal. As the highest-
ranking officer in S. W.A. was Lt . Col. Kruger, Hofmeyr "temporarily" assumed 
the rank of Colonel ll . Major Van Coller felt that more volunteers came in to 
he 1 p when they hea rd tha t Hofmeyr was tak~ ng persona 1 command because "they 
12 
were pleased that he was willing to take the responsibiliti' By 25 May it 
was decided that enough troops were ready. There were twenty-two officers 
and 348 other ranks. 13 
7. R.P . N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 73. Major Herbst on the A. R.B. 
8. See MapC. 
9. ibid . pp.171-172. Major Van Coller - his report on military operations. 
10. ibid. p.135. Telegram Hofmeyr to Fleck. 15 May 1922. 
11. ibid. p. 58. ~lajor Herbst on the A.R.B. 
12. ibid. p.170 . Major Van Coller - his report on military operations. 
13. ibid. p.201. 
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Meanwhile the Bondelswarts were organizing their own campaign. Jacobus 
Christian was hereditary chief, Morris fighting chief, and Timotheus 
Beukes under-captai nand Admi ni strati on Secretary. Each under-captain 
contro 11 ed a Commando, and each commando was di vi ded into secti ons under a 
sergeant-major14. Those that wanted to fight stayed,and ~ne of them, 
David Klaas, said later that his group had had ten rifles and eighteen 
muzzle loaders, and had to make their own cartridges since they were short 
of these15. One of those who did not fight, Christian Marcus, told the 
N.A.C. that there were three Bondelswarts to every firearm16. 
It seems that the Bondelswarts intended to conduct thei~ campaign on the 
same general 1 i nes that they had used so success fully in the 1904-1906 
revolt17 . Stephanus Christian later said that he had "thought that this 
was going to be the same business as the war with the German government" 18. 
14. ibid. p.994. Prinsloo. 
Timotheus Beukes, under oath, made a statement on 22 June 1922, saying 
that the Bondels' leaders, besides Jacobus Christian, were Adam 
Pienaar, Morris, Gert Zwartbooi, Jacobus Christian (junior), Jacobus 
Christian (nephew), Klaas Isaac (alias Babab), Abraham Matroos, Her-
manus Stephenus, Adam Witbooi, John Christian, Jan Christian, Gert 
Christian, Klaas Mattheius, Karl Josop, Lucas Witbooi, Hendrik Schnee-
uwe and Jantje Prens . p.4. W.A. Adm. File A388/1.p.4. 
15. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.634. Det. Cilliers. 
16. ibid. p.770. Christian t,larcus. 
17. ibid. p.467. Stephanus Christian. 
T8. ibid. p.477. Christian Marcus. 
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The Bondelswarts intended to build up their poor stock of arms and 
ammunition by ambushing Government sOldiersl : As a draft N.A.C. Report put 
it: 
"Whatever may have been the intention of the people with regard 
to armed resistance it is clear J •.• that at the time of van 
Niekerk's visit they were unprepared. They had one rifle for 
four men . No doubt when they did determine to rise they trusted to 
obta in enough guns to go round a 11 the men by ambushi ng thei r enemi es" 20 
The Bondelswarts under Morris worked out a military strategy, and if Hof-
meYL · had moved a little slower they might have had initial successes. 
Morris divided the eastern Bondelwarts commando into two sections. One 
under Babab and Adam Pienaar moved north to Driehoek and Wortel with 
seventy-five men 21 , commanding the most direct approach to the Reserve, 
and the second group, under Morris and Beukes moved south-east to Warmbad. 
The N.A . C. Report stated that Morris's intention was to attack and occupy 
the town22 . But Beukes later said that he and Morris had gone to Warmbad 
with fifty men to try and join up with the Warmbad Bondelswarts for the 
revolt 23 . Jacobus Christian and the remaining Bondelswarts occupied the 
western portion of the reserve, the hilly country around Guruchas and Us24 
There was activity in the Union too. On 20 May Hofmeyr wired Smuts saying 
that, if necessary, the South African Police might have to co-operate with 
the S.W.A . forces. Lt. Col. Trew, head of the S.A.P in the western districts, 
instructed the District Commander in Calvinia to send as many men as possible 
to Steinkopf to patrol the border, and the Pella police station was reinforced . 
Lt. Col . Trew kept in touch with Hofmeyr, but his instructions from Smuts 
were that the S. A.P . were not to cross the Orange River to participate in 
suppressing the revolt 25 . 
19. ibid. p.772 . Christian ~1arcu s... 
20. R.P.N.A.C . Report drafts. Draft B. pp.7-8. 
21. R. P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 484. T. Beukes. 
22. N.A.C. Report, p.23, paras. 99-101. 
23. R.P .N .A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . p.484. T. Beukes. 
24. N. A.C. Report, p.23, para. 101. 
25. R.P . N. A.C. Report . Minutes of Evidence. pp.l, 031-1,033. Lt. Col .H. F. Trew . 
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Lt. Brinton. sub-inspector of police in Little Namaqua1and. sent out 
patrols along the Orange River from Springbok . His instructions were to 
ascertain the movements of Nama in the Warmbad district. warn all the white 
farmers along the Orange River. and collect information about the revolt. 
He engaged six Nama for intelligence work. and sent out mounted patrols 
through the Richtersve1d26 . 
After the collapse of the Bonde1swarts revolt. Lt. Col Trew organized an 
armed patrol through the Richtersve1d as a show of force and to show the 
inhabitants that the area was not as impregnable as it was commonly regarded 27 
The first battle came at Oriehoek on 26 May , Capt. du Preez and Lt. Jordaan ' s 
"0" Squadron narrowly avoided a Bonde1swarts ambush and drove them off. 
One Government soldier. de Klerk. was killed. but nine Bondelswarts were 
killed . three were wounded and nine prisoners were taken 28• Babab was 
wounded in the battle and surrendered at Gabis 29 . The Bondelswarts retreated. 
and pursuit was made impossible owing to nightfal1 30 • The Government forces 
had narrowly avoided an ambush by taking a higher road to get around some 
soft sand31 . 
Morris. on his way to Warrnbad. heard of the Oriehoek defeat and turned back. 
The failure of the ambush was a serious blow to his plans. since the Bondel -
swarts were very short of arms and ammunition . Instead of fighting along 
an extended front. they were being forced back into the confines of Guru~ 
chas. where. mixed up with women. children and stock, they were an easy 
prey for bombs and machine-guns 32. 
26 . ibid. pp . 531-4. Lt . E. J. Brinton. 
27. ibid. p.l.053 . Lt.Col. Trew. 
28. ibid. p.l72. Major Van Coller. 
29. ibid. p.173. 
30 . ibid. p.l72. 
31. ibid. p.205. Major H. C. De Preez. Acting-Inspector of S.W.A. Police. 
32. N.A.C . Report, p.23. paras. 103-104. 
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On 24 May "A" Squadron, with two mountain guns and two machine-guns, ac-
companied by Colonel Hofmeyr and the H.Q. 's staff, moved from Kalkfontein-
South to Neufontein. Later Capt. Prinsloo was sent to occupy the Auputus 
waterhole, and on the way encountered the Bondelswarts near Us. The Bon-
del swarts under Pienaar had laid an ambush, but had opened fire too soon and 
had to retreat33 . The Government forces lost one man, Oelofse, in the am-
bush, and three Government soldiers were wounded. But Pienaar was shot and 
killed in the skirmish and the Bondelswarts were now in a predicament since 
all the waterholes around Guruchas were occupied by Government forces 34. 
The troops began to close in on Guruchas . On 29 May at 3p.m. Guruchas was 
bombed by the two aeroplanes and shelled by mountain guns 35. The Bondelswarts 
responded with heavy rifle fire, and the battle raged until dusk. With 
nightfall the Government forces attempted to form a cordon around Guruchas, 
but most of the Bondelswarts fighting men excaped unseen through gaps in 
the cordon in the darkness. At dawn on 30 May bombing was resumed, and the 
area fell silent . White rags were seen and the Bondelswarts surrendered. 
Ninety ma les and 700 women and children were taken prisoners36 
When the white flags were sighted Col. Hofmeyr sent a note to Jacobus Chris-
tian saying that if the white flags meant surrender, Jacobus should report 
to Hofmeyr pe rsonally and alone37 . ~1ajor Van Coller reported that: 
"At dawn 00 May] the aeroplanes entered to the attach, but after 
dropping a few shells t he enemies' fire was completely silenced. 
At 9a.m. reports were received that white flags were discernible in 
t : ,e enemi es' pos iti on, whereupon the order to cease fi re was i mmedi ate ly 
i ss ued".38. 
33. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Mfnutes ot EVid"ence . p. 173. r~ajor Van Coller. 
34. ibid. pp.966-970. Lt. Prinsloo. 
35. ibid . p.179. Major Van Coller. 
36. ibid . p.180. 
37. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures . Ex . 2. Hofmeyr to Jacobus 
Christian. 30 r~ay 1922. 
38 . ibid. An 1. p.17. A.R.B. 
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Sir Pierre van Ryneveld, commanding officer of the South African Air Force, 
said later that when the aeroplanes bombed Guruchas on 30 May he did not 
know if the Bondelswarts women and children had surrendered. Visibility was 
poor, and the bombs were aimed at stock and horses. Sixteen bombs were 
dropped during the course of the revolt39 , and the prisoners at Guruchas 
reported that the bombing had terrified and demoralized them. 
The Bondelswarts' livestock was collected, amounting to 12,470 sheep and 
goats, 800 cattle and 700 donkeys. Col. Hofmeyr decided that: 
"From information imparted by prisoners it was manifest that the 
rebellion had been completely crushed and that the fugitives, 
which included the redoubtable Abraham Morris, were merely fleeing 
to take refuge in the hi 115"40. 
But Major Prins, the liason officer between the Union and S.W.A. forces 
during the revolt, reported that on 30 Maya Bondelswarts prisoner had told 
Col. Hofmeyr that all the Bondelswarts fighting men had escaped . Col. Hof-
meyr decided that this was not true, and ordered the aeroplanes to bomb 
Guruchas 41. 
In fact, on the night of 29 May Jacobus Christian had instructed the Bondels-
warts fighting men to break out for Haibmund or the Fish River. He told his 
wife to put up a white flag when dawn broke42 . 
Col. Hofmeyr estimated that only about 150 Bondelswarts had escaped through 
the cordon. But Capt. Prinsloo reported that the figure was more like 500, 
and that the rebell ion was "by no means" over43 . Col. Hofmeyr sent Capt. Prins-
100 with only forty-five mounted men to pursue the Bondelswarts escapers. 
Meanwhile Guruchas was razed and the prisoners and stock taken away44. 
39. R.P.N.A.C. Report. r~inutes of Evidence. pp.l,1l7-1,1l8. Col. Sir 
Pierre van Ryneveld's statement on military operations. 
40. ibid. p.18l. Major Van Coller. 
41. ibid. p.l, 120. Major Anton Joseph Friedrich Prins. 
42. ibid. pp.770-771. Christian Marcus. 
43. ibid . p.l,017. Lt. Prinsloo's report on the A.R.B. 
44. Freislich, p.41. 
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Confident that the worst was over, Col. Hofmeyr and his H.Q. moved back 
to Kalkfontein-South 45 
With the collapse of their military strategy, the Bondelswarts fighting men 
excaped through the cordon in two companies, leaving behind the women, 
h . 1 d 1 d d b t t t f' ht' 46 0 e lf G h c 1 ren, 0 men an a ou wen y 19 1ng men n  c ear 0 uruc as 
A 
they rejoined to decide a plan of action. Abraham Matroos, a Bondelswarts 
corporal, said that after the flight from Guruchas, Morris and Jacobus quar-
relled. Jacobus Christian wanted to return and surrender, but Morris refused . 
Jacobus pointed out the Bondelswarts' lack of arms and ammunition, but 
Morris felt that they should go to the Fish River and try and get rifles from 
Nicholas Christian, who was living in exile there, or perhaps from the 
Richtersveld47• Morris won the day, but on the whole the Bondelswarts' 
military strategy had been knocked awry by the devastating effects of the 
bombing. As Jacobus Christian later said: 
"Wy hadden geen plannen omdat die vl iegmachines ons 
bedondered geschoten hadden."48. 
But things were not to work out for the Bondelswarts as well as they had 
-in the 1904-6 rebellion. The aeroplanes were a new and highly effective 
means of reconnai ssance and communication for the Government forces, and 
the subsequent cutting off of the Bondelswarts' western retreat by a Govern-
ment force moving down the Uhabis , River49 to Vioolsdrift on the Orange 
River, hem'ned the Bondelswarts in and made the end only a matter of time 50 . 
45. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.18]' Major Van Coller. 
46. N.A.C. Report, p.23, para. 105. 
47. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.252. Abraham Matroos . 
48. ibid. pp.466-467. Jacobus Christian. 
49. See MapC. 
50. N.A.C. Report, p.23, para . 108. 
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Capt. Prinsloo picked up the Bondelswarts' spoor and reported to Col. Hof-
meyr on 30 May that about 500 Bondelswarts' had excaped in three lots, one 
of seventy going to Sperlingsputs. one of 130 to Kurnaims, and one of sixty 
mounted and about 160 footmen which seemed to be making for Haibmund. 
Prinsloo decided to follow the last group, and asked for water and reinforce-
ments, suggesting that all waterholes be occupied and troops stationed at 
Uhabis and Haibmund to prevent the Bondelswarts' escape51 . Later, Prinsloo 
described the scene somewhat caustically to the N.A.C. : 
"Judging from the spoor it was clear that at least 500 of the 
rebels had escaped, and it was generally realized that this 
rebellion could now develop into a long and disastrous guerrilla 
war, because all the leaders with all their fighting men had es-
caped through an unpardonable lack of proper organization and 
supervision, and because nothing now could prevent the rebels from 
reaching the impregnable Orange River mountains, which afforded easy 
access to the Fish River and also to the Karas mountains" .52 
In reply to Capt. Prinsloo's report. Col. Hofmeyr sent Lt . Jordaan with 
seventy-five mounted men as re-inforcements, although they only met up 
with Lt. Prinsloo on 2 June 1922. Lt. Eksteen with mounted troops and a 
machine-gun was sent rapidly from Driehoek to Vioolsdrift by lorry, where 
he li nked up with Capt. Balt who was based on Uhabis, and a Bondelswarts 
attempt to break through the ViOOlsdrift-Uhabis line on 5 June failed 53 . 
~1eanwhile, on 31 May Capt. Prinsloo followed the spoor to Kurnaim, and 
from there into the Gunguniep kloof. Here in the mountain fastnesses 
luck once again eluded the Bondelswarts, for Prinsloo, familiar with their 
strategy in the 1904-6 rebellion, was on the alert and narrowly avoided an 
ambush they had set up. That night Prinsloo led his men out of the kloof 
and around the Bondelswarts, so that his force was now between them and the 
51. R.P.N . A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.939-940. Lt. Prinsloo. 
52. ibid. p.973. This was t he strategy the Bondelswarts had successfully 
followed during the 1904-6 rebellion. 
53. See Mop,C. 
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vital waters of the Orange River. Capt. Prinsloo went to Goodhouse to 
replenish his food and water supplies, leaving five men to guard the exit 
of the Gunguniep kloof. Lt. Jordaan arrived with re-inforcements, al-
though Prinsloo had had to wait another day at Goodhouse for them, since 
Col. Hofmeyr had neglected to leave anyone at Neufontein. to pass on Prins-
100'5 messages. However, the aeroplanes had moved their base to Goodhouse, 
and provided invaluable aid in ferrying supplies and providing Capt. Prinsloo 
with rapid communications and reconnaissance. Nonetheless, the delay in 
the arrival of the re-inforcements meant that, as Prinsloo pointed out, 
"the very hard subsequent chase could have been avoided". 
On 3 June 1922 Capt. Prinsloo resumed operations and followed the Bondelswarts 
up the Haib River gorges . He came across a waterhole unknown to the Govern-
ment forces at a place called Bergkamer. Once again, Prinsloo saw the 
Bondelswarts lying in ambush just in time, and a fierce battle ensued. But 
the Government forces' casualties were, as usual, slight. Lt. Jordaan was 
slightly wounded whi le storming a kopje, as were two other Government sol-
diers . Capt. Prinsloo and Lt . Jordaan managed to get above the Bondelswarts 
and they inflicted heavy 10sses54 . 
Forty-nine Bondelswarts were killed, including two of their leaders. Willem 
Ortman and Gert Gertzen, and fifteen rifles and all the Bondelswarts' re-
maining cattle and donkeys were captured. Later it was learned that Morris 
had been fatally wounded in the battle, and he died early the next morning 55 . 
But a Bondelswarts prisoner, one of three captured, delivered a message from 
Morris to Capt. Prinsloo and Lt . Jordaan. Morris stated that the aeroplanes 
did not frighten him, that he would never be captured alive, .and that not a 
single Bondelswarts would surrender as long as he lived. The Bondelswarts still 
54. R. P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.942-978. Lt. Prinsloo. 
55. ibid. p.189 . Major Van Coller. 
97. 
had twenty-nine rifles and twenty-four muzzle-loaders. 
On 4 June Prinsloo and Jordaan returned to Goodhouse with their troops 
and to replenish supplies. and asked for a doctor and more ammunition to 
be sent. On the night of 5 June the Bondelswarts made a final desperate 
attempt to break out between Uhabis and Vioolsdrift. but this was foiled 
by Capt. Balt and his men . 
Capt. Prinsloo resumed the chase on 6 June and caught up with the Bondel-
swarts on 7 June56 . The exhausted. starving Bondelswarts surrendered. 
among them Jacobus Christian. Beukes and Hendrik Schneeuwe. with 14B others 
and fifty rifles 57. 
The able and skillful campaign conducted by Capt . Prinsloo had helped 
to prevent the development of a long and drawn out guerrilla war like that 
of 1904-6 which had exacted such a terrible toll of German lives 58. The 
aeroplanes. however. had played a vital role in his success. especially 
with reconnaissance in which the - they had been helped by the fact 
that the Bondelswarts. who had never seen an aeroplane before in their lives. 
made no attempt to conceal the smoke from their campfi res 59 . 
Prinsloo claimed to have shot Morris durjng the Bergkamer battle. He said 
that Morris "owing to his bravery". had been conspicuous because he had 
constantly exposed himself to fire while directing the battle, and in the 
process was shot by Lt. Prinsloo in his arms and legs. Three Bondelswarts 
died in the hail of fire trying to pull Morris to safety before they were 
successfu1 60. 
56. ibid. pp.983-993. Lt. Prinsloo - his report on military operations. 
57. ibid. p.194. Major Van Coller. 
Much of this occount of the campaign is drawn from Lt. Prinsloo ' s 
report, but it is corroborated in a separate report by Lt. Jordaan 
on his part in the Bondelswarts' rebellion; 23 June 1922. R.P. "Papers 
connected with the Bondelzwarts rebellion". M.S. 14 787/A/(ii). 
58. N.A.C. Report, p.31. para. 14. 
59. Freislich, p.61. 
60. N.A.C. Report, p. 24. para . 110. 
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At dawn on 4 June 1922, Abraham Morris died of loss of blood from his 
wounds6l . 
Prinsloo estimated that about 160 Bondelswarts had fled into the Richters-
veld. About eighty rifles were recovered, mostly German in make. 400 
Bonde 1 swa rts men surrendered, and fifty- three were wou nded62 . 11 0 Bonde 1-
swarts were killed in the revolt63 . Lt. Prinsloo said that the Bondelswarts 
were, on the whole, good shots64 , and Major Prins agreed65 Lt. Brinton 
said that they seldom wasted a bullet66 . 
Prinsloo also admired the bravery of the Bondelswarts, reporting that at 
the Bergkamer battle as one shot another wou ld take his place and his rifle67 . 
A draft N.A.C. report later stated that: 
"Wi thout food and water thei r (the Bonde 1 swart0 p 1 i gnt mus t 
have been very miserable . It speaks well of both their courage 
an~ t ~eir doggEdness t~at even in such hopeless circumstances -they 
were sti 11 prepared to fi gilt wherever they came into contact wi th the 
(}. W. A.J Protectorate forces". 68 
There was one further incident on 16 June 1922, known as the Tatasberg 
incident, in which some Union Nama on the Union side of the Orange River were 
shot at by S.W.A. Government forces under Captain Drummond. Mistaking the 
I~ama for Bondelswarts, the troops killed one of them and seriously wounded 
two others , and confiscated their stock. But the witnesses on both sides 
gave conflicting evidence, and the key witness, Capt. Drummond, had sailed 
61. Freislich, p.79. 
62. R.P.N.A.C. Report . Minutes of Evidence. p.991. Lt. Prinsloo. 
63. ibid. p.198. Major Van Coller. 
ibid. p.260. Det. -Sgt. Pietersen. 
64. ibid. p.995. Lt. Prinsloo. 
65. ibid. p.l, 123. Major Prins. 
66. ibid. p.678. Lt. Brinton. 
67. ibid. p.983. Lt. Prinsloo. 
68. R.P.N . A.C. Report drafts. Draft B. p.60. 
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for Australia after the Bondelswarts' revolt. Thus the N.A.C. Report recom-
mended the appointment of a formal investigation by the courts and that 
compensation be paid to the Union Nama involved for stock losses incurred, 
and to the widow of Joseph de Wet, the Nama who was killed in the incident69 . 
Lt. Brlntonhad been ordered to investigate the incident at the time, and 
found that the wounded men had received no medical attention 70. Or.Cowan 
of Port Nolloth reported that three Union Nama had been wounded in the 
incident. Joseph Cloete had been shot through the back, Joseph Goliath 
7T the buttocks, and Piet Matthys, a Bushman, or San, in the arm . Lt. Brin-
ton found that the men had been there for nine days, and that the body of 
the deceased , Jose ph de Wet, was lying behind a stone, fac ing the river in 
a defensive position. He also found that the group were Le Fleur adherents, 
and that Jasper Cloete had some stock amongst that which was captured in 
th . ' d 72 e lnCl ent . 
Major Van Coller explained the comparatively low number of Bondelswarts 
wounded as being due to the fact that four or five Bondelswarts shared each 
rifle, and as one was shot another took his place. In addition, he said, 
the Union forces had had plentiful ammu nition and had machine-guns 73 . Lt . 
Col. Kruger felt that the ratio of Bondelswarts killed to wounded was not 
unusually high for a "kaffir war,,74 . 
Col. Hofmeyr had instructed his officers to respect the white flag and not 
to illtreat prisoners. The Bondelswarts were given medical treatment and 
fed, and the women and children were looked after. After the rebellion was 
69. N.A.C. Report, pp.25-26., paras. 117-123. 
70. R. P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.534-5. Lt. Brinton. 
7l. ibid. p.673. Dr. Michael Weston Cowan of Port Nolloth. 
72. ibid. pp.677-678. Lt. Brinton. 
For further discussion of the ramifications of the Tatasberg incident 
see p.I"" 
73. ibid. p.19l. Major Van Coller. 
74. ibid. p.872. Lt. Col Kruger. See p. ~d.5". 
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over, "as far as possible" the rank and file rebels were liberated75 . 
Both Major Van Coller76 and Major Prins77 denied reports of ill treatment of 
prisoners, and Major Herbst told the Permanent Mandates Commission that 
the more seriously wounded Bondelswarts were taken to the Keetmanshoop and 
Windhoek hospitals, and that the Bondelswarts women were not imprisoned, 
but were kept at Driehoek, while the male Bondelswarts prisoners were kept 
for about two weeks until they had been "sorted out" 78. Indeed, one of 
the Government soldiers, Coetzee, told the N.A.C. that the tro ops had been 
dissatisfied because they had had to walk while the Bondelswarts wounded and 
aged travelled in the trucks 79 . 
Lt. Col. Trew said that the Bondelswarts fugitives in the Union were al-
lowed to go home after the rebellion. Thos who lived in S.W.A. had to get 
a pass from the Springbok magistrate if they wanted to return80 
Charles Valentine, a clerk from Windhoek who had volunteered for the 
campaign, presented a report on the medical treatment of prisoners to 
Hofmeyr on 11 August 1922. Valentine had run temporary hospitals at 
Guruchas and Kalkfontein-South, and later at Warmbad, where he had treated 
Bonde 1 swarts wounded (One of whom, Jan Laberlot had wa 1 ked seventy- fi ve 
mi les from Haibmu·nd to Warmbad with seven bullet and shrapnel wounds). 
Valentine reported that he had treated thirty in-patients and 100 out-patients, 
and that the hospital was regularily inspected and found to be satisfactory 
by both Dr G.H. MacRobert81 , the Keetmanshoop district surgeon, and 
Dr L.H. Bowkett82 , district surgeon for Windhoek . The medical staff during 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79 . 
80. 
8l. 
82. 
ibid. pp . 74-75. Major Herbst on the A.R.B. 
ibid. p.200. Major Van Coller. 
ibid. p.l,121. Major Prins. 
" ~.A. P.M.O. Vol. 6. League of Nations. Report by the Permanent Mandates 
Commi ss i on on the Bonde 1 zwa rts rebe 11 ion:' (Fiereafter referred to as the 
P.M.C. Report] p.16. 
R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.337. F. van R. Coetzee. 
ibid . p.l,046. Lt. Col. Trew. 
ibid . p. l,012. Dr. L.H .. Bowkett. 
ibid. p.759. Dr. G.H. MacRobert. 
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the campaign had consisted of two doctors, two orderlies and a matron. 
Jacobus Christian had been treated in the hospital for wounds caused by 
a bomb on 2 June, and he reported that he had received good treatment and 
had been well looked after by Valentine83. 
There "ere, " hO\'lever, some unfortunate aspects of the treatment of 
Bondelswarts prisoners. 
Many of the Bondelswarts who had surrendered on 30 May at Guruchas re-
ported that although they had put up white flags they had been fired upon 
by the Government sol di ers, unti 1 an offi cer gave the order to cease fi re84 . 
Major Herbst said that this incident was an accident, and that some children 
had been shot on the backs of their mothers who were trying to escape from 
Guruchas on the night of 29 May85. Christian Marcus, one of those who sur-
rendered at Gu\'uch as, held that the troops had in fact been firing on those 
rebels still hiding in the hills86. 
There were also reports of the beating or flogging of Bondelswarts' prisoners. 
A Bondelswarts prisoner, Johannes Boois said: 
"Wij werden gesl agen van af onze gevangeneming tot aan die dag 
toen wi j op vJannbad aan kwamen" 87. 
83. ibid . p.269-278. Cha"rTes Valentine's report on medical treatment during 
the Bondelswarts rebel li on. 
84. ibid . p.77l. Christian Marcus. 
ib i d. p.775. Johannes Matroos . 
ibid. p.784. Annie Christian. 
ibid. p.528. Sara Ortman. 
ibid. p. 765. Johannes Boois. 
ibid. p. 786. t~aria Boois. 
85. ibid. p.76. Major Herbst on the A.R. B. 
86. ibid. pp.771-772. Christian Marcus. 
87. ibid. p.765. Johannes Boois. 
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Others su pported him in this accusation88. The N.A.C. report noted that 
prisoners had been flogged, and that proceedings were taken against those 
responsible89 . One of them, a twenty-four year old policeman, P.J. Struweg, 
was subsequently found guilty of assault and fined £2. lOs or fourteen days 
hard labour. He was also dismissed from the police force90 
The stragglers in the mountains were rounded up by the police. Only the 
ringleaders were detained for trial, among them Jacobus Christian, Klaas 
Isaac (alias Babab) and Man Stephanus, and the i r legal defence was organized 
for them. Nicholas Christian was.' made to return to the Reserve. It was 
found that he had had no part in the revolt, but had quarrelled with 
Jacobus Christian in 1919 and had left the Reserve with his wives and 
children and a few followers and gone to the Fish River mountains. On 
his return he faced charges of failing to pay the dog tax and of shooti ng 
big game91 . 
T. Beukes, one of the Bondelswarts ringleaders turned King's evidence and 
was pardoned92. Jacobus Christian was defended 'pro-·deo' by Advocate 1. Gold-
blatt93 . He was sentenced to five years hard labour on a charge of having 
engaged in active hostilities against His Majesty 's forces, but the court 
paid tribute to his character and conduct94 . 
Hofmeyer felt that the Bondelswarts were not ready for self-government by 
their Raad, and decided to return all their stock captured by the Government 
forces, and to give them a new magistrate and police. He also wanted to 
create a belt of wiJite settlers between the Bondelswarts' Reserve and the 
Union border to prevent access to the Orange and Fish river mountains 
88. i bi d. p.765. Johannes 800i s. 
89. ibid. p.495. T. Beukes. 
ibid. p. 529. S. Ortman. 
ibid. p. 773. C. Marcus. 
90. R.P.N . A. C. Report. Minutes of Evidence .. p.742. Pieter Jacobus St rul'i eg . 
91. ibid. pp.77-79. Major Herbst on the A.R.B. 
92. ibid. p.l,129. G.R. Hofmeyr. 
93. C. A. File . A106. (Retroactive) 1. Goldblatt to A. Davey. 5 July 1961. 
94 . We llington, p.286. 
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and the Richtersveld95 • but this was not implemented. Jacobus Christian 
and the other ringleaders did not serve their full term of sentence. They 
were released from the Windhoek goal on 19 May 1924 96 , on the Administrator 
Hofmeyr's orders to commemorate the visit of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales 97 . 
On 21 May 1924, the Administrator appointed Jacobus Christian official 
Captain of the Bondelswarts tribe at a salary of £4 per month, in return for 
his promising to "loyally co-operate" with the Administration9B. He had 
to agree to carry out all laws and to persuade the able-bodied young Bondel-
swarts men to go and seek employment99 By July 1924 Hofmeyr could report 
to the P.M.C. that the entire Bondelswarts Reserve had been restored to 
them, together with all the captured stock. Work was offered to the Bondel-
swarts, and rations and free medical assistance were provided for paupers. 
Mission stations and schools were being encouraged in the Reserve, and a 
new white Reserve Superintendent had been appointedlOO 
However, the Bondelswarts were in fact left impoverished because 
much of their stock had stampeded into the desert and died of thirst during 
the rebellion lOl . The crushing of the rebellion had broken the independence 
and cohesion of the Bondelswarts nation forever. But the repercussions had 
only just started. 
o 0 0 - - -
95. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.l,125-1,128. G.R. Hofmeyr. 
96. W.A. Adm. File No. A 383/44. "Bondelzwarts campaign - release of 
prisoners". C!iereafter referred to as W.A. Adm. File A388/4!). 
Secretary for the Protectorate of S.W.A. to magistrate, Windhoek. 
12 May 1924. 
97. ibid. Hofmeyr to magistrate, Warmbad. 12 May 1924. 
98. ibid. Hofmeyr to Jacobus Christian. 21 May 1924. 
99. Goldblatt, p.217. 
100. Well i ngton, p.289. 
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SEC T ION 2. 
CHAPTER 6. 
THE DEBATE . 
The Bondelswarts rebellion and the manner in which it was suppressed led to 
a rising tide of criticism in the Union, which soon found an echo overseas 
and, ultimately, in the League of Nations. As a result of this the 
Bondelswarts revolt is unusual in that it prompted three reports and two 
memoranda. These varied in their conclusions from an ardent defence of 
Hofmeyr's handling of the rebellion to mild criticism of it, and the debate 
covered the spectrum of opinion from that of Hofmeyr himself, to that of 
the Permanent Mandates Commission. 
Hofmeyr's Report on the rebellion was tabled in the Union Parliament by 
Smuts on 19 July 19221. Although it had been hastily drawn up in order to 
get it to Parliament before prorogation, Hofmeyr said that it "substantially". 
presented the facts of the case as he saw them2. 
He began by tracing the history of the Bondelswarts tribe and the build-up 
to the rebe llion. Basically, he saw the revolt as only part of a widespread 
plot among blacks in S.W. A. and the Little Namaqualand to revolt. Although 
he said that "nearly every responsible person believed that a general rising 
was pending " , he himself did not at first believe this . But he felt that 
he could not "allow matters to drift", and so he took action. 
Hofmeyer, felt that Jacobus Christian had del iberately "evaded all possi-
bi 1 ity of a peaceful settl ement" unless Morri s and the other were pardoned3, 
1. R.P .N .A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An.l. A.R.B. (U.G. 30-'22). 
2. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.l,125. Hofmeyr. 
Lt. Prinsloo pointed out several inaccurracies and inconsistencies 
in Hofrneyr's report, especially on military operations. pp.l ,016-1 ,020. 
Lt. Prinsloo . 
3. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An. 1. p.4. A.R.B. 
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and was ready to resist by force any attempt to enforce the law, an inten-
ti on wh i ch Hofmeyr read into the "gross i ndi gni ty" of the armed escort on the 
occasion of the visit to the Bondelswarts, by Major Van Coller, Fleck and 
Noothout, as well as the later disarmament of Noothout. Hofmeyr felt: 
"that the administration had exercised great patience and, short 
of going on its knees to the Hottentots, had done everything it 
was possible to do, in order to avoid bloodshed". 
But after the disarming of No6thout by the Bondelswarts Hofmeyr decided that 
any further delay on his part "would have merited censure,,4. He resolved to 
move swiftly, and to this end took personal command of military operations 
and asked for Union aeroplanes. Hofmeyr said that he was determined, one 
the use of force had been decided upon, to "inflict a severe and lasting 
lesson" on tbe Bondelswarts 5. 
He felt that the Bondelswarts' grievances like the dog tax, branding law 
and boundary dispute were unjustified, and were merely excuses to incite 
the people and to hide the prevalence of stocktheft. Jacobus Christian, 
Hofmeyr said, had been organizing his people since his arrival in 1919, 
and had invited Morris to join him in the agitation. At the same time 
Hofmeyr bel ieved that Le Fleur Vias doing the same amongst the Union Nama 
and that the two movements were interconnected. The Bondelswarts were 
itching for confrontation, said Hofmeyr, and neither he, Major Herbst, 
Fleck. 14ajor Van Coller nor Noothout had any doubt that: 
4. 
5. 
6. 
"nothing the Administration could do in : this matter, short of 
complete surrender to the Hottentots, would have averted the 
present conflict, and we are of the opinion that had we agreed 
to the i r demands, whi ch is i nconcei vab 1 e, the evil-day - a much 
blacker one · - would only have been indefinitely postponed"6. 
i bid. p.5. 
ibid. p.6. 
i bid. p.6. 
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Included in Hofmeyr's report were a series of annexures7, such as the report 
of Major Manning on his visit in 1921 to investigate the Bondelswarts' 
8 unrest over the dog tax. There was also a report by Major Van Coller on 
the negotiations with the Bondelswarts and the military operations9 
Both Hofmeyr and Van Coller denied press reports of illtreatment of the 
Bondelswarts prisoners. Van Coller in his report said somewhat naively 
"I am n9t, however, aware of any Gncidents of illtreatmenO, 
but, in such instances the circumstances must have been beyond 
control for the moment, for, as previously stated evidence is not 
wanting to show that our men were imbued with a sense of chivalry, 
and it is inconceivable that hardships were inflicted where such 
conditions possibly could be avoided"lO. 
However, Hofmeyr concluded his report by saying that: 
"In view of the statements and criticisms in the press, I welcome 
a full enquiry into the campaign and every phase connected with 
the ri sing" 11. 
Indeed, there was a clamour in the Union for an investigation. In private 
Smuts tried to restrain Hofmeyr, while publicly defending him12 This is 
well illustrated by the alterations to Hofmeyr's report made by Smuts in 
correspondence with Hofmeyr before its publication. 
In a section of the Report entitled "The future of the Bondelswarts", 
Hofmeyr had proposed that only half the stock of those Bondelswarts who had 
not taken part in the rebellion should be restored to them. In addition, 
the tribe as a whole would receive 200 donkeys, twelve horses and six vehicles 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
1 2. 
ibid. pp.7-21. Annexures A to E. 
ibid. p.7. Annexure A. Major Manning's report on Bondelswarts' unrest 
and res is tance to dog tax. See p 45. 
R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An. 1. p.21. A.R.B. 
Annexure E. Report on military operations by Major Van Coller, 
Divisional Inspector of the S.W.A. Police. 19 June 1922. 
ibi d. p.21. See p.d..d.£. 
R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures An.l. p.6. A.R.B. 
Hancock. pp. 109-110. 
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complete with "trekgoed". The rest of the property would be forfeited to the 
Crown. Smuts suggested that the proposal to confiscate Bondelswarts' 
stock be rephrased to read that this would be done since 
"to restore all their captured property to them would only serve 
to make them thi nk they can go into rebe 11 ion" . 13 
Hofmeyr also proposed that a line be drawn from a point east of Haibskoppe 
via Sorg and Jakopsplaats to a point opposite Armvlei to the northern 
boundary of the Bondel swarts' R'eserve 14. The land west of this line would 
be at the disposal of the Government. East of the line, together with 
additional grazing land to the north and north-west would belong to the 
Bondelswarts. 15. In this way the Bondelswarts would be cut off from the 
Fish River mountains by a belt of white farmers. 
But Smuts felt that this proposal would cause an outcry in the League of 
Nations. He suggested that Hofmeyr adopt a subtler approach, and that he 
should say that: 
"It will be necessary to take some precautions with a view to the 
niaintainance of peace and good order in the reserve .... " 
and that, in accordance with this aim,"such impregnable positions" as 
Guruchas and Haib, with their proximity to the Fish and Orange river moun-
tain s should be taken away from the Bondelswarts leaving them the eastern 
portion Gf the Rese l've "where there is sufficient grazing and stock". 
However, both these proposa ls were dropped 16 and all reference to them in 
the A.R.B. was excised. 
Smuts was in an awkward position, since he had appointed Hofmeyr as Admini-
strator of S.W.A., and now had to defend him17. Hancock points out that 
13. ~J.A. Adm. Vol. 158. File W.60. Telegram Smuts to Hofmeyr. 4 July 1922. 
Telegram Hofmeyr to Smuts.n.d. Telegram Smuts to Hofmeyr . 29 June 1922. 
R.P.N.A .C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 10. 
14. See t~apD. 
15. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Exhibit 10. 
16 . See p.13'7. 
17 . C.A. File . 106 ~ (Retroactive) 1. Goldblatt to A. Davey . 5 J uly 1962. 
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Hofmeyr 
"had come to Smuts originally on the strongest recommendations 
of John X. Merriman and had always proved himself trustworthy and 
intelligent" . 
Smuts had been supported in the appointment by Major Herbst and Major 
Manning lB. Smuts had made an urgent appeal to Hofmeyr just before the 
outbreak of the Bondelswarts revolt "to use every effort towards a reason-
able settlement" 19. Hancock views the revolt as only attracting abnormal 
attention because S.W.A. was a mandated territory20 
On B June 1922 Smuts made a short statement on the rebellion in the House of 
Assembly, and was pressed by John X. Merriman for more information. Merri-
man was supported in this by a deputation from the Native Welfare Society 
under Sir Walter Stanford and Mr J.W. Mushet, who asked for an enquiry into 
the rebellion's causes and pleaded that no land should be confiscated as 
puni shment 21 . The press, notably the Star and the Cape Times added 
pressure for an enquiry. On 19 July Smuts tabled Hofmeyr's report/and 
annouhced that a Commission of Inquiry would be set up and that its members 
would consist of the Union's Native Affairs Commission 22 . 
As early as 5 July 1922 Smuts had telegraphed Hofmeyr warning him that 
there was "considerable" pressure for a commission of inquiry into "the 
Bondelswarts revolt. Hofmeyr had wanted a Parliamentary Commission, but 
Smuts proposed to ask the N.A.C. to do it. On 12 May he telegraphed Hof-
lB. Hancock, p.103. 
19. ibid. p.109. 
20. ibid. p. lOB. 
21. The confiscation of black's lands if they rebelled had several 
precedents in Sou th Afri can hi story Thi sis evi denced by Davenport, 
T.R.H . , and Hunt, K.S., (eds.) The Right to the Land (Cape Town, 1974). 
See conditions of Sir George Grey's grant "of perpetual quitrent title 
to payers of hut tax in the Mfengu Crown Reserve in lB56 (p.36, No.57), 
the Glen-Grey title deed under the Glen Grey Act of lBB4 (p.37,No.5B) 
and the 1903-1905 South African Native Affairs Commission's proposals 
for a new black land policy. (p.41, No. 66.) 
22. Davey, A.M. The Bondelzwarts Affair - a study of the repercussions. 
(Pretoria, 1961). p.9. 
109. 
meyr saying that he did not think that a Parliamentary commission would 
be a wise idea because some might view it as an attempt by the Government 
to "whitewash" its ro1 e in the rebell i on 23 . 
As Davey points out, in general overseas opinion on the Bonde1swarts rebel-
lion was fairly moderate and restrained in the 1920's.24. The official at-
titude in Britain was illustrated when on 25 July 1922, Col. Josiah Wedgewood 
raised the Bondelswarts affair in the House of Commons. He wanted to know 
what steps Britain was taking and questioned the use of aeroplanes to 
suppress the rebellion. Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies at the time, replied: 
"I hope we shall fi nd something better to do ... than attack our 
domi nions25~ 
But there was overseas reaction nonetheless, and not all of it was easily 
shrugged off. The British press, especially the Manchester Guardian and 
the New Statesman, critically publicised the Bonde1swarts revolt. 
Sir Edgar Walton, High Commissioner for South Africa, informed Smuts from 
Geneva on 16 September 1922 that: 
"the general impression here is, first, that the t reatment of this 
tribe was far from humane; second, that the attack on them was not 
justified; and third, that the operations were conducted in a brutal 
manner. I have assured everybody that Hofmeyr is one of the mos t 
humane men I know, and that anyhow you had ordered a thorough investi-
gation and would certainly see that the enquiry was . ample and searching". 26 
23. W.A. Adm. "Correspondence 1915-1920." Vol. 145. File No. C 300. 
Bondelzwarts rising; Commission of Enquiry. (Eiereafter referred to 
as vJ.A . Adm. Vo1. 145. File C. 30C[). Telegram Smuts to Hofmeyr. 5 July 
1922. 
24. Davey, p.20. 
25. ibid. p.15. 
26. C.A. Smuts Correspondence. Private Papers . Vol. 25. "Letters". 1922. 
File No. 198. (}Iereafter referred to as C.A. Smuts Corr. Vol. 25 
File 198). Walton, Geneva, to Smuts. 16 Sept. 1922. No. 337. 
1 W. 
More serious was Walton's next letter to Smuts from London on 25 October 
1922, in which he said: 
"The Colonial Office sent us word that they have reports, through the 
Foreign Office, that the Bondelzwarts rising has been seized upon 
in the United Stated by parties opposed to the League of Nations and 
unfriendly to Great Britain as an excuse for a violent attack on both. 
The Foreign Office feels that it would be well if we were to take steps 
to have the history of the matter properly presented in the United 
States .••. " 27 
South Africa formally brought the Bondelswarts affair to the notice of the 
L f N t · 5 S t b 1922 t' the ' . t bl 28 eague 0 a 10ns on ep em er , accep 1ng 1neV1 a e . 
On 8 September M. Bellegarde, the representative for Haiti, gave notice 
of a resolution asking the Council of the League to make a full enquiry into 
the Bondelswarts revolt. Bellegarde felt that the revolt had been caused 
by the prohibitive dog tax and "intimated that it (the revolf) was a brutal 
busi ness" 29. 
However, by 11 September Bellegarde had toned down his attack somewhat. In 
the meantime, Walton had recieved a deputation from Mr Harris of the Aborigines 
Protection Society, who wanted to know if a commission of enquiry into the 
rebellion was being instituted, and what was being done for the Bondelswarts 
. 30 pn soners . 
On 21 September a foretaste of trouble to come for South Africa was given when 
the Inriia ndelegate in the League Assembly attacked the Union over the rebellion . 
But, said Walton, it "did not seem to excite much interest in the Assembly,,3l . 
Meanwhile, on 20 July 1922 the terms of reference of the Commission appointed 
to enquire into the Bondelswarts rebellion were tabled. The Commissioners 
27. ibid. Walton, London, to Smuts . 25 Oct. 1922. No. 342. 
28. Davey, p.17. 
29 . C.A. Smuts. Carr. Vol. 25. File 198. Walton to Smuts. 8 Sept. 1922. 
No. 336. 
30. ibid. Walton to Smuts. 11 Sept. 1922. No. 337. 
31. ibid. Walton to Smuts. 21 Sept. No. 338. 
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to investigate and give their views on : 
"(1) The causes of the Bondelzwarts rebellion and any features in 
respect to the manner of its suppression to which the Commis-
sion wishes to draw the attention of the Government. 
(2) Whether and to what extent the rebellion was influenced from 
Union side of the Orange River . 
(3) Suggestions for any remedial action in respect of (1) and (2).,,32 
The Commission began its investigations in August 1922, visiting the towns 
and villages in S.W.A. and the Little Namaqualand area of the Union as well 
as Windhoek and Pretoria. The Commissioners examined the area where the 
rebellion had taken place, and 124 witnesses, ranging from the Administrator 
to members of the Bondelswarts tribe gave evidence. Before arriving in a 
centre the N.A.C. would advertise through the local press and officials for 
witnesses who felt they could help. The S.W.A. Administration suggested 
witnesses it felt might be helpful, and the N.A.C. itself frequently reques ted 
specific witnesses to give evidence as the facts of the case became evident. 
The evidence was not taken under oath, and was heard in private in order 
to allow witnesses to talk freely, without fear of public and press reaction, 
and to al10vi officials to talk without fear of endangering their jobs, and 
also to avoid prejudicing the cases pending against alleged Bonde1 swarts , 
ringleaders in the High Court. However, when Union or S.W.A. police gave 
evide nce a senior police officer was always present, by request of the 
t · Ad" t t' 33 res pec 1 ve ml m s ra lons . 
The N.A.C. consisted of Dr. A.W. Roberts, the chairman, Dr. C.T. LOl'am and 
34 
General LAS. LenunerJhe Native Affairs Commission itself had originally been 
32. N.A . C. Report, p.1, para.!. (UG 16-'23). 
33. N.A.C. Report, p.2, para's.I-~ . 
34. See AppendixB. 
.. 
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set up under the 1920 Native Affairs Act to look after all aspects of . 
black affairs. It was empowered to submit its recommendations to the Minister 
of Native Affairs, or, if it failed to obtain satisfaction, to the Governor-
General, and ultimately to both Houses of Parliament. It was to be advised 
35 by local African councils in black and rural areas The N.A.C . had also 
investigated the Bu1hoek riSing of 192236. 
The N.A . C. only issued its report on 19 March 1923. This delay is explained 
by the strong disagreement between the liberal views of Roberts and Loram 
as against the unbending, conservative views of General Lemmer. The ri ft 
is illustrated in the six unpublished draft reports to be found in the Rober ts 
37 papers The drafts were longer than the final report, and, except General 
Lemmer's draft38 • tended to be far more critical of Hofmeyr's role in the 
rebellion and of his Native administration generally. The drafts ironed out 
some factual inaccurracies and gaps before the final report was drawn up. 
Loram and Roberts seem, from the draft reports, to have been almost of one 
mind in their attitude to the rebellion, but General Lemmer acted as an 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
Smurthwa ite, A.G. "The Policy of the Smuts Government towards Africans 
1919- 1924". M.A. Thesis, Unisa. 1975. p.59. 
Hancock, p.93. 
R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. CBS 14787/a/(iiiD. 
One of the six drafts is labelled "Genera,.l emmer's draft (Qraftg 
whereas the others are untitled. However, by studying the comments 
written in the margin of the others one can deduce that they were 
by either Roberts or Loram (although it is certain that Roberts, as 
chairman, did most of the editing), since the comments often refer to 
General Lemmer's objections to certain paragraphs or statements . The 
combined length of all the drafts prohibits a detailed account of each 
. one, but in the body of this work whenever reference is made to an 
excerpt from a. draft, it is to a contenti ous or perti nent poi nt in 
the draft which has been left out of the final report. I have marked 
the drafts A-F in ascending order towards the final draft, Draft F. 
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effective brake. His draft report was far more complimentary to Hof-
meyr, denying allegations of incompetence,or illtreatment of Bondelswarts 
prisoners. General Lemmer also attributed a great deal of the causes of 
the rebe 11 i on to the "s i ni ster" i nfl uences of Le Fl eur and Ameri can neg ro 
. 39 
movements , although he had to agree to tone this aspect down a lot in 
the drafting of the final report. 
It was at General Lemmer's insistence that all references to the alleged 
ill-treatment40 or shooting of prisoners 4l , bungling of certain aspects of 
42 the military operations by Hofmeyr , and, in general, any severe criticism 
of the S.W.A. Administration was deleted . The final report was a combination 
of the view points of the three. Loram's and Robert's views predominated, 
albeit in a watered-down form, and General Lemmer consistently contested 
every contentious point in the final report , section by section43 . 
Major Herbst was later to tell the Permanent r~andates Commission of the 
League of Nations that Smuts had described the N.A.C. Report on the rebellion 
as epitomi zing the "soul of South Africa", since it reflected the deep 
divisions between Dutch and English-speaking South Africans' views on native 
policy44. 
39. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft C. p. 9. (General Lemmer's Draft). 
Heaton-Nicho11's book, Bayete! Hail the Ki ng (London, 1923), is interes-
ting reading in this respect for its flctional depiction of the"revolu-
tionary" influences of the American negro movements on Blacks in 
southern Africa via the Ethiopian church movements . It was publishea 
in 1923, and may thus perhaps have had some influence on General Lemmer's 
thinking. 
40. See R.P.N.A.C. Reports Drafts. Drafts A-F. See alsop.'d;;lS. 
41. See p.'6.d-..b. 
42. See u, . II . 
43. N.A.C. Report. passim. 
44. t.A.P.M.O. Vol. 6. C.P.M. 3rd Session. Provisional Minutes. Permanent 
Mandates Commission. p. ll. Major Herbst's re-examination by the P.M.C. 
7 Aug. 1923. 
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The final report shows that Loram and Roberts were unable to reach a 
consensus of opinion with General Lemmer. Smuts privately ascribed the 
tussle to a overhasty judgement on Hofmeyr by Roberts and Loram, saying 
that 
"they were goi ng to condemn Hofmeyr' s admi ni s tra ti on root and branch. 
However, when they came to examine the report more carefully and 
weigh up the evidence which they had taken, they found that a great 
deal of the evidence could not bear out the interpretation which they 
had put on it in the first place"45. 
Although the las t comment does not fully tally with the evidenc~ "given 
to the Commission, there remains the possibility that the final report was 
affected by the knowledge that it was to appear before the P.M.C. for 
judgement on South Africa's role as the mandatory power in S.W.A., and hence 
it could not be too damning 46 . 
The report was condensed to twenty-three pages of print. The minutes of 
evidence alone had come to 1,130 pages of typescript. Hence the condensa-
tion was drastic, and generalizations and omissions were bound to occur. 
The N.A.C. Report 47 described the history and characteristics of the 
Bondelswarts until the takeover by the Union as first an occupying and 
then a mandatory power48 It fo und that the changeover from the harsh 
German rule to the comparative leniency of the Union administration had 
been too sUdden49 . The Bondelswarts were disappointed when they found that 
they were not going to get their lands back under the new dispensation, and 
even more so when the Government was reluctant to allow their leaders to 
return from exile50. 
45. C.A. Smuts Correspondence. Vol. 27. "Letters" 1923 (LlS). (Bereafter 
referred to as C.A. Smuts Corr. Vol. 2~. Smuts to Walton. 16 March 
1923. No. 198. 
46. I have not, however, been able to find substantiating evidence for this 
suppos iti on. 
47. Since most of the reports' findingsappear in t he body of this work I 
am giving a very basic outline here. 
48. N.A.C. Report, p.2. f""'(>'5."'l-f~. 
49. ibid. p.29, para.3. See p4b . 
50. N.A.C. Report, p.29, para . 2~ See r:tl. 
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The Commission felt that while the new Administration had had good inten-
tions, "no adequate effor~' had been made "to build up the people under 
the new conditions of life"51 . It found that there was no real fixed native 
policy, and said that 
"If efforts to equal to those which were made to faci litate the 
settlement of Europeans in the land had been made in the case of 
the indigenous Natives, the latter wou ld have had less cause for 
complaints" . 
This caustic remark was followed by a comment by General Lemmer disagreeing 
with the above statement. He felt that native policy did not fall within 
the scope of the N.A.C's. inquiry, and that the Ad~inistration had had too 
short a period since the granting of the mandate in 1920 to achieve any far-
reaching changes. 
In commenting upon the return of Jacobus Christian in 1919 the Commission 
criticized the European panic wh ich had resulted, saying, that it had 
increased inter-racial hostility and highlighted 52 the strained relations 
. between the Bondelswarts and the police53 . It felt that matters had been 
aggravated by the breach of faith when Jacobus's emmissaries were locked up 
by the police, and that the fact that Jacobus was allowed to stay might have 
encouraged t~orri s to return 1 a ter 54 . 
The N.A.C. felt that the poor Bondelswarts relations with the police were 
worsened during the period of martial law55 • when the police some ti mes took 
matters into their own hands 56 , and that this mistrust of the police was 
borne out by black witnesses to the Commission. 
51. N.A.C. Report, pp.4-5, para. 16. See u,. "1. 
52. N.A.C. Report, p.5, para. 20. See p.lDed-. 
53. See (1.1 "l. 
54. N.A.C. Report. p.6, para. 20. See p. 3J. 
55. N.A.C. Report, p.6, para. 22. 
56. i bi d. p.6, para. 25. See p. 56.. 
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Lemmer added that the Administra tor had always acted swiftly if it was 
found that the police had acted in an "irijudicous manner,,57. He felt that 
the Bondel swarts , reluctance to meet Major Van Coller58 was not so much due 
to mistrust as to simple defiance, and cited the evidence of T. Beukes 59 who 
had said that while he and Jacobus Christian had been willing to meet Hof-
meyr the Bondelswarts' tribe under Morris had refused to allow this60. In 
general, Lemmer stated, from the evidence he was convinced that the police 
were regarded with fear and suspicion only by those Bondelswarts who had 
broken the 1 aw. 
The N.A.C. found that the 61 law had been a strong Bonde lswarts 
grievance, as was the dog 
branding 
tax62 . They pointed out that the Bondelswarts 
needed dogs for protecti on and to ki 11 vermin, and that many witnesses 
had testified to the Bondelswarts' great attachment to their dogs. Hofmeyr's 
ostensib le reason for the dog tax, to prevent hunting and to encourage "honest 
labour", was condemned by the N.A.C., which stated that this "unwonted reason 
for imposi ng a dog tax does not commend itself to the Commi ssi on~ General 
Lemmer disagreed, saying that he did not think that the dog tal< was desig-
ned to make the Bondelswarts work, and pointed out that .the Transvaal dog 
tax had been imposed solely to protect the game. 
The Con~i ssion also found that administrative vacillat ons over the amount 
of the dog tax might have led the Bondelswarts to think that they could bring 
about change by agitation. 
The N.A.C. said that the branding law was a grievance because blacks could 
not keep the branding irons they had paid for, and suggested that the Admini-
57. N.A.C. Report, p. 7, para. 27. See p.l'n. 
58. See p-~O. 
59. N.A.C. Report, pp.7-8, para. 27a) . See p. ~II. 
60. Seep.} d... 
61. N.A.C. Report, p. 9, para . 34. See p.4"7· 
62. N. A. C. Report, p.9, para. 33. See f- 4 '6. 
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stration should have provided them free of charge. It felt that blacks 
resented the discriminatory treatment between whites and blacks under the 
law, and that it implied that the blacks were stock-thieves. 
General Lenmer stated that the law was enacted to protect Blacks from false 
accusations of stock-theft by whites and thus to help control it. He did 
not see why the Bondelswarts should be treated differently from other blacks 
in S.W.A., and said that Major Manning had told the N.A.C. that he felt that 
the Bondelswarts did not feel discriminated against by the law or insulted 
by the implication that they were stock-thieves63 . 
The Commission cited the evidence of Col de Jager that the changeover from 
64 German to Union rule had been rapid and had disorientated the blacks of S.W.A. . 
However, it admitted that it failed to see what could have been done to 
bridge the gap, and General Lemmer added that Gorges's 1916 Memorandum65 and 
Lord Buxton's6~peeches after World War I had been misunderstood by ~lacks 
and that this had led to their lack of respect for the police67 
The N.A.C. stated its opposition to any direct or indirect coercion to 
make blacks seek work, pointing out that the black attitude to work generally 
differed from that of the whites. It recommended the repeal of the old 
German law requiring blacks to work unless they had a certain amount of 
visible means of support68 ,- and of any tax that directly or indirectly 
forced blacks to seek .work. 
Genera 1 Lemmer, however, i nsi sted that non-vlOrkers we re paras ites on the 
state, and said that one of the duties of the whites as the "civilizing" 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66 . 
67. 
68. 
N.A.C. Report, p.9, para's. 34 & 36a). See (-'.'-11_ 
N.A.C. Report, p.10, para. 38. 
See p.-.:IJ._ 
See p.15]. 
N.A.t. Report, p.1O, para's. 39 & 39a). 
ibid. p.ll, para. 41. See f~D. 
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race was to teach blacks the dignity of labour69 . 
Reference was made by the Commission to the findings of the Native Reserves 
Commission70 on the low wage/l of blacks and their allegations of ill-
treatment 72, as well as to white employer complaints of Bondelswarts 
1 · 73 aZl ness . 
The N.A.C. found that this had aggravated poor master-servant relations 
and poverty74 among the Bondelswarts, as evidenced by Major Manning in his 
1921 report. 
The N.A.C. also felt that the general attitude of the Bondelswarts towards 
the whites was antagonistic and suspicious75 , and stemmed from their res ent-
ment of the police. Therefore it felt that the civil and not the police 
authorities 76 should have been used i n the negotiations with the Bondelswarts 
before the revolt. General Lemmer, howeve r , felt that it would have made 
no di fference. 
The N.A.C. found that the Bondelswarts still resented their loss of lands 
in German time/7, and that this resentment was aggravated under Union 
admini stration by increased white settlement in the south78. 
The Commission was uncertain as to the real reasons for Abraham Morris's 
79 return to S.W.A. . It felt that Morris had been invited by Jacobus Chris-
tian and T. Beukes to join the Bondelswarts "in their agitation for i mproved 
conditions", and that Morris's arrival was used by some Bondelswarts extre-
mists 80 to urge the tribe to revo l t. 
69. N.A.C. Report, p.ll, para. 41a ). 
70 . ibid. p.11 , para. 42. See p.55. c..-d p.\~3. 
71. See f. L.i3. 
72 . See p.I.jO. 
73 . See p.l<n 
74 . See p.i15. 
75 . N. A. C. Report, p. 12, para 's. 47 and 48. See f · I'lO . 
76. N.A.C. Report, p. 16, para. 66. See p. c. la . 
77 . N. A. C. Report, p. 12. para. 49. See «35". 
78. N. A.C. Report, p. 12, para. 50. See p . ?,b. 
79. N.A.C. Re port, p.13, para . 53. See p. lQb, 
80. N.A.C . Report, p. 13, para . 55. 
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But General Lemmer said that it was clear to him that Morris was invited 
by Jacobus Christian to return, that Morris was a Le Fleur adherent8l , and 
that Beukes, also under Le Fleur's influence, had been inciting the Bondels-
warts to revolt. General Lemmer felt that Morris, being, "a man of common-
sense" knew that he was breaking the lciw by returning, and those who came 
with him were armed. He therefore concluded that Morris had come to do 
everything in his power, including using force, to try and restore the 
Bondelswarts' tribal status to what it had been before the Germans had 
o d82 arnve . 
The N.A.C. found that after Sgt. van Niekerk's attempted arrest of Morris83 
the Bondelswarts were sure that the Government intended to declare war on 
84 them . From this time on, the Commission said, .·matters passed from Jacobus 
Christian's hands to Morris's85 . 
As for the sending of Major Van Coller to conduct negotiations, the Commis-
sion felt that it would have been better to have sent a competent civil 
official fami liar with the Bondelswarts' ways86. They felt that even though 
the affair was, 'strictly speaking, a police matter "the larger view should 
have prevailed". They pointed out that the Bondelswarts knew that an 
appeal for volunteers had gone out when Major Van Coller arrived, and that 
this had nlade them doubly suspicious of the Government's intentions87 . 
After Sgt. van Hiekerk's visit, the Commission said, the Bondelswarts were 
prepared to resist by force any armed entry into their Reserve. 
General Lemmer, however, agreed that Hofmeyr had done the "proper thing" in 
sending the Chief of Police, and pointed out that Major Van Coller had used 
81. ibid. p.13, para. 55a). See r.b~. 
82. See pod-I". 
83. See pob'l. 
84. N.A.C. Report, p.15, para. 61._ 
85 . ibid. p.15, para. 63. See p.alb. 
86. N.A.C. Report, p.15, para. 64. See p. ~13. 
87. N.A.C. Report, p.16, para. 67. See p. ~\O. 
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great discretion and had worked through authorities like Mgr. Krolikowski 
and Noothout88. As for the co 11 ecti ng of volunteers, General Lemmer said 
that Hofmeyr had had to do this to protect the white population in the event 
of a rebellion. He felt that a show of force had lent more weight to Maj or 
Van Coller's bargaining, and he felt that the Bondelswarts were intent on 
revolt once Morris had arrived anyway. 
The N.A.C. found that the Bondelswarts had hoped to improve conditions by 
rebelling, and had expected to do as well as they had done against the GenTIans 
in the 1904-6 rebellion89 . 
General Lemmer felt that Jacobus Christian was a "weak ma n" under Morris's 
control. and had feared the consequences of his part in not aiding the 
arrest of Morris, and hence did not want to meet the police during negotia-
tions . Jacobus, said Lemmer, ~/as merely using delaying tactics until the 
Bondelswarts were ready and fully organized for resistance90 . 
In discussing the alleged promise made to the Bondelswarts by Noothout91 
the N.A.C. found that Noothout was: 
"an exceptionally sens itive man, and it is possib le in his desire 
to bring t he people with whom he worked to a state of reason he 
went further than the commission given him entitled him to do".92 
General Lemmer felt that it was Mgr. Krolikowski 93 who had been anxious to 
settle matters and had misunderstood Noothout. Lemmer did not think t hat 
Noothout would have disobeyed his orders, and saw the letter simply as a 
statement by the Bondelswarts of the conditions upon which they would treat 
with Hofmeyr. Noothout interpreted the letter one way , Mgr. Krolikowski 
the other94. 
88. N. A. C. Report, p. 16 • para. 68. Seep. aD?>. 
89. N. A. C. Report, p. 16, para. 69. See p. ~'\ . 
90. N. A. C. Report, p. 17, para. 73a) . 
9l. See P.IC/, . 
92. N.A .C. Report, p. 19, para. 82. 
93. See p./eo. 
94. N. A. C. Report, p. 19, para. 82a) . 
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Whatever the case, the N.A.C. said, if the Bondelswarts had understood 
Noothout's promise to mean what Mgr. Krolikowski said it did, they would 
have felt threatened and deceived by its non-materializatiQ~5. 
While the N.A.C. agreed with Hofmeyr that the Bondelswarts' armed escort of 
Major Van Coller, Fleck and Noothout on their96 visit to the Reserve was a 
"gross indignity,,97, the Commission regretted that the meeting between Hof-
meyr and the Bondelswarts98 had never taken place, ffid felt that such a 
meeting might have settled matters. But it commended Hofmeyr for his peace-
ful intentions and patience during the negotiations, and General Lemmer 
pointed out that Hofmeyr had done his best to bring about a meeting with the 
Bonde 1 swarts99 . 
The N.A.C. then gave a summary of the military operations against the Bondel-
swarts 100. They felt that to avoid a worsening of black-white relations the 
volunteers for the Government forces should have been drawn from districts 
as remote as possible from Warmbad l01 . But General Lemmer pOinted out that 
the need for swift action had made this impossible. As for the use of aero-
planes, the Commission felt that while they had proved efficient and effec-
t i ve 102, the Bonde 1 swarts shou 1 d ha ve been warned by a demonstra ti on of the 
aeroplane's capabilities 103 . But General Lemmer felt that the aeroplanes had 
been essential, and pointed out that the Government pilots were unaware that 
women and children were mixed up with the stock and fighting men. He said 
that the Bondelswarts could have surrendered after the first bombardment, 
but had instead broken out that night, to continue the war104 , showing that 
a demonstration would not have led them to surrender. 
95. ibid. p.20, para. 88. 
96. See p. '1:1. 
97. N.A.C. Report, p. 21, para. 91. 
98. See f' \3<>'. 
99. N.A.C. Report, p.22, para's. 96 & 97. 
100. NA.C. Report, pp.23-24, para's.IId--'~. Seer.'!,'7. 
101. N.A.C. Report, p.24, para. 114. Seep.~5. 
102. N.A.C. Report, p. 211, para. 115a). 
103. ibid. p.25. para. 116. 
104. ibid. p.25, para. 116a). Seep.q'd... 
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As for the Tatasberg incident lOS• the N.A.C. felt that a formal investi-
gation by a court of law was required l06 
The Commission found that although Le Fleur was a "sinister" influence on 
the Richtersveld Nama 107, and that the Bondelswarts admired him, there was 
no direct or organized connection between the .Bondelswarts rebellion and 
Le Fleurl08 , even if the Union Nama were restive l09 . 
In respect of remedial measures in S.W.A. the N.A.C. recommended the extension 
of the Cape Vagrancy law to the territory, and the irr!jJrovement . of labour 
conditions by the setting up of a minimum wage and a standard ration. It 
felt that although native policy was not strictly within its scope of 
inquiry, it nevertheless felt that it could make recommendations. It 
recommended that Native Commissioners with limited magisterial powers be 
appointed. It found that black education was backward, with no Government 
grants -in-aid to mission schools, and said that this could be improved llO 
It also recommended the implementation of the N.R.C. suggestions like the 
prOVision of reserves and industrial and agricultural development, and pro-
posed the principle of consultation with blacks before legislation affecting 
them was promulgated. In all, the Commission felt that .:. 
"The whole native problem, not on ly as it affects the BondelZVlarts, 
but as it exists throughout the territory required the most careful 
and exhaustive examination, in order to bring it into harmony with 
the idea that the Native is a sacred trust of the f·1andatory state". 
General Lemmer, however, felt that as the Commission had not fully investi-
gated the native situation it could not pass judgement, and said that Hofmeyr 
had done well in fulfilling the obligations of the Mandate lll . 
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The N.A.C. Report was thus a muted but condemnatory criticism of Hofmeyr. 
His reaction was immediate. 
On 4 April 1923, Hofmeyr submitted a Memorandum on the Report, which was 
presented to both Houses of Parliamentl12 . He agreed with General Lemmer's 
comments, and felt that they had "effectually disposed of the arguments or 
rather statements advanced" by Roberts and Loram. Hofmeyr disagreed with 
the view that no attempt had been made to build up the blacks, and pointed 
to his appointment of Noothout as Superintendent of the Bondelswarts Reserve 
and the existence of and Government support for mission schools. Hofmeyr 
said that he could not reconstruct the Bondelswarts' Raad under its heredi-
tary chief as the N.A.C. had suggested because if he had allowed Jacobus 
Christian to return as Captain it would have precipitated a scare amongst 
the whites 113. 
He felt that the N.A.C. Reports' criticism of his native policy was ill-
informed, since, as General Lemmer had pointed out, it was beyond the scope 
of their investigation, and they had not given him a chance to defend his 
policies. He had been "condemned without trial", and he quoted from his 1921 
annual report to show how he had set about establishing a firm native policyl14 
t · bl k d t' d d' 1 115 promo lng ac e uca lon an me l ca care . 
Hofmeyr pointed out that the Cape Vagrancy law recommended by the N.A.C. 
was already in force in S.W.A. and said that the numbers of stock captured 
during the rebel lion had shown that the Bondelswarts were not as poor as was 
generally supposedl 16 The N.A.C. Report had failed to state that the 
Bonde 1 swarts' property had not been confi sca ted, and that the rank and fi 1 e 
had been a110vled to go home. 
112. R.P. Hofmeyr's ~lemorandum. (flS 14 787/A/(iv)). 
113. R. P. Hofmeyr' s i~emorandum. p.1. See p. '~. 
114. See p.55. 
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As for the use of police officials in negotiations, Hofmeyr said that it had 
b t . 1 1 . tt 11 7 een en lre y a po lce ma er He denied that the dog tax had been 
imposed to force blacks to work l18 , and agreed with General Lemmer's 
. 119 
comments on the branding law . 
Hofmeyr also felt that the Commission had been wrong in saying that there 
was too big a jump from German rule to Union administration, and pointed out 
that most 
fonn 120• 
of the old German laws had been retained, albeit in a moderated 
He denied that there were any laws 
or indirectly forcing blacks to work121. 
in S.W.A. either directly 
He went on to point out that the N.A.C. Report had praised him for his 
"patience and fo rbearance" in the negotiations. He felt that the revolt had 
been inevitable, because it was 
"perfectly clear that Morris was invited by Christian and the people 
to come over to take command of the fighting IT,en and conduct military 
operations" . 
He felt that this was logical because Morris was the best Bondelswarts 
military leader. 
Hofmeyer said that the use of police in negotiations had made no difference, 
and that both Mgr.Krolikowski · and Noothout had failed 122 . Jacobus had 
ignored Hofmeyr's invitations to meet him, and after the armed escort of 
Major Van Coller, Fleck and Noothout123 , Hofmeyr said that he would not have 
gone to the Bondelswarts and suffered similar humiliation: 
" I n the face of thi s acti on the Commi ss i on has the temeri ty of 
suggest that I personally should hav e go ne to Ha ib to see Christian". 
He said that the collecting of volunteers during negotiations was an essential 
precaution124 and that the use of aeroplanes was unavoidable and efficient. 
Hofmeyr felt that a demonstration of the aeroplanes' capabalities would have 
117. SeE p'.';).l 0.. . 
118. Seep' nb. 
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had no effect, and in fact might have precipitated the escape of the 
Bondelswarts from Guruchas 125. 
He also felt that if .the Tatasberg incident had been such a misdeed it 
seemed strange that a formal police investigation had not ensued. He ended 
by saying that any short-comings on his part whould be attributed to the 
fact that his job kept him very busy rather than to a lack of effort126 . 
If Hofmeyr was annoyed in public, in private the N.A. C. Report seems to 
have stung him into a state of irrational anger. In a private letter to 
Sr"uts, 127, written after the P. M.C . report on the Bondelswarts rebellion, 
Hofmeyr wrote that he felt Roberts and Loram had: 
"become so obsessed with one aim that whatever means might be 
necessary to that end , their great opportunity had come for proving 
their faith that a Dutch South African must for ever be banned from 
exercising authority i n Native administration in South Africa. To 
such a pitch of racial del irium had they brought themselves " 
He went on to say that he felt the N.A.C. had "led"the evidence, and that 
the evidence heard by the COfTlllission from black witnesses was "most 
II 
unreliable, if not totally worthless. He felt that Roberts and Loram were 
under the influence of : 
"European political wirepullers, office seekers, newspaper influences, 
ulterior-motive informers and street tittle-tattl ing". 
He also said that 
"Dr Roberts and Dr Loram had approached their task armed with all 
the press misrepresentation and perchance the s inister blessings 
of a few politicians whose ready tools they were". 
Hofmeyr felt that Roberts and Loram were a "positive danger to both. races" 
in S. W.A. The barb had obviously struck home. One wonders what Hofmeyr's 
reaction would have been if he could have seen the draft reports. 
125. R.P. Hofmeyr's Memorandum, p.9. 
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The reaction to the N.A.C. report in S.W.A. itself was vociferous. Die 
Suidwes Nuus condemned the report : 
"in die sin dat die kommisarnisse eniggens uit hulle pad gaan 
om :te Hottentots te beskerm en so min alle molik in die ongelyk 
te 's te 1" . 
And it supported General Lemmer's minority viewpoints in the N.A . C. Report l28 
The same news paper in July 1923 reported a meeting in Windhoek attended by 
about 150 people and addressed by Col. de Jager l29 protest i ng against the 
comments of some members of Parliament on the N.A.C . Report. They protested 
that these M.P. 's were unsettling S.W.A. and did not know what was really 
going on in that countryl30 
Overseas the N.A.C. Report came under a differ ent line of attack. An anony-
mous contributor to the New Statesman in May 1923, writing on "The Bondel 
Massacre,,131, strongly criticized the N.A.C. Report, saying that it was "one 
of the most unsatisfactory docume nts ever publ ished on a punitive expedition", 
and painting out that· Roberts and Loram were completely "at loggerheads" with 
General Lemmer, and hence no agreement had been reached on any of the major 
points of the Report. 
The correspo ndent felt that the Commission had ignored all the principal 
al legations against those who carried out the "punitive expedition". In 
addition, it stated that the Report had not proved that the Bondel swarts had 
actually rebelled, pointing out that until the Government military operati ons 
began there had been 
"neither the pillage, arson nor murder; the Bondels did not touch a 
single hair of the head of a single white man". 
128. Die Suidwes Nuus. Oct. 1919-Jan. 1925. State Archives, Windhoek. 
Mlcrofilm. 20 April 1923. No. 16. p.2. 
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The N.A.C. Report was also criticized for not giving any casualty figures or 
an answer to the allegations that Bondelswarts wounded had been shot and 
killed. But, the article went on to say that: 
"Happily there is one point made abundantly clear, General Smuts 
was not consulted before the Administrator began his attack on the 
Bondels". 
In fact, Smuts had been told by Hofmeyr before the attack began132 . The 
article ;recommended that the P.M . C. should propose to the League of Nations 
council that a Judicial Commission be appointed in view of the Tatasberg 133 
incident in which British subjects were shot in the Union. Also, the League 
should ask for a casualty list, and for a list of able-bodied survivors 
of the revolt, and ask what was done with or for the wounded. Finally, the 
correspondent held that the League should insist that in future: 
"no punitive exped ition should be fitted out and dispatched without 
prior reference to, and the sanction obtained of, the Mandatory 
Government - in this case the Union of South Africa". 
In fact, the article had been written by t~r Harris of the Aborigines Pro-
tection Society134. 
The N.A.C. Report was presented on 10 April 1923, and in the Union Parliame nt 
the Labour party launched the attack on Smuts. Arthor Barlow, Labour member 
for Blo~nfontein North, proposed that Smuts's salary be re~uced by £2,EOO, 
an amount equal to Hofmeyr's salary as Administrator. Barlow blamed the 
tactlessness of the police for the revolt, and the Government for its mal -
administration of the Bondelswarts and its neglect of the "sacred trust" of 
132. See f. qO . 
133. See p. Ci '!. 
134. C.A.P.j,i,0.L.N.13/4. Vol. 4. Comment by Smuts. 
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135 the mandate . 8arlow was later to say that: 
"General Smuts made a mistake in regard to the Bondelzwarts. He 
should have dismissed Gys Hofmeyr on the spot. The latter lost his 
head" .136 
Barlow predicted that the outside world, particularly the blacks, liberals 
and the Labour Party in Britain would attack the Union's race policies in 
the League of Nations , saying "Our name is going to stink in the nostrils 
of the outside world,,137. Another Labour member, Mr Madeley, referred to 
the rebe 11 i on as a "b 1 ot on the escutcheon" of South Afri ca. The Rev. J. 
Mullineux, a Labour M.P., said South Africa was guilty of a breach of faith 
in its handling of the affair, and Col. Creswell felt that it was his "pain-
fu 1 duty" to demand the reca 11 of Hofmeyr for hi s "dep 1 orab 1 e ma 1 admi ni-
138 strati on" of S. W.A. . The debate later turned into a heated argument 
between Smuts and Cresswell, with the 1 atter compari ng the high rati 0 of 
Bondelswarts killed to wounded with the shooting of strikers during the 
1922 Witwatersrand rebellion139 . Tha National party, however, remained 
silent, letting its Labour allies attack Smuts without actually supporting 
them, leaving its conservative white-supremacist image untarnished140• 
Where the Labour party M.P 's. left off, the English press, spearheaded by 
the Star took over the condemnation of Hofmeyr, and criticised the appointment 
of General Lemmer as a member of the N.A.C. of enquiry141. 
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Smuts defended Hofmeyr vigorously in Parliament, saying 
"whatever thei r (Jhe Bondel swarts"] gri evances, whatever thei r reasons 
or their action - and they may have had just and substantia ~ grievances -
in the ultimate result a rebellion was brewing there, and it was 
the swift action of the Administrator at the last moment which prevented 
a very terrible catastrophe in South Africa" .142. 
He was worried, however, about South Africa's image abroad, and proposed 
sending Major Herbst, the Secretary for S.W.A., to Geneva to help put 
143 South Africa's case to the P.M.C. . 
On 5 September 1922, Sir Edgar Walton, South Africa's accredited representa-
tive at the League of Nations, put Hofmeyr's report at the disposal of the 
League Assembly. The Haiti representative in the League, M. Be11egarde, 
proposed that the matter be referred to the P.M.C., and this was accepted. 
But is was only when the N.A.C. Report was published in 1923 that the P.M.C . 
could take up the matter144. 
The Anti-Slavery Society and the Aborigines Protection Society tried ·to brjng 
the Bondelswarts' affair up before the League Assembly again. The British 
press, expecially the Manchester Guardian, disparaged the N.A.C. Report when 
it came out, and the Times in an Empire day issued in 1923 ·published a 
review of the Bondelswarts' revolt. Sir Sydney Oliver attacked South Africa's 
handling of the affair in a letter to the Times on 2 June 1923, calling 
the suppression of the rebellion a "massacre"J45. 
142. House of Assembly Debates. Vol. 8. p.329. "A Curious Synchronization". 
22 May 1923. 
143. Davey, pp. 10-11. 
144. ibid. p.17 . 
145. ibid. pp.16-17. 
130. 
Walton wrote to Smuts saying 
"@ilberf) Murray seems to hope that we will excape the censure 
of the ~eague ol) Nations by keeping the thing covered up in the 
Council. I am quite sure,however, that Harris and other good people 
will make that impossible and will see that the matter is brought up". 
He went on to say that he hoped to have an answer ready for the critics, 
for ··.he was sure that Hofmeyr had done nothing more that he "conscientously 
believed was necessary,,146. Later, Walton wrote: 
"With regard to the Bondelzwarts business, we are almost sure to 
get that brought up at th e League of Nations and the Representative 
of Haiti and other will make lengthy extracts from the m.A.C.] 
Commission's l'eport. It is rather a pity in some respects that the 
evidence is not published, for the attack, I think, wi ll be mainly 
on the line that Hofmeyr got flustered and lost his head. "147 
Major Herbst was sent to Geneva to help Walton put South Africa's case to 
the P.~1.C., and prepared a memorandum on the revolt for the P.M . C. 148 . In 
it, Herbst poi nted out that the Government had compensated the Bondel swarts 
for their First World War ' stock 10ss2s1 49 , an j that the Bondelswarts had 
caused constant friction since the Union takeover 150 . Major Herbst said ' 
the Bondelswarts resented "laws made by Europeans for the suppression of 
i d 1 eness and vag rancy" 151 Wi th reference to the sys tem of na ti ve admi ni-
stration through the magistrate, with the police acting as their agents lS2 , 
Major Herbst said that while it was understandable that the Bondelswarts 
might not want to incur the enmity of the pol ice by comp.laining, Hofmeyr 
had, on his visit to the BCindelswarts Reserve in 1921, told them that if 
the magistrates and police failed in their duty he himself could be approached 
and would see that justice was done 153 . 
146. C.A. Smuts Correspondence. Vol. 28, "Letters". 1923. (T-W). (Bereafter 
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Major Herbst said t hat Hofmeyr had consistently resisted pressure from white 
farmers to give wider powers like flogging to local officials, and had tried 
to improve black-white relations in S.W.A. 154. 
Whi le admi tting that the dog tax was high and that its enforcement increased 
the Bondelswarts' dislike of the police155 , Major Hel"bs-t -sa+d- j;ha-j;- Hofmeyr·---I 
had imposed it to protect the gam e. As for the branding law, Major Herbs t 
reiterated that it was enacted to protect blacks from unjust accusations of 
stocktheft by whites 156 . 
~lajor Herbst pointed out that Morris had had the opportunity of returning 
to S.W.A. when the Union forces were demobilized, but instead he had returned 
to the Union 157 . Herbst was convinced that Morris had returned to lead a 
revolt, and that the Bondelswarts had been preparing for it for some time 
before Morris's arrival 158. 
He also felt that the Bondelswarts were disappointed in their hopes that 
with the overthrow of the German rule their lands would be restored to 
them and their German master expelled from the country.159 
But soon Major Herbst and Sir Edgar Walton began to realize that the P.M.C. 
was not easily convinced. Herbst appeared before the P.M.C. for a re-exami-
nation in August 1923. 160. He told them 
"it was only when Sir Edgar Wa lton and I had given evidence and laid 
information before the Commission that Vie really became aware that 
the matter was far more serious than origina lly anticipated".161 
He went on to tell the P.M.C. that it wou ld have serious consequences if they 
condemned Hofmeyr "except in the c 1 ea res t and mos t undoubted ev i dence" . 
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He pointed out that Hofmeyr had tried hard for a peaceful settlement while 
the Bondelswarts had consistently defied the law162 AS'for Hofmeyr going 
to see the Bondelswarts personally at their camp at Guruchas, Major Herbst 
asked the P.M.C. 
"how it is possible for any man having the authority of an administra-
tor in a country where the white population far exceeds the native 
population in the Southern area, to maintain the prestige of Admini-
strator and to follow the Hottentots into their stronghold where they 
had collected arms and were thus prepared to take the law into their 
own hands and resist the authori ty of the Government?" .163 
He also asked the P.M.C. to take more cognisance of General Lemmer's comments 
in the N.A.C. Report on the rebellion , because: 
"after a 11 it refl ects the opi ni on of three-fourths of the Gih it~ 
population of the South Africa today". 
He said that the P.M.C. should consider the effects a condemnation of 
Hofmeyr would have on South Africans, black and white alike. If the P.M.C. 
condemned Hofmeyr, Hofmeyr would have to resign, and this would result in 
white reaction in S.W.A., for they, Herbst said, already felt that the 
Government in S.W.A. was "far too liberal.,,164 
Major Herbst concluded by saying that since there was no standing army to 
speak of in South Africa, and since the white population was far outnumbered 
by the blacks, .the Government had to act swiftly in the event of trouble to 
prevent a catastrophe developing 
vindicated to keep control. 165 
The law had to be immidiately and forcefully 
It is not unreasonable to conclude that this unsubtle but frank appeal to 
the mercy of the P.M.C. may have had a restraining influence on the authors 
of ' the final report. 
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The P.M.C. examined the reports on the rebellion, and questioned Walton 
and Herbst closely for supplementary evidence. Among the P.M.C. members were 
experienced colonial administrators like Sir Frederick Lugard of Britain166 . 
Wellington says that the P.M.C. was frustrated because there was no expression 
of black opinion on the Bondelswarts' revolt reports submitted to them 167 
Under its constitution drawn up and approved by the League Council on 29 Nov-
ember 1920, the P. M.C. consisted of seven members, the majority of whom were 
nationals of non-mandatory powers, and who did not hold .any office which 
made them directly dependent on their Governments. They were appointed by 
the League Council, and the International Labour Organization was permitted to 
appoint an expert to attend the P.M . C. and advise it on labour matters. Each 
168 
mandatory power could have a delegate to sit on the P.M.C. . 
The P.M.C. submi tted its report on the Bondelswarts rebellion to the Assembly 
of the League of Nations in September 1923 169 The Report170 opened by 
stating that under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, in 
which the duties of the P.M.C. were defined, it was bound to "advise the Council 
on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates". 
166. Davey, p.19. Margery Perham. Lug"rd: The years of Authority, 1898-1945. 
(London, 1960). p.649 notes that Lugard was "strongly critical" of 
South Africa's perfonnance in her mandate in S.W.A., and of the Union's 
"evasion and delay in the face of criticism". 
In 1921 the members of the P.M.C. were ~.1. Beau for France, ~1adame Anna 
Bugge Wiekse for Sweden, M. Friere d'Andrade for Portugal, the Hon. 
W. Ormsby-Gore for Britain, M.Pierre Orts for Belgium, M. van Rees for 
Holland, the Marquis Theodol.i for Italy, and M. Kunion Yanagida for 
Japan, GA. P.M.O. Vol. 6. League fo Nations Council document. "Report 
on the ·P. M. C. - Memorandum by the Secretary-General." Geneva. 26 Apri 1 1921. 
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The P.M.C. Report was "principally" based on reports submitted to it by South 
Africa, and on the evidence of Herbst and Walton171 . The P.M. C. had received 
Hofmeyr's Report , the N.A.C. Report, Hofmeyr's Memorandum and Major Herbst's 
Me;ilo randum, but no report from the Mandatory Power itself. Therefore, the 
P.M.C. held that it was ignorant of South Africa's attitude to the rebellion, 
and of any action taken by Hofmeyr to deal with t he situation and the measures 
taken after the rebellion for the Bondelswarts prisoners 172 
Walton had told the P.M.C. that he was not empowered to declare whether the 
MandatQry endorsed the opinions of the majority or the minority in the N.A.C. 
Report, or Hofmeyr's Memorandum on the latterl ?3. Thus the P.M.C. concluded 
that: 
"By fail i ng to pronounce on tili s matter the mandatory power rendered 
it i" ' ossib l e for the Mandate's Commission to decide which of the 
contr .dictory version which had been supplied was the one which should 
be regarded as exactly describing the course of events and the measures 
of the administration." 
The P.M.C. had been told by Major Herbst that the N.A.C. inquiry had been 
"unsatisfactorily conducted" and that it was the work of "persons ignorant 
of the local conditions " . But the P.M.C. could not regard Major Herbst's 
evidence as being suffici ent, for he was a member of the South West African 
Administration. Thus the P.M.C. unanimously decided that "a complete and 
authoritative enquiry had not taken place,,174 Two members therefore 
felt that the P.M.C. could not make a full report since it did not have a full 
inquiry at its disposal, and could not call on witnesses involved in the 
rebellion175 . 
However , the majority of the P.M.C. decided that the qua lificati ons of th e 
N.A.C. Commissioners and the obvious care with which their report was dray," 
up made it worth considering. Therefore, the P.M.C. decided to meet the wishes 
171. ibid. p.l. 
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of the League Council by giving an opinion on the revolt, subject to the 
reservations that there was no official report from South Africa and that 
only the evidence of one party in the affair had been heard. 
The P.M.C. upheld the high standards of mandate obligations, and stated that 
it felt that, with these in mind, any criticism of the local administration 
176 in S.W.A. would be shared by Smuts and "by enlightened public opinion, 
British and Dutch, in South Africa". 
The P.M.C. found that the Bondelswarts rebellion was mainly due to mutual 
distrust between blacks and whites, and said that: 
"In South West Africa even the educated classes, the Commission 
was told, regard the natives as existing chiefly for the purpose 
of labour for the whites". 
This had also been the case under German rule, said the P.M.C. 
In general, the P.M.C. felt that it was its duty to determine whether the 
policy . applied. and action taken,in S.W.A. was in accordance with the spirit 
of the mandate or not 177 . 
In the case of the dog tax 178 the P.M.C. found that the evidence did not 
appear .to justify a flat rate for both blacks and whites, and felt that the 
tax must have been quite"prohibitive "for blacks, stating that: 
"Since these people, we are told, could not179 find money to pay 
the tax or fi ne, thi s meant that they had to work for the whites, 
who, mo reover, could not pay cash to their labourers." 
As for the Vagrancy law of 1920180 . the P.N.C. condemned the prOVision that 
the magistrate could sentence a first offender under the law to a term of 
work on public works or for a private employer. 
The P.M.C. found the r easons for the application of the branding law181 I'/ell 
176. ibid. p.7. 
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founded, but added : 
"It is, however, open182 to question whether it would not have been 
wiser to refrain from exacting payment from the. natives". 
It stated that since the Bondelswarts rebellion the compulsory purchase of 
irons had been stopped183 . The P. M.C. concluded: 
"The first cause of the trouble, therefore,was the discontent of 
a peop le driven to exasperation by grievances which they probably 
exaggerated, and for which they could obtain no redress". 
While acknowledging the "delicate and difficult" task of the Mandatory, 
the P.M.C. felt that the treatment of blacks in S.W.A. as shown in the evide nce 
was unjust. 
The P.M.C. saw the use of police instead of civil officia ls 184 in negotiations 
as a further cause of the rebellion. But the P.M.C. felt that once the 
revolt had started Hofmeyr had acted \visely in swiftly suppressing it before 
it could spread. 18S. However, since the P.t~.C. had no evidence from blacks 
involved, it could not express an opinion as to whether the military opera-
tions were .neealessly severe or not. It accepted the effectiveness of the 
use of aeroplanes 186 , and felt that a demonstration might have persuaded the 
Bondelswarts to surrender. On the other hand, it pointed out that this was 
not necessarily so, since the war was already on at the time. The P. M.C. 
thought that Hofmeyr's assumpt ion of persona l command was "unfortunate" 
because it· l eft the Bondelswarts \vith no higher authority to appeal to and 
interfered with Hofmeyr's role as "an impartial critic and judge of the con-
duct of operations ,,18? 
Major Herbst had told the P.M.C. that after the revolt the bulk of the 
Bondelswarts had been allowed to return home, and that their stock was later 
182. CA.P.M.O. Vol. 6. P.M. C. Re po rt. p. 1 O. 
183. i bi d. p.ll. 
184. See p.?-I a. 
185. t. A. P.M.O. Vol. 6. P . 1·1. C. Report. p.12. 
186. See p.'ll. 
18? . c'A.P.M.O. Vol. 6. P.M. C. Report. p.13. 
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returned to them. The wounded were Kept in hospital. The chairman of the 
P.M.C. drew attention to the high proportion of Bondelswarts killed to 
wounded, and to reports of the ill-treatment of prisoners. Herbst had told 
the P.M.C. that wounded Bondelswarts were hospitaliz ··d, and that the Bondel-
swarts "invariably carried away their wounded" from the battlefield, and thus 
few wounded Bondelswarts were captured188 Only the ringleaders had been 
kept for trial, and the other Bondelsl'iarts prisoners had been fed until their 
release and the return of their stock.No further aid had been necessary189, 
since the Bondelswarts men could return to work. No specia l relief had been 
requested, although a private society was distributing clothing . The widows 
were looked after by the tribe. Unfortunately, owing to the drought, only 
about half the cattle had survived, but all these were returned to the 
Bondelswarts. 
Major Herbst had said that nothing special had been done to rehabilitate the 
economi c 1i fe of the tri be. and that the "men were merely encou rag ed to go 
out and work,,190. 
There was an annexure to the P.M.C. report containing a statemen t made by the 
chainna n, Marquis Theodoli. In a masterly exposition he set out the l'iho le 
problem facing the P.t1.C.in enquiring into the 60ndelswarts rebellion. 
He said that to pass judge~ent on the question meant making a comparison be-
tween the theoretical policy which should have been followed in S.W.A. and the 
actual policy l'ihich was. He outlined the theoretical policy. In colonies, he 
felt, it was necessary to have a peaceful development with whites collaborating 
with the blacks. For a mandatory territory this policy was, hOViever , radically 
altered. Under Article 22 the fundamental principle had been laid down that 
188. ibid. p.1S. 
189 . ibid. p. 16 . 
190. ibid. p.17. 
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the Mandatory had to assist: 
"peop 1 es not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world". 
and thus : 
"The well-being and develo pm ent of less advanced peoples from 
a sacred trust of civil i zation" . 19l 
As far as S.W.A. was concerned, he felt that: 
"the Administration has pursued a policy of force rather than of 
persuasion, and further that this policy has always been conceived 
and applied in the interests of the colonists rather than in the 
interests of the natives". 
While conceding that the special conditions on the spot and the characteristics 
of the po pulation had made South Africa's task a difficult one, Theodoli 
concluded : 
"My conscience, however, will not allow me to admit that these 
difficulties justified a departure from the principles of the 
mandate, a departure which instead of appearing to be a demon-
stration of strength and superiority, might be considered an in-
dication of weakness and incapacity in the exercise of a mission 
which is a lofty one only if its true spirit is respected" . 192 
Sir Edgar Walton presented a paper containing his comments 193 on the P.M.C. 
Report to the League of Nations on 1 September 1923. 
He opened his reply by saying that it Vias impossible for the P.~1.C . to re port 
satisfactorily on the Bondelswarts' rebellion because they had no first- hand 
knowledge of the tensions or conditions of S.W.A. Thus he felt South Africans 
would find the P.~1.C's report "i ncredible". 
191. ibid . p. 18. 
192. ibid. p.19. 
193. C.A.P.M.O. League of Nations. A.48. 1923. VI Geneva, 1 Sept. 1923. 
P.M.C. "Comments of the accredited representative of the Union of 
South Africa on the Comm issions' Re port on the Bondelzwarts rebellion". 
23 Aug. 1923. CDereafter referred to as r.A.p. r~ . o. Walton's "Comments" 
on the P. M.C. Report) . 
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He pointed out the difficulties of administering a country in which post-war 
tensions and the overthrow of the old regime had made unrest prevalent 
amongst the blacks. Hofmeyr had been appointed because of his ability, and 
Walton described him as being: 
"a man of the highest possible character, who is incapable of 
an act of wrong or unjustice, a man of wide sympathy, and a man 
who certainly felt to the full his deepres ;>onsi bility for the 
well-being of the native races placed under his hand". 
Indeed, a paragon of Virtue! 
As for the lack of an acceptable report on the rebellion by the Union, Walton 
said that he felt he had explained the Unions' position to the P.M.C. 194 , and 
besides which the Union had not been asked to make a report, and felt that 
it would be incorrect to interfere with the N.A . C. Report. In fact, Walton 
sai d : 
"the a tti t ude of the Government towards Mr Hofmeyr and its 
conuuct might be sufficiently indicated by the fact that 
r·lr Hofmeyr was left undis ourbed at his post". 
From this very pertinent statement it would seem fair to conclude that Smuts's 
defence of Hofmeyr's actions was not made simply in the course of duty. 
Walton went on to say that South Africa n experience had sh0l1n that the best 
I,ay to deal with a rebell ion was to act swiftly. 
He felt that Theodolis' views in the annexure to the P. M.C . report were 
unsubstantiated and extreme. The maintenance of law and order "las an 
essential prerequisite for the inculcation of the principles of civilization, 
for : 
Unless law and order be established and maintained, the presence 
of the white man himself in these countries is impossible". 
194. ibid. p.l. 
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In general, Walton felt that the P.M.C's. report would be resented by the 
white population of South Africa and S. W.A., and could make the blacks "more 
difficult to manage and less amenable to civilizing influences". The success 
of the Government in S.W.A. was more due to moral force than force of arms, 
as evidenced by the small police force in the country, and therefore Theodoli's 
accusation that a policy of force rather than persuasion had been followed 
was false 195. In a mandated territory, Walton said, it was not true that 
the interests of the blacks should predominate. Both black and white should 
rather be treated equally. 
The Bondelswarts had only resented the police196 because they had broken 
the law, and the dog tax 197 had been reduced a few months before the revolt, 
and even the P.~1.c. had found the branding law justified, said Walton . As 
For the objections to the Vagrancy law198 Walton felt that it was better 
that offenders should be kept away from the contaminating influences of 
prison. Walton concluded with an eulogy to South Africa's native policies, 
sayi ng 
"For upwards of two centuries the South African people have been 
brought into contact with the native races, and it is only just 
to claim for them that they ha ve not shirked the wh ite man's 
burden" . 
The P.M.C. report, Walton said, would be read in South Africa with "bitter 
feel ings" 199. 
One of those South Africans was Hofmeyr. He wrote to Smuts saying that he 
felt the P.M.C. in censuring him had adopted an "unusual to my mind, unconsti-
tuti ona 1" procedure200 
195. ibid. p.2. 
196. See p.I~I. 
197. See p4~. 
198. See p.l35 . 
199. CA.P.M.O. Waltons' "Comments" on the P.M .C. Report . p.3. 
200. C.A.P.M.O. Vo l. 6. Hofmeyr. Windhoek, to Smuts. 30 Aug. 1923. 
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As was the case with the N.A.C., so too Hofmeyr felt that the P.M.C . had 
shown itself susceptible to "the penetrating persistence of the inordinate 
irrationality of the present time". The P.M.C. had not appreciated the 
fact that Smuts, by letting Hofmeyr remain undisturbed at his post, had im-
plicity shown his approval of Hofmeyr's actions and policies in S.W.A. 
Hofmeyr felt that the P.t~.C. 's judgement was "hasty and immature", and reite-
rated the points made by Walton to the League of Nations in reply to the 
P.M.C. He felt that the P.M.C. had not appreciated what had been accomplished 
by the Mandatory in S.W.A. during the short time the mandate had been in 
eXistence, and had instead resorted to "ultra-superior fault finding". For 
his part, said Hofmeyr, he would do the same as he had done if the rebellion 
were to happen again 201 . 
The P.M.C,'s report was a moderate censure in fact, and was unanimously 
approved by the League Assembl§?2 South Africa came under attack because 
Major Herbst was appointed Commissioner for Native Affairs under the Hertzog 
Government 203 . But the Bondelswarts affair had been so thoroughly . aired in 
the Union in 1922 that the P.M.C. Report. produced little response when it 
was tabled in Parliamant on 29 January 1924. To improve South Africa's image, 
Hofmeyr himself, \vho was left at his post as Administrator of S.W.A., was 
sent to the League as South Africa's representative to the 1924 session to 
present his annual report on the mandate in person 204 
Thus despite all these reports and memoranda, a conclusive decision either 
way had not been made. The debate remained largely unresolved. 
000 - - -
201. ibid. pp. 16-18. 
202. Davey, p. 19. 
203. LA.P.t~.O. L.N. 13/4 . Vol. 4. 30 Aug. 1923. Daily News article. 
204. Davey, p.20. 
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CHAPTER 7. 
ORIGINS OF THE REBELLION 
Some of the causes of the 1922 rebellion can in fact be traced back to the 
past history and lifestyle of the Bondelswarts tribe. Originally a nomadic, 
pastoral people, they were dependent for their liveli hood on the produce of 
their stock and on the game and natural produce of their environment. 
They were not cultivators of crops, and the area in which they lived was not 
climatically suited to agriculturel Manual labour l'ias disliked and largely 
unnecessary. Major Manning agreed with the chainnan of the N.A.C., Dr. Ro-
berts, when the latter said that the Bondelswarts disinclination to work was 
"panly due to history and partly to the particular conditions here Qn the 
south of S. W.A.],,2. 
The role of the Bondel swarts Raad or counci1 3 had an important part to 
play in the 1922 rebellion, for it was the Raad that made the final dec ision 
not to surrender Morris and to prepare for war4. A draft N.A.C. Report 
stated that: 
"It will be pointed out in dea ling with the demand for the 
surrende r of Morris that a Captain (Jacobus Christian) could 
not execute an order to which the people, speaking through their 
Raad, was opposed".S 
In 1922 it was the Raad majority that overruled Jacobus Christian and decided 
on l'iar6. 
1. Seep.3 . 
2. R. P.N.A. C. Report. ~linutes of Evidence. p.llS. i'lajor ~1anning. 
3. See p-'5. 
4. See r- 't a.. 
5. R.P.N.&.C. Report Drafts. Draft A. p.2. 
6. T.A. Dept. Justice. Vol. 106. File 2/122/11. Affidavit by Hendri k 
Jonas, who said that Jacobus Christian's Raad consisted of Ti moth eus 
Beukes, Nols Ortman, Gert Jager, Adam Pienaar, Stephanus Christian, 
Carl Blaauws, Gert Christian, Klaas Isaac, Klaas Mattheuys, Jan Hen-
driks, and Elias and Mans Stephanus. 
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The Bondelswarts were proud of their nation and their past7. Before the 
German occupation of S.W. A. the Bondelswarts had had great influence in 
8 the south of S.W.A. , and in 1922 there would have been Bondelswarts still 
living who could remember their former days of freedom not more than thirty 
years ago. The tribe had a tradition of independence, and had been one of 
the two tribes that did not acknowledge the Red Nations' suzerainty in S. W.A.9. 
This independence was resolutely maintained and cherished for as long as possi-
ble lO . Even after the Bondelswarts independence was broken by the Germans in 
the 1904-6 rebellionll , their leaders in exile had kept in touch with the tribe12 . 
The N.A.C. Report found that even by 1922 the Bondelswarts had never easily 
adjus t ed to a subordinate position under the whites 13 . Major Eadie, the 
inspecting rnagistrate of S.W.A. said that the Bonde l swarts unrest led by 
Adam Christian (alias Pi enaar) in 1917 was aimed at the creation "of an 
independent tribe with Jacobus Christian as Captain,,14 When Jacobus 
returned in 1919 the Bondelswarts told the local policeman that they had come 
back to. claim their traditional lands 15. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
1 2. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
N.A . C. Report, p. 2, para. 11. 
Este r huyse, p.7. See p'3. 
Ve dder ,Early Ti mes. p. 128. See f$. 
Freislicn, p.4. 
See p.I~. 
N.A.C. Report. p.3, para. 12. 
N.A.C. Report, p.29, para . 1. 
R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 2. p.5. Magistrates 
Office, Windhoek to Secretary for Protectorate, re; Bondels unrest. 
6 March 1917 . See p.bO. 
ibid. An. 12. p.3. "Correspondence re: entering of Protectorate by 
Jacobus Christian and others". See p.30. 
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The Native Reserves Commission reported in 1921 that the Bondelswarts' 
"aspirations towards acquiring their former tribal lands under a 
hereditary chief are viewed with considerable dissatisfaction and 
uneasiness by European's resident in Warmbad who allege that even 
today under the control of a chief appointed by the Administration 
cr. Beuke~ their native servants are continually being summoned to 
attend tribal meetings .. . . ".16 
The N.A.C. also found that there was a strong Bondelswarts desire for 
independence17 David Klaas, a Bondelswarts rebel, said that Morris had 
told the tribe in 1922 
"we are to make war against the white people and capture the Pro-
tectorate back for ourselves the same as we had it before the 
Germans took it .... " .18 
Klaas himself said: 
"The chie f reason of the present trouble is we wanted the land 
agai n the same as we had it before the German government came" .19 
Lt. Prinsloo, \'iho had played such a major role in suppressing the 1922 
revolt wrote years later that he had often 
"sympathetically discussed the fact that, the Bondels were, after 
all, only once more fighting for their freedom as they saw it, and 
against certain laws which they thought were oppressive ........ "20 
G Thi s desire for independence amongst the Bondelswarts was a major stimulus 
for their agitation which culminated in the 1922 revolt, and which is under-
ernphas i zed by the reports and memo randa on the revolt. Even today some Bonde 1-
swarts still feel a strong sense of injustice at the loss of their lands and 
freedom in 1906 and 192221. 
16. W.A. Adm. Private and Semi-Official Docs . Report of the N.R.C. to 
Secretary for the Protectorate. 1921. p.9. 8 June 1924. 
17. N.A.C. Report, p.29, para. 1. 
18. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.633. Det. A. Cilliers. Affi-
davit of David Klaas. 
19. ibid. p.637. Seep.55. 
20. C.A. File A. 106. (Retroactive) p. 3. In obituary by Col. Prinsloo for 
Judge "Toon" van der Heever. 
21. Interview with Ludwig Scheeuwe, Wortel. 22 July 1977. 
Interview with Johannes Zwartbooi, Gabis. 21 July 1977. 
Interview with Isaak Witbooi, Hamlbad. 20 July 1977. 
Interview with W.J. Adriaanse, Harmbad. 19 July 1977. 
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And the desire for the r ~ storation of the traditional l ands was not only 
confined to the Bondelswarts, for Hofmeyr remarked that when he had tried to 
draw up reserves for those blacks without any land 22 he had found that 
"Almost without exception each section asked for the allotment of 
the old tribal areas ' ' .... "23 
During the period of German rule and the break i ng of black resistance in the 
19D4-6 revolt24 , this desire for a return to freedom and independence among 
the Bondelswarts seems to have manifested itself in a vaguely expressed 
desire for "English" rule. The Bondelswarts remembering the mutually res-
pectful relations that they had had with the Cape Colony, fondly imagined 
that the justice, aid and non-interference they had received at the hands of 
the British would return if t he British came to power . Their disillusionment 
when this did happen sowed further seeds of di scontent, to be reaped in 1922. 
The Bondelswarts held great hopes for a British victor/5 when the First l'iorld 
l~ar began, and some, like Abraham Morris, even took service with the Union 
26 Defence force . Their frustration and anger was thus all the greater when 
they found that under Union rule their lands were not restored to them and 
that they were still subject to many of the old German laws, which, albeit 
in a mi lder form 27 , were now more strictly app1 ied. 
The Bondelswarts felt that German rule was too restrictive, and the constant 
enmity between black and white eventually sparked into revolt all over S. v!' A. 
in 190428 ,. The peace treaty signed with the Bonde1swarts on 23 December 1906 
reduced what was left of their territory to a Reserve of 175,000 hectares 29 . 
22. See p.'54.. 
23. R.P. Hofmeyr's Memorandum, p.4. 
24. See p. (1. 
25. N.A.C. Report, p.3, para. 12. 
26. Seep.'J.3. 
27. N.A.C. Report, p.3, para. 14 . 
28. N.A.C. Report, p.3, para. 12. 
29. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.239-240 . Det.-Sgt. C.C. Pie-
tersen (presented a copy of the 1906 treaty to the N.A.C.). 
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The diehards, like Jacobus Christian and Morris, fled into the Union as 
'1 30 ex 1 es . It is important to note that the Bondelswarts had not been com-
pletely defeated by the Germans. By ably pursuing guerrillatactics they 
had inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, who were unused to both the 
terrain and the mode of warfare31 . It was the sheer weight of numbers and 
the superior weaponry of the Germans that had made their victory inevitable. 
But the Bondelswarts had learned that the whites were not invincible and 
could be successfully opposed. None of their leaders had been captured, but 
h d 1 fl d . t '1' th U . 32 a me re y e 1 n 0 ex 1 e 1 n e n1 0 n . 
The Bondelswarts had learned another lesson from the 190~,~6 rebellion. It 
had started when the local German divisional commander, Lt. Jobst, had 
interfered with the Bondelsl,arts chief's juridicial pOl,ers, and had gone 
to arrest him. In the scuffle both Lt. Jobst and the chief had been killed33 . 
This, allied with the wide and often abused powers of the German police had 
made the Bonde lswarts deeply suspicious of any white in uniform,and ready for 
any duplicity from such whites 34 
The "German yoke" fell heavily on t he Bondelswarts shoulders after the 1904-6 
rebe l lion. On 18 Augus t 1907 the Governor, Lindequist, drew up new regulations 
v/hich proh ib ited blacks from owning riding animals and large stock, and imposed 
a pass system, vagrancy law and a strict cont rol of ma ster-servant re l ations, 
. 35 
often to the benefit of the ma s ter, on them . 
Thus the period of German rule left the Bondelswarts confined to a small por-
tion of their original lands and subject to much disliked pass and work laws. 
30. N.A.C. Report, p.3, para. 12. See fll . 
31. R.P.N.A.C. Report . Minutes of Ev idence. p.949. Lt. Prinsloo. 
32. See r· n . 
33. Bley. German Rule, p.144. 
34. See p.I'i"7. 
35. Bley, Gennan Rule. pp.172-173. See f"~O. 
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It also left a legacy of enmity between blacks and whites and a deep Bondel-
swarts distrust of the law and the police. These feelings were re-awakened 
with Lt. Jordaan's duplicity in arresting Jacobus Christian's emissaries in 
191936 , and with Sgt. van Niekerk's attempted arrest of Morris in 1922 37. 
And it was these Bondelswarts suspicions which hampered the negotiations pre-
ceding the 1922 revolt38 . 
The Bondelswarts were bad ly hit economically by the First World War. During 
their trek to Tsumeb 39 most of their stock had died of drought and disease40 , 
and many of their huts were destroyed. But thei r hopes for a redress of the ir 
grievances were high once the Union had won the war in G.S.W.A. 
The Union troops found the Bondelswarts at Tsumeb. But the question of their 
resettlement and compensation for their war stock-losses was to give the 
Bondelswarts a foretaste of what was to come. The N.A .C. found that the 
Union victory had aroused "extraordinary" hopes amo ng the Bondelswarts and 
that when they were disappointed in these their anger at the Germans was 
redirected at the Union41 . Hofmeyr said that although the blacks in S.vJ.A. 
had had the i r l ands confiscated, cut up and sold by the Gennans, they had 
expected these to be restored to them with the Union's victory, and were 
42 aggrieved when this did not happen 
The Germans had taken mos t of the Bondelswarts with them to Tsumeb, for 
reasons which are not ent i rely clear. Some said that the Germans were afraid 
that the Bondelswarts woul d aid the Union forces 43 , wh ile others held that 
the Bondelswarts had wanted to avoid capture by the Union and had acted as 
36. Seef·3off 
37. See ~ b9ff. 
38. See U .I O. 
39. See p. ?-3. 
40. See p. a~ 
41. N.A.C. Report, p.29, para. 2. 
42. R.P. Hofmeyr's Memora ndum. p.4. 
43. W.A. Adm. Vo l . 50. File 599. Extracts from minute by Dr. Jorison, 
Omaruru. 13 July 1915. 
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scouts and guides for the Germans 44 . Whatever the case, after some initial 
delay, the Bondelswarts were resettl ed at Warmbad in August 191545 , and £950 
worth of rations was issued to them46 . 
But the question of compensation for stock losses was not solved quite so 
easily. In 1922 Jacobus Christian wrote a letter to Le Fleur47 complaining 
that, amongst other things, the Union Government had not yet compensated the 
Bondelswarts for their war stock 10sses48 . The complaint was a recurrent one 
for the Bondelswarts, and proved to be their first disillusionment with Union 
rule. In 1920 they petitioned General Smuts about it49 . 
In fact the Bondelswarts did get some stock50 , but a study of the military 
~overnnlent' s correspondence about the compensation is revealing, showing a 
peculiar combination of ineptitude, tactlessness and de lay, as well as a 
complete lack of understanding for and comm unication with the Bondelswarts ' 
wishes, starting off Union rule in S.W.A. on a sour note. 
On 21 July 1915 ~lajor Pritchard at Vlindhoek was inf( rmed that the Bondelswarts 
at Tsumeb had 400 cattle ~Ihich they 11ished to sell, and that they wanted to 
have the proceeds transmi tted to Harmbad 51 . However , three days 1 ater the 
information was sent that the 400 cattle did not actually belong to the Bon-
de lswarts, but had been given to them by the Germans to provide food 52 . After 
the Bondelswarts had been resettled at ~'!armbad they wanted the money from the 
sale to buy stock. Lt. Kendrick at Kalkfontein-South telegraphed the Native 
Comm issionEr at Windhoek on 18 September 1915 stating that the Bondelswarts 
woul d not be compensated for any losses caused by the German Government, but 
44. Interview with Joseph Christian, Sit-eon. 26 July 1977. 
Intervie\1 loJith Johanne s Zwartbooi, Gabis. 21 July 1977. 
Interview 11ith Izaak Witbooi, \'ar; nbad. 20 July 1944. 
45. R.P.N.A . C. Report. ~lillutes of Evic! nce. pp.90-91 Major Manning. See (,,;;14. 
46. R. P. Hofmeyr's l1emorandum. p.8. 
47. See p.b"". 
48. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.l,1l2. Lt. J.H. Thomas. Jacobus 
Christian to Dirk Schas, Cape Town. 
49. W.A. Adrn.Vo1.106.File 3353. \'armbadl·iagistrate to Sec:for S. ,Ui. 14 i\pr.1920. 
50. ~ee p.as~ 
51. vJ.A.Adm.Vo1.50.Fi1e 599. Telegram ~laj. Leisk to t·laj. Pritchard. 21 J ul. 19,5 . 
52. ibid. Telegram Capt. Leife ldt, Tsumeb to Windhoek . 24 'Ju1y 1915. 
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would prefer cattle instead of the cash owed to them from the sale of the 
Tsumeb stock53 . 
When nothing had happened by November 1915 Lt. Kendrick sent a letter to 
the acting Native Commissioner, on 4 November, reminding him that the Bondel-
swarts should be paid in cattle and not cash. With some foreboding , Lt. Ken-
drick wrote that since the Union authorities had agreed to sell the Bondelswarts' 
stock at Tsumeb and to transmit the proceeds he felt that 
"The administration has therefore incurred responsibility in the 
matter and should not adopt a course which would be to the detriment 
of the Bondelswarts who appear to have suffered more than other natives 
in the conditions brought about by our occupation".S4 
But the officer in charge of Native Affairs at Keetmanshoop was informed by 
the Native Affairs department of S.W.A. on 6 November that the Bondelswarts 
were to be paid in cash and not cattle, in order to obviate any misunderstan-
ding 55. In fact, it would have had the op~osite effect. The Keetmanshoop 
Native Affairs officer replied to the effect that, if cash had to be paid, 
it should be paid out in February 1916 when the Government sales of unclaimed 
stock would take place. Otherwise the Bondelswarts might squander the cash 
or if they tried to buy stock, \~ould have to do so at inflated prices from 
white farmers who would be aware that the Bondelswarts had been paid out56 . 
But the months \~ent by, and on 27 ~larch 1916 the military magistrate at 
Warmbad reported that he had received a deputation of Bondelswarts complaining 
tha t their ration supplies had been stopped and that the £2,000 realized by 
the sale of the Tsumeb stock had not been given to them. While he felt that 
the Tsumeb stock had actually belonged to the Government and not the Bondel-
swarts, since it had only been given to them to provide milk, the military 
mag i strate felt that for obvious reasons the money, or its equivalent in stock, 
53. ibid. Telegram Lt. Kendrick to Native Commissioner. 18 Sept. 1915. 
54. ibid. Lt. Kendrick to Acting Native Commissioner. 4 Nov. 1915 . 
55. ibid. Protectorate Native Affairs Dept. to Native Affairs Offi cer, 
Keetmanshoop. 6 Nov. 1915. 
56. ibid. Native Affairs Officer, Lt. Kendrick, to Native Commissi oner, 
Windhoek. 25 Nov. 1915. 
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sh-ould be given to the Bondelswarts 57 . 
The Secretary for the Protectorate replied on 19 July 1916 saying that 
some of the Tsumeb stock had belonged to a local farmer, and so £300 would 
be deducted from the £2,000 to compensate him. The remaining £1,700 was to 
be used to buy small stock, not cattle, at the lowest possible price for the 
Bondelswarts 58. In addition, the cost of rations supplied to indigent 
Bondelswarts since the official ending of ration supplies was to be deducted 
from the £1,700. The Bondelswarts finally got their compensation on 16 August 
1916. It had taken a year and two mon ths to come through, and when it finally 
did they were compensated with goats, not cattle or even sheep59. 
So, after an unnecessarily long delay and with some reluctance, the Govern-
ment had fulfilled its obligations. In the process they had lost a chance 
to win the Bondelswbrts' goodwill. 
However, the Bo ndelswarts did not regard this as adequate coolpensation, and 
on 30 June 1917 a deputati on of Bondelswarts met the Secretary for the Pro-
tectorate of S.W.A. to complain about the lack of compensation for war stock 
losses . He replied that "The English government does not pay the German 
governments' debts".60 
This lack of compensation remained a strong Bondelswarts grievance, and left 
many of them impoveri shed. Some Bonde 1 s\-Iarts sti 11 remember the greats tock 
losses they incurred during the war and the lack of compensation with bitter-
ness 61 . 
As for the stoppi ng of rations before the proceeds of the sa 1 e of the Tsumeb 
57. ibid. Military magistrate, ~iarmbad to Sec. for Protectorate . 27 r~arch 1917. 
58. ibid. Deputy Sec. for Protectorate to mil itary magistrate, ':armbad. 
19 July 1916. 
59. ibid. Military magistrate, ~Ia rmbad to Sec. for Protectorate. 
60. W.A. Adm. Vol. 51. File 599/2. Bondelswarts deputation to Maj. J.F. Herbst, 
Sec. for the Protectorate. 
61. Interview with Joa hnnes Zwartbooi, Gabis. 21 July 1977. 
Interview with Isaak Witbooi, ~Iarmbad. 20 July 1977. 
See Appendi xA. 
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stock were transmi tted, Col. de Jager told the N.A.C. that he had 
"heard from many districts (in S.W.A.) that the natives say that the 
British are in sympathy with us, they kill us with sympathy but our 
stomachs are empty". 62 
Immediately after the First Wo rld War Lord Buxton,the Governor-General of the 
Union of South Africa (1914 to September 1920) toured S.W.A., making speeches. 
He proclaimed the equal ity before the law of black and white , and said that 
there was to be no more indiscriminate flogging of blacks, and that the rights 
of black employees wou ld be safeguarded. Blacks would be able to own la nd 
communally, would be allowed to own cattle, and would have their existing 
reserves secured to them63 . 
General Lemmer felt that Lord Buxton's speeches might have aroused false 
hopes among the blacks of S.'I.A. as to the liberalization they could expect 
under Union rUle64 . This opinion was echoed by many authorities, some of 
whom saw the disappointment caused by the false hopes as a direct cause of 
the 1922 Bondelswarts rebellion65 . General Lemmer felt even more strongly 
about it, blaming Lo rd Buxton's speeches for the "1 icentiousness" of the 
blacks in S.W.A. under German rUle66 . 
The Bondel Sl1arts were aware of Lord Buxton 's speeches, and they did seem to 
base some of their hopes for Union rule on them. In 1921 they had protested 
about the branding law's discriminatory treatment between blacks and whites 
"terwyl Gouverneur Lord Buxton gezegt heeft dat wy allen gelyk hebben,,67 
62. : R.P. II. A.C.Report . . t4inutes of Evtdence.p.316. Col. de Jager. 
63. W.A. Private and Semi-Off. Docs. 6293/10. "Tour of Governor-General in 
Protectorate. ' Speech del ivered by His Excellency the Governor-General 
of the Union of South Africa at Windhoek, on the 2nd October 1919. 
Printed by SVlakopmund Buchhandlung. pp.8-9 
64. N.A.C. Report, p.10, para . 39a). 
65. Die Suid-West. 2 June 1922. 
R. P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.l, U28. Lt. Col. Trew. 
66. R.P. N. A.C. Report Drafts. Draft C. pp.8-9. 
67. R.P. N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.447. Noothout. 
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The Bondelswarts' disillusionment with Union rule was all the greater, since 
after the First World War they were faced with the fact that over 8,000 
68 Germans had been allowed to stay in S.W.A. , and sometimes they had to 
work for these Germans to raise money. 
The Bondelswarts' disillusionment was expressed by a desire for "English" 
and not "boer" rule. They regarded t i e Union Government of S. W.A. as being 
"boer" rule. On the eve of the 1922 r ebellion Jacobus Christian wrote to 
Abram Watt that he had been "dumbstruck" when Noothout had told him that 
S.W.A. had separate laws to the Union, since he felt that the Bondelswarts 
acknowledged only "English" law69 . Mgr. Krolikowski said in 1922 that the 
Bondelswarts had told him that 
"in the Union the dog tax was 2s and 6 pence and they asked if they 
were not no\,. under the English flag. The asked why they should pay 
more" . 70 
Several Bondelswarts told the N.A.C. that it was t~e "boer l aw" and the "boer 
government" that was responsible for their sufferings , and not the "English 
law", which they desired71 . There seems to be some paral ·lel in this with 
the Union Richtersveld "Old law,,72 party, which, under Jasper Cloete a 
follower of Le Fleur73 , vaguely promise d a return to "Engl ish law" as it had 
been in the days of Queen Victoria 74 . 
The Administration's action on the occasion of Jacobus Christian's return 
from exile in 191975 did not exactly endear it t o the Bondelswarts, and set 
in motion a growing mood of distrust amongst the Bondelswarts wh ich culmi -
68. Hancock, p.103 . 
69. N.A.C. Report, p.15 , para. 62. Jacobus Christian to Abram vlatt. 16 May 1922. 
70. R.P .N. A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.354. J~gr. Krolikowski. 
71. ibid. p.752 . John Brown. 
ibid. p.7 74. Johannes Matroos. 
ibid. p.879. J .W. Haite. 
72. See p.b"-. 
73. See p.\'?,. 
74. See p.b3. 
75. See p.33. 
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nated in the 1922 revolt. Jacobus Christian had made repeated but unsuc-
f 1 1 · t' 76 t t f '1 th U' G t k cess u app lca lons 0 re urn rom eXl e once e nlon overnmen too 
over S.W.A. Eventually, in 1919 he decided to return anyway, and crossed 
with a number of followers, spurred by the climate of economic depression in 
the Union Little Namaqualand area whic h had forced copper mines there, a 
major source of employment, to close down77 
The Bondelswarts first contact with the new Government in S.W.A. for which 
they held such high hopes was with Trooper Roux, a lone policeman stationed 
at Haib78. His actions gave the returning exiles a taste of what to expect 
in the future. He refused the Bondelswarts cattle water for some time, and 
d h f · t' 79 arreste t e lrst messengers 0 arrlve . It was Trooper Roux and a local 
fanller80 vlhose alannist reports contributed to the d'ebacle that followed. 
Lt. Jordaan went wi th fourteen pol icemen to investigate and thei r anlled 
arrival at Jacobus's camp caused many Bondelswarts to take cover and prepare 
to fight81 . Jacobus, his susp ic ions arous ed, refused to accompany Lt. Jor-
daan to ~1armbad but instead sent four of his headmen as emissaries82 . But 
Lt. Jordaan , lying in wai t ahead , captured and imprisoned the emissaries83 , 
and although, as soon as he heard ·· of it, the Administrator orderE'd their imm;:-
diate release, the damage wa s done . Jacobus angrily told the magistrate who 
came to investigate the case that the Bondelswarts had returned open ly and 
in peaceB4 , and took strong exception to Trooper Roux's initial refusal of 
water for their stock, saying 
"How can a person who is thirsty, that went without water for four 
days between Uhabis and Haib with a thirst, be treated in such a 
manner ... . "B5. 
76. See p.d-'1. 
77. Seep-d.".. 
78. See f" 7-"1. 
79. See r· '3 o· 
80. See~. 1,\3.. 
Bl. See f' 30. 
82. See p." I, 
83. See f '31· 
84. Seep.33· 
85. R.P. Exhibits and Annexures. An.12. Jacobus Christian to Hannba d 
11agistrate. 8 Aug. 1919. 
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Poor relations between the Bondelswarts and the police were thus further 
aggravated86 , and Lt. Jordaan's actions left the Bondelswarts suspicious and 
angry. A draft N.A.C. report sunl11ed up the effects of the incident, saying 
that it was: 
"recorded as exempl ifyi ng the 'ruses de guerre' whi ch were cons i dered 
justifiable in dealing with the Hottentots and as explaining why in-
subsequent negotiations the Bondelzwarts were unwilling to trust the 
promises and safe conducts of the administration".87 
Major Manning told the N.A.C. that is would have been better for the magistrate 
himself to have gone' to see Jacobus, rather than the police88 On his 1921 
visit to the Bondelswarts Reserve he reported that the 1919 incident had 
J 
made them suspicious of the Government and he condemned the handling of the 
affair, saying that: 
"perusal of the report discloses hasty action of the Illrt of the 
police calculated to bring on a disturbance and excitement which 
it should have been their first object to prevent. This comparitively 
small body of Bondelzwarts appears to have left the Union in good faith 
on declaration of Peace and after on arduous journey and having diffi-
culty about wa ter at one farm, a rri ved at its old reserve, where it was 
promptly met by armed force, ins ':ead of some representative of the 
civil administration .... "89 
He felt that Lt. Jordaan's duplicity -
"was likely to create a wan t of confidence in GovErnment methods, 
and it could hardly be wondered if Jacobus Christian became nervous 90 
or s us pi ci ous, and was reported unl'li 11 i ng to comp ly with summonses." 
Although it was not desired that Jacobus should be allowed to stay in S. W.A., 
the S. W.A. Administration had to let him stay since the Union refused to allow 
the stock that Jacobus and his followers had brought with them to be brought 
back to the Cape, in order to prevent the spread of stock diseases9l . 
86 . See p.3d-.. 
87 . R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft A. p.9. 
88. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.1l2. r'lajor Manning. See pJli7. 
89 . R.P. Exhibits and Annexures. An . l. A.R.B. p.8. Major ~lanning's report 
on Bondel s.' unrest. 1921. 
90. ibid. p.9. 
91. R.P.N.A.C. Report. r'linutes of Evidence. pp.14-l6. Major Herbst. 
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What is striking about the 1919 incident is its similarity to the C2use of 
the outbreak of the 1904-6 rebellion, with Lt. Jobst's attempted arrest of 
the Bondelswarts' Captain92 Jacobus and his followers had been invol ved 
in that rebellion and would have remembered the incident, as their reaction 
on Lt . Jordaan's arrival showed. But, more important, was that it showed 
the returning Bondelswarts that little had changed since 1906, and it incul-
cated a mistrust and fear of the police and the Government which was to severely 
hamper negotiations on the eve of the 1922 rebellion93 . Lt. Jordaan's double-
cross was to make the Bondelswarts all the more reluctant to let Morris go 
to ~1armbad, especially when they knew that Sgt. van Niekerk was waiting for 
them on the road to Warmbad94 . The 1919 incident vias not forgotten, and was 
vi vi dly remembered by one of the informants i ntervi ewed in 197795 . 
Over the next four years after 1919 there was a steady trickle of returning 
Bondelswarts exiles to S.W .A.96. Once there, they found that labour conditions 
under Union administration we re nearly as burdensome and poor as in German 
times, and the situation was aggravated by the prevailing drought and depres-
sion97 . Things vlOrsened in 1920 whe n mi lita ry rule ended because with the 
withdrawal of ga rrisons there were fel'ler j obs ava i lable and less mon ey \~as 
in circulation98. Lt. Prinsloo felt that the Bonde l swarts were suspicious of 
the rising inflation in the country99. 
Labour conditions were poor lOO In 1915 Lt. Kendrick had reported that some 
Bondels\~arts refused to work for vlhite f armers because they alleged they vlere 
i 11- trea ted by them 101 . 
92. See p.14. 
93. See r- I~. 
94. See p. I'I~. 
95. Interview with Isaa k Hitbooi, Warmbad. 20 July 1977. 
96. See f3~. 
97. See p-~'1. 
98. R.P.N .A .C . Report . Minutes of Evidence.p.865. Lt. Col. Kruger. 
99. ibid. p.949. Lt. Prinsloo. 
100. See p.V\. 
101. Adm.Vol.50.File 599. Report of Lt. Kendrick, Officer of Na tive Affairs 
Dept. to Native Commissioner, viindhoek. 22 Sept. 1915; 
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In 1917, Lt. Col. Kruger, investigating Bondelswarts unrest, said that he had 
given: 
"instructions that all natives present in the Wannbad district not 
in possession of working passes are for the present to be left alone. 
I am of the opinion that this had a great deal to do with the alleged 
unres t" . 1 02. 
The N. A. C. found the relationship between the Bondelswarts and their 
\~hite employers to be genera 11y unsa ti sfactory 103 The problem was a 1 so 
that there were no local industries and that the educational system was 
backward 104. 
, 
But, if the Bondelswarts were reluctant to work there were ways that the 
Government could put pressure on them to do so, by reducing their economic 
independence by prevent i ng them from hunt i ng, or 105, i nd i rectly by forci ng 
them to 1 ok for work in order to get cash to pay the dog tax l06 
The N.R.C. investigated the labour position in S.W.A. in 1921 107 . The com-
mission heard complaints from white fanners that the blacks were lazy, unre-
liable and insolent, that the qualifications . for black exem::-tion from labour 
requirements were too low, that too many visiting passe s were issued to blacks, 
and that penalties for black contract-breakers were too light. Thus the N.R.C. 
recommended stricter control over contracts , stricter pass laws, and that 
powers of corpora l punishment should be restored to the police l08 
The Vagrancy law l09 wh ich provided that a first offender under the law cou ld 
be sentenced to a tenn of work on public works or for a private person was 
another hidden fonn of making blacks seek work. It \'las defended by the Govern-
102. W.~ .. Adm.Vo1.106 .File 3353. Gorges to Secretary for Defence, Pretoria. p.3. 
Report of Col. Kruger ' on Bondels' unrest. 16 Jan. 1917. 
103. N.A.C. Report, p:ll, para. 43. 
104. ibid. p.32. 
105. Seep.S I. 
106. See p. n 5 . 
107. Seep. I'!;'!,. 
108. R.P.N.A.C.Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp. 842-845. Lt.Col. Kruger on 
N.R.C. Report. 
109. See p4 1. 
157. 
ment on the grounds that it kept the blacks out of jail 110 
But the N.A.C. Commissioners, Roberts and Loram, felt that the 
"freedom to work or not to work whi ch we regard is fundamental 
to native policy and administration. " 
111 
was being eroded in S.W.A. . Wellington accurately discribed the effect 
of the Vagrancy law as being that 
"the unres t of vagrants thus became in fact a useful means of 
supplying farmers with labourers".112 
Some authOl'ities felt that work was "good" for black s, basing their 
argument on the idea that civilization could be transmitted through the 
dignity of labour. Hofmeyr felt this way, but strongly denied that there 
was any law in S.W.A. directly or indirectly forcing blacks to wo rk l13 . 
There re;;Jains the fact, hOI-lever, that offenders under the Vagrancy Law had to 
work , and that unless they owned a certain number of stock blacks were re-
qui red by law to work. 
It should nonetheless be remembered that there had been some improvements in 
the legal aspects of labour conditions for blacks under Union rule l14 . The 
old German l aws had been amel iorated to el iminate indiscriminate pOl1ers of 
flogging, and to ensure the payment of wages and a certain degree of protec-
115 tion for employees But these legal safequards we re not always implemented, 
and depended largely upon the attitudes of the local officials involved l16 . 
. A draft N.A.C. report summed up the position: 
"The wages paid Go the Bondelswart0 ranged from 10/- to 15/-
a month with food which is not a living wage; the prevailing de-
pression and poverty made it doubtful if the wages always paid or 
the food all"ays supplied, and there were numerous complaints about 
beating and other forms of i ll-trea trnent by the European masters" .117 
110, CA.P.I'1.0. Vo1.6. ,Jalton's "Coml.lents" on t he P.~1.C. Report. p.3. 
111. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft A. p.16. 
112. ('le11ington, p.283. 
113. R.P. Hofmeyr's !'lemorandum. p.8. 
114. See P·4d.. 
115. R.P. Exhibits and Annexures. Exl. N.A.t1. p.g. 
116. See p.I'!'\. 
117. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft A. p.17. 
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Thus the N.A.C. recommended a minimum wage level and standard rations llB . 
General Lerrmer disagreed feeling that the Bondelswarts, being "temperamen-
tally lazy" and unreliable, were only worth low wages 1l9 Major Herbst 
excused the farmers who paid low V/agesby saying that they had to import 
their food at high cost because the conditions in the south were un sui table 
for agriculture120 . But the high costs of food affected the Bondelswarts 
just as much. Herbst 
"bokboer" had entered 
He said 
admitted that a certain class of poor farmer or 
121 S.W.A. and could not afford to pay decent wa.ges. 
" I agree that economically it is not sound t o have these peopl e here 
but on the other hand one cannot prohi bit them to come into the country". 
But Herbs t felt tha ~ the Bonde 1 swa rts' i nadequa te wages were compensa ted 
for by the fact that they did not pay a poll tax, and so received the "bene-
fits" of white administration for nothing . He spoilt the effect somewhat 
by adding : 
"The wages paid to the native are so low that it would be an 
impossibil ity for him to pay the poll tax". 122 
As for paying higher wages, the local farmers in the Warmbad district told 
the N.A.C. that they had 
"thought about it but we never di d it. They are too bad to work 
arid do not deserve more pay". 123 
A consequence of the 1 ow wages was that the farmers suffered from a shortage 
of labour. In 1919 the military magistrate at Warmbad said: 
lilt is regrettable, however, to have to state that the farmers 
have themselves to blame for not getting reasonable employment 
because the tendency is to·get labour as cheaply as possib le. 
These natives are by no means stupid".124 . 
118. N.A.C. Report, p.27, para. 31. 
119 . ibid. p.30, para. 6a). 
120. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.27. Major Herbst. 
121. See p. 3b. 
122. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.84-85. Major Herbst. 
123. lbid. p.343. F. van R. Coetzee. 
124. lV.A. Adm. Vol. 106. File 3353. Military magistrate to Secretary for 
Protectorate. No. 45. 28 Oct. 1919. 
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Instead of attracting better labourers and increasing their productivi ty 
and motivation through incentives like fair wages and reasonable rations, 
the farmers resorted to pressurizing the Administrator into imposing taxes 
like the dog tax to force blacks to work to pay the tax 125. The white 
farmer's attitutde towards their black labourers was nearly alYJays selfish 
and exploitative. Even the N.A.C. in 1921 remarded : 
"the apparent reluctance at some of the meetings lliith white farmerD 
to consider such questions as minimum wages and a standard ration 
served to indicate that the whole question had been approached from 
the standpoint of the European with little or no regard to the interests 
of the natives".126 
Another difficulty which faced the Bondels\~arts and aggravated their steadily 
mounting frustration was their lack of ready cash to pay their tax. They 
sold lime and grass to the Government127 But the N.A.C. found that the 
traders exploited them, and that the traders' system of allowing unlimited 
credit and charging high interest rates kept the Bondelswarts perpetually in 
debt. The traders did not pay cash for the Bondelswarts stock, but instead 
paid in "good fors" redeemable at their stores, thus making a profit both 
ways on the stock and produce exchanged for it. Farmers too often paid in 
stock, and the value of the stock was often less that the cash value of the 
wages 128. The traders paid low prices for Bondelswarts ' stock anyvJay, kl ,o\Ving 
that the BondelsVlarts had to sell their stock in the fJarmbad area due to the 
strict quarantine controls 129 . In addition, Fleck told the N.A.C. that f .-r,lers 
often paid their Bondelswarts en;ployees dog tax for them "so that the boys 
would not leave their service",130 a system of debt bondage which left the 
Bondelswarts perpetually short of cash. 
125. See p.I'64· 
126. W.A. Adm. Private and Semi-Off. Docs. N.A.C. Report. p.2. 8 June 1921. 
127. ibid. Publ ic Works Office, Keetmanshoop to Director of fJorks, \~indhoek. 
17 July 1918. 
128. See e.43. 
129. N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.102. Major Manning. 
130. ibid. p.415. Fleck. 
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This was an important cause of the Bondelswarti anger and frustration, 
because they had to buy their food since their stock was few in numbers and 
the area was unsuitable for agriculture13l , and under Union law hunting was 
forbidden 132. Hofmeyr himself said that amongst the Bondelswarts 
"those unable to work have to depend almost entirely upon such 
of their old staple diet, meat and milk, as they can get".133 
After the rebellion of 1922 the number of stock captured134 led the Govern-
ment to say that the Bonde 1 swarts were not as poor as had been commo n ly 
imagined 135 ,and that therefore many of their grievances connected with their 
supposed poverty were exaggerated. But, as an editional in the Star at the 
time pointed out, the numbers of stock captured did not represent extra-
ordinary wealth, and it wondered if Hofmeyr had expected the Bor.dels\·tarts 
to sell of the feV! stock they possessed, their only independent fileans of 
livelihood, to pay taxes 136 . 
The low wages and, somet i !;leS, the hars h treatment of the Bonde 1 s~larts worki ng 
for white fanners did not encourage any enthusiasm amongst them for their 
work. There \vere no major towns nearby to provide much of an alternative source 
for labour, and Hofmeyr wished to discourage the black urban drift anyway137 
General Lemmer felt that the Bondel s~larts' poverty was not due to Government 
neglect, but to the world-wide economic depression at the time, and also because 
he felt that t here was 
"no doubt that if the method of living of the Bondels had been differently 
arranged, they would have been better able, by hard labour, if necessary 
outside the Reserve, owing to their limited needs, to combat this poverty:'138 
131. See p. r. 
132. See p. ,D. 
133. R.P . Hofmeyr's t~elnorandum . p.2. 
134. Seep.Lib. 
135. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . p.27. Major Herbst. 
136. Star editorial. 5 June 1922. 
137. R.P. Hofmeyr's Memorandum. p.2. 
138. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft C. p.5. (Gen. Lemmer's draft). 
l 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
I 
161. 
However. he fai led to give any concrete examples or suggestions as to hO\,I 
this could have been done. Whatever the case. there vias poverty among the 
Bondelswarts. and this was attested to by the N.R.C. 139 and graphically 
illustrated by Major Manning on his visit to the Bondelswarts' Reserve in 
1921 140 . Bishop Simon said that. in his opinion. 
"the miserable conditions of t he natives is the main cause of the 
trouble they gave lately in the South West" .141 
It was this poverty. combined with disillusionment and discontent. that 
caused the Bondelswarts to become frustrated, bitter and angry. 
- - - 000 - - -
139. See p. SS().(lJ p. \~3. 
140. See p.45". 
141. R.P. Exhibits and Annexure 7. Statement by Bishop Simon 
sent to N.A.C. 1. Septer,l ber 1922. p.l. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
THE CAPTAINCY QUESTION, LAND AND LAWS 
One of the biggest of the Bondelswarts' disillusionments with Union rule 
came over the Captaincy questionl I"lInediately after the Union Government 
took over S.W.A. the Bondelswarts had begun agitating for a Captain 2 It 
was part of their desire to restore their ~ raditional tribal status. The 
Warmbad military magistrate said in 1917 
"The Native wants some chief whom he can recogni ze and to whom 
he can have recourse in matters affecting his interests. He does 
not understand departmental administration and is su~picious of it".3 
The strength of the Bondelswarts' desire to have a Captain and their st rong 
belief in their traditional tribal status is reflected by a comment by the 
military magistrate of Wannbad, who said: 
"Icannot in my opinion too strongly advise the Administration not 
to appoint a Captain over the Bondels as that would inllnediately 
combine the nation which could then give endless trouble".4 
Difficult i es arose because most of the Bondelswarts specifically wanted 
Jacobus Christian, who had been living in exile in the Un ion since 1906, 
to be Captain. Jacobus had taken part in the 1904-6 rebellion and had had 
no part in the signing of the hated 1906 treaty. Freislich holds that the 
Bondelswarts ' tribal elders had often crossed the Orange River to confer with 
their leaders in exi le5. 
But the Ad~inistration in S.W.A. was no less aware of Jacobus' s reputation. 
After Jacobus return to S.W.A. in 19196 the N.R.C., while realizing that the 
tribe "clearly" regarded Jacobus as their chief7, did not reconmend that the 
Administration recognize him as su ch , since he was regarded as an "undesirable 
person". Unfortunately for the Administration, there was little they could do 
-------.- ----
1. See ~.J,.l. 
2. See p.",-,. 
3. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.851. Lt.Col. Kruger on N.R.C. 
Report. 
4. W.A. Adm. Vol. 51. File 599/2. r~ilitary magistrate to Secretary for 
Protectorate. 30 Aug. 1915. 
5. Freislich. p.5. 
6. Seep."-IiI. 
7. W.A.Adm. Private and Semi-Off. Docs. Report of N.R.C. 8 June 19?1. r.4. 
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to prevent the Bondelswarts from regarding Jacobus as the real Captain 
because, as Jacobus himself explained it 
"I am considered Ca[>tain amongst my people because my father was 
Captain before me".B 
Hofmeyr 1 a ter told Smuts h at he had been reque sted by the Bonde 1 swa rts 
to officially recognize Jacobus as their chief. But, said Hofmeyr, he had 
found out that Jacobus had been regarded as an outlaw since 1906, and that 
his appl ications to enter S.W.A. before his 1919 arrival had been refused 
because the Government had felt that he would, "sooner or later", lead his 
people to make trouble. After 1919 Jacobus had been under a suspended sentence 
for a yearand so could not be appointed9 But, said Hofmeyr, Jacobus had 
"openly" led agitation for his instalment as Captain. Hofmeyr, however, 
admitted that the Bondelswarts regarded Jacobus as their Captain, and that 
"Jacobus should therefore either have been recognized as such when 
he came over the Orange River, or he should have been punished and 
sent back to the Cape Province". 
But, Hofmeyr said that his advisers had "strongly urged" him not to revoke 
the previous Administrators' decision not to recognize Jacobus as c hief , 
because the authority of the Gover nment would "be undermined" .10 This led 
the Ii.A.C., in a draft report, to condemn as "official \'/eakness" the 
"failure or unwillingness to r ecognize Jacobus Christian as Captain 
as soon as the period of his suspended sentence had expired , seeing 
that he was the real Captain and that even the officials of the 
Administrat ion were in the habit of addressing him and referring to 
him as Captain. If it was not considered necessary to punish and deport 
Jacobus Christian for breach of the l aw a good opportunity was missed 
of showing the Bondels that the Government was not only willing to 
listen to their complaints but to give effect to them where it could".ll 
8. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 455. Jacobus Christian. 
9. Seep.:r3. 
10. CA. P.~1.0. Vol. 6. Hofmeyr to Smuts pp .8-9. 30 Aug. 1923. 
11. R.P . N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft. B. p.7. 
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The absurdity of the situation is highlighted by a study of those "Captains" 
whom the Government saw as acceptable for the Bonde 1 swarts. In 1918 the 
Bondelswarts were allowed to have a Captain, but Willem Christian was appoin-
ted as Jacobus was still in exile12 . Willem died in the influenza epidemic 
in December 1918. The military magistrate at Warmbad described him as "a 
harrnless idiot" who had shown no interest in his tribe. 13 On 21 February 
1919, Captain Wentzel, the military magistrate at Harmbad, held a Bondelswart s 
meeting to appoint a new Captain. They wanted Jacobus Christian to be made 
the new Captain, despite all Wentzel's efforts to dissuade them14. But instea d 
of Jacobus, Hendrik Schneeuwe was appointed Captain. The result, said Major 
Herbst later, was that 
" the Administration's ma n drew the money and the other ma n QacobusJ 
wieldedthe influence~ 
The Government held that Jacobus had forfeited his claim to the Captaincy 
becau se he had left the country in 190615 . Hendrik Schneeuwe was an unusual 
candidate for the Captaincy. He was not of the royal family, but had been a 
Native Cons tab le appointed as foreman of the Bondelswarts at Warnlbad, whereas 
all other Bondelswarts' foreman vlere elected 16. HO\~ever, he \~as elected as 
Captai n on 15 May by a meet i ng of Bonde 1 svlarts at vlhi ch were present "a 11 
recognized headmen, foremen and old men ~ersonally or by proxy'~ as indeed 
the Secretary for the Protectorate had insisted they should bel? 
Schneeuwe's reign was short lived. The Bondelsl'larts objected to his en-
thusiasm in rounding up labour for the local farmers 18 , and on 11 March 1920 
the acting magistrate at \,armbad held an enquiry into Bondelswa rts allegations 
that Schneeuwe had embezzled tribal moneys and defrauded individual Bondelswarts. 
1 2. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
1 ~: 
N.A.C. Report; p.5, para. lB. 
W.A.Adm. Vol. 51. File 599/2. Hi litary mag istrate to Secretary for 
Protectorate. 3 Dec. 1918. 
ibid. Copy of report from Lt. H. van de Made, officer ccmi:land i ng 1st r1 .C . 
Police district No. 18, Keetmanshoop toAdjudant, Keetmanshoop.23 Feb. 1919. 
R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.14. Major Herbst. 
W.A.Adm.Vo1.51. File 599/2. t1ilitary t~agist rate, Wannbad to Secretary 
for Protectorate. 11 Jan. 1918. 
jbjd. 15 May 1919. 
K.P.N.A.C. Report. t,iin utes .of Evi dence. p.457. Jacobus Christian. 
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The magistrate was suspicious of the Bondelswarts' accusations however. 
Schneeuwe was asked to resign, and in April 1920 the Government recognized 
Timothe us Beukes as Captain, with a salary of £4 per month 19 . Beukes did not 
last long either, for, as ~~ajor Herbst told the N.A.C. "no native' would 
accept the position that a commoner be the Chief". 20 In fact, Beukes was 
not even a Bondelswart, but was a Baster 21 . 
However, Beukes had long been a ~vourite of the Administration. In June 
1918 he h -d been appointed a for eman for the Harmbad 10cation22 . The \,armbad 
magistrate in 1921 recoJTlllended Beukes as "efficient" and as being of "great 
assistance" in persuading the Bondelswarts to pay their dog tax and generally 
helping the magistrate in "obtaining infonnation,,23 This may account for the 
view of a rel iable infonnant \vho remembered Beukes as being a Government stooge 
and a labour-gatherer 24 . 
Not all Government officials idol ized Beu kes. The viarmbad mtgistrate, Fleck, 
told the N.A.C. that Beukes was a "drunkard,,25 . ~\ajor t'lanning, in 1921, felt 
that Beukes had "no desire or particular ability" to rule the Bondelswarts 26 . 
In fact, Beukes was Captain only in name , and he ack nowledged Jacobus's 
position as the real Captain 27 Beukes resigned his post in April 1921, and 
no other Bondelsvlarts Captain was appointed until 192428 . 
The vi ews of the Bonde 1 swarts tr i be on th i s process i on of Capta ins is refl ec-
ted by the opinion of informants, who withou~ exception were adamant that 
Beukes and Schneeuwe were only "waarnemende" or acting Captains, and most 
described them as only being foremen 29 . 
19. W.A.Adm . Vol. 106. File 3353. hcting l'lagistrate, viarmbad to Secretary 
for Protectorate. 14 Apri 1 1920. 
20. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.19. Major Herbst. 
21. ibid. p.417. Noothout. 
22. W.A.Adm. Vol. 51. File 599/2. ~lilitary magistrate to Secretary for 
Protectorate. 21 June 1918. 
23. ibid. Magistrate, \'ia)'mbad , to Secretary for S.W.A . 28 Dec. 1921. 
24. Intervi ew with Isaak v:itbooi. Warmbad. 20 July 1977. 
25. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Mi nutes of Evidence. p.416. Fleck. 
26. ibid. p.97. ~lajor ~lanning. 
27. R.P. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 3. Copy of letter from T. Ge'l kes 
to Jacobus Christ -an . 
28. See p.. 103. . • 
;>9. ~ee ,~:; jlf:n d lx ' l . 
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Th us, i n qui ck succession the Government had foisted on the Bo ndel swarts an 
idiot, a swindler and a dru nkard stooge as Captain. The last two were not of 
the roya 1 fami 1 y, and t he 1 as t one was not even a Bonde 1 swarts. At the sam e 
time, whi le not officially recognizing him, the Government held Ja cobus res-
ponsibl e for his tri be 's actions right until the 1922 revolt, and it was obvious 
that he was the l egitimate and rightful Captain. In fac t, it was the restrai nt 
30 ex ~rcised by Jacobus that helped to delay the 1922 rebellion as long as it was 
Nevertheless, the Government could ha rdly have worked ou t a better way to 
disillusion and em bi tter t he Bondelswarts, to inj ure their pride, and to exhibi t 
a clumsy tactlessness and a complete lack of any desire to understand the Bondel-
swarts' wishe s . 
Th e land question was another major Bonde l swarts ' disil lusionme nt. They had 
a deep-rooted desire to regai n their trad it iona l tribal ' lands 3l , and th ~ ir 
disappointmen t when these were not restored to them when t he Union took over 
S.W.A. vias a contributory cause of the 1922 rebellion32 . 
Major Herbs t summed up the Bondelswarts' feelings when the expected restoration 
of their traditional lands did not mate rialize. He t old the P.M.C. 
One can understand their (Bondelswarts) feeling against the fanners 
\'I ho now occupy their land .... Then came the last and greates t dis-
appointment. With the arrival of the 'English' he expec ted the 
Ge~~ans would be driven out and deprived of the land whic~ woul d be 
restored to its original 0\Iners ".33 
The Bonde lswarts found that not only were their lands not returned to them, 
b t 1 t h t G 11 d t t . S WAd U' 1 34 u a so a many ermans were a owe 0 s ay on 1n ... un er mon ru e . 
The Bonde l s\'larts had , in Germa n times , lost most of their la nd to the l and 
35 
compa nies, especia ll y the S.A. Territories Company They lost the r est 
under the 1906 treaty36 , retaini ng on ly a small fracti on of the ir orig i na l 
- ---_. 
30. Se:; p. :uS-, 
31. S ~ e p_~o, 
32. See (,.Illt,-
33. f.A.P. 11.0. Vol. 6. Herbst's 1·,lemora ndum. p.5. 
34. See P·"4. 
35. R.P. N.A.C . Report. 11inutes of E vi dence. p.479. T. Beukes. 
36. See piS. 
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lands as a Reserve. As far as the Reserve was concerned, Hellington pointed 
out that 
"There was little land in the reserve which could be cultivated, anG, 
in any case, the Bondels . were never cultivators; the area for pasturing 
their flocks of sheep and goats was now too small, so that they . ere 
forced to work for the German settlers i n the vicinity and to hunt 9 me 
with small packs of dogs". 37 
To aggravate matters, when the Union took over the administration of 
S.W.A. not only were the Bondelswarts' traditional lands not restored, but 
. 38 
they were opened up to a flood of South African settlers . As Goldblatt 
pOints out: 
"The German Government, by confi scat i ng the 1 and of the Nati ves. 
provided itself with a large portion of the Territory as crown lend, 
whi ch in terms of the Versai lles Treaty became German lands of South 
West Africa, under the Mandate. 
The Union Government, as Handatory, thus reaped the benefits of the 
acti ons of the Gennan governr.le nt whi ch had been deemed unv/Orthy to 
01'1n colonies". 
General Botha after the conquest of S.W.A., and vlith elections looming up in 
1918, thought that it might help matters and smooth ruffled feelings about 
the Union's entry into the First World vlar if it was known that the 
S.W.A. would uffer plenty of openings for farmers and civil servants fro:n the 
Union?9 The results. of this policy had far-reaching ramifications for black-
white relations in S.W.A.40, for, as Goldblatt says, 
"No applications (for lancj) "iere received, or expected to be received 
from the natives, who all l ooked on with dismay at the disposal of the 
lands which they had thought wou ld be restored to them after the defeat 
of the Germans. "41 
For some, like the Bondelswarts, ·the feeling Vias someVlhat stronger than "dis-
may". Wh ite settlers poured into t he 1·lambad district, aided by low interest 
loans vih ich enabled them to start farming vlith little capital investment, 
a system controlled by a Land Board under the Land Settlment Act which had 
been extended to S.W.A. in 192042 . 
37. We llington, p.284. 
38. See p. '56. 
39. Goldblatt, p.226. 
40. See p.l,!q. 
41. Goldblatt, p. 226. 
42. See p. jb. 
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A side- effect of this system was tha t many poor farmers, known as 'bokboers', ar-
rived in the district who could not afford to pay a fair wage to thei r labourers 43. 
One informant, a white farmer, W.J. Adriaanse, whose fami ly had trekked into 
the Warmbad district in 1916, recalled the influx of white farmers in the 
period from 1920 to 1921 under the "Nedersettings' Wet" or Land Settlement 
I\ct44 . 
The Bondelswarts fe l t very strongly about this invasion of what they regarded 
as being their territory . With no prospect of their lands being returned to 
them they jealously defended wha t land they still had. The infl ux of white 
settlers increased the pressure on the land available, and soon the Crown 
lands along the boundaries of the Reserve were being div i ded up for white 
settl ers . Confl i ct was i nevi tab 1 e 45. The 1906 treaty had restri cted the 
Bondelswarts to a Reserve of 175,000 hectares, the boundaries of which had 
been fixed by a commission of three German officials and three Bondelswarts' 
46 
representat i ves, with a sketch plan and certain beacons marking the boundaries. 
A dispute broke out over the farm "Plankieskop,,47. The Bondelswarts argued 
that the boundary line dra\':n. up under the 1906 treaty had included the farm 
in the Reserve, while the Union administration was adamant that it was outside 
the Reset've. In 1921 matters came to a head, al ld Noothout Vias instructed to 
move the Bondelswarts squatting on Plankieskop back to their Reserve , since 
the farm had been allocated under the Land Settlement Act. 48 . The Surveyor-
General of S.W.A., A. G. Landsberg , had checked the Bondel swarts , Reserves' 
boundaries and found that the co-ordinates as determined by his survey differed 
hard ly at all from the Gennan survey, and hence the Bondelswarts cl aim of 
~-------- -----
43. See f " ~'b 
44. Interview with W.J. Adriaanse, flar1;l bad. 19 July 1977. 
45. N.A.C . Report, p.12 , para. 50. 
46. See p.s«;. 
47. See 11apD. 
48. R.P . N.A.C. Re port. Minutes of Evidence. p.423. Fleck to ~oothout, 
No. 2/8/20. 3 July 1921. 
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encroachment was invalid49 . Thus the matter was rega r ded as settled by the 
Government5°. 
But the Bondelswarts were adamant. Lt. Prinsloo told the N.A.C. that he 
thought the Bondelswarts felt threatened by the increasing number of wh ite 
farmers being allocated farms around the Reserve 51 . They f elt that the 
Reserve was too small and had insufficient wa ter, and were indeed supported 
on the latter point by the NIR.C. 52 . 
The boundary question was a very real Bondelsvlarts grievance. On the eve of 
the 1922 rebellion, in May , the Bondelswarts had to l d Noothout that newly-
arrived white farmers were encroaching on their Reserve and that the Go vern-
ment \'las i gnori ng the Bonde 1 swarts' comp 1 a i nts to that effect53 . A 1 oca 1 
wh i te fa rrner to 1 d the N. A. C. tha t pri or to the 1922 rebe 11 i on the Bonde 1 sliarts 
had "often" held meetings protesting,amongst other things, that they wanted 
certain farms "which in fomler days were their property" l'eturned to them 54 . 
Jacobus Christian himself ci ~ed the boundary question as one of the causes of 
the 1922 revolt55 . 
In fact, so strong a grievance ~Ia s the boundary dispute that it still r<dlkles 
today. A i'eliable informant, Johanne~ Zwartbooi, remembered it vividly and 
could still point out the disputed Plankieskop boundary. nost of the 
informants intervi e\'led rcme,nb ered the affair as a cause of the rebellion and 
a strong Bondelswarts' grievance56 . 
49. i bid. p.42. Surveyor-G eneral, A.G. Landsberg, to Native Commissioner, 
No, 1548/1/5016/21. 3 Decer,lbe r 1921. 
50. ibid. p.427. Fleck to Noothout, No. 2/8/20. 27 Feb. 1922 . 
51. ibid. p.951. Lt. Prinsloo. 
52. ibid. p. 843. Lt. Col. Kruger on N.R.C. Report. 
53. ibid. p.447. Noothout. 
54. ibid. p. 332. F. van R. Coetzee. 
55. ibid. p.374. Fleck. Jacobus Chri stian to Fl eck. 27 July 1922. 
56. Interview with Johan nes Zwartbooi, Gabis. 21 July 1977. 
Interv i ew with Nols Kennedy, Gibeon. 27 July 1977. 
Inte l'view with Frank Sasson and Sara Ortman, Gibeon. 25 July 1977. 
Interview with J oseph Jacobus Christian, Gibeon. 26 July 1977. 
Inte~view with Isaak Witb ooi, Harmbad. 20 July 1977. 
See AppendixA . 
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Despi te the di si 11 us i onments, and perhaps spurred by them, the Bondel swarts 
nurtured what remained of their independence fiercely, and resented any 
action of the Union Government which they regarded as interfering with it. 
And, being basically a conservative pastoralist society, they particularly 
resented Government interference with their stock. 
One such interference in Bondelswarts eyes was the compulsory dipping of 
stock. Although regular dipping was enforced the itrict quarantine regula-
tions prevented the Bondelswarts from selling their sheep and goats at the 
must lucrative markets 57 . The dipping was done to prevent "brandsiekte" or 
scab disease, which is highly contagious. Hofmeyr in February 1922 had 
appealed to the Bondelswarts to support the Government dip-tanks 58 Regu lar 
dipping \'las necessary since . the plentiful springbuck in the area spread the 
disease 59 . This \Vas particularily irksome to the Bondelswarts since they 
were not allowed to hunt game60 
~lany of the infonnants felt strongly about the issue. J.J. Christian saw 
it as a contributory cause of the 1922 rebel lion, and said that the Bondel-
swarts did not believe in dipping and had resented the interference. Johannes 
Zvla rtbooi 61 said that the Bonde l sl'/al'ts disliked it because the dipping killed 
the stock whic h was already \'leak from drought and disease62 . 
57. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evi de nce. p.102. Ma jor Manning. See p4? 
58. R.P. Exhibits and Annex ures. An 1. p.8. A.R.B. Ma j. Manning's report. 
59. ibid. Ex. 4. Copy of reply frorn Hofroleyr to Gonde lsvlarts petition. 24 Feb. 
1922. 
60. ibid. An. 1. p.7. A.R.B. Maj. I:anning' s report. Seef'50. 
61. Interview with I saak Witbooi. \'ianJbad. 20 July 1977. 
Intervie\v \'lith J. J. Christi an, Gii:;00n. 26 July 1977. 
Inte ,'viel'i with J. Z\'Iartbooi, Gabis. 21 July 1977. 
See Appendi xA. 
62. See Davenport, T.R.H., The Afrikaner Bond. (Cape Town, 1966), p.156, 
for a simi 1 a r obj ect ion by-Afri ka-ner fam i 1i es in the north-I'/es tern Cape 
in the 1890's to the CC\lipulsory dipping of sheep unde r the Cape Scab 
Act of 1886. See also the "Report of the Scab Disease Comin ission, 1292-
1894". (G 194) 18 84, I·,hich covers the same subject. 
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Even more strongly resented was the branding law, introduced in September 
1921 63 . The provision that the ·police or superintendent had to brand the 
blacks' cattle64 f or them did not he lp the already strained relations 
between the Bondelswarts and the police65 . In addition, the cost of 
compulsory brand ing iron was 30s,66 the equivalent of the average Bondel-
swarts ' wag es for two months , or of two to three goats. The Bondelswarts 
felt strongly about this, and many witnesses told the N.A.C. that it was a 
cause of the 1922 ebe llion67 . In February 1922 Jacobus Christian, T. Beukes 
and tvle nty-nine other Bondelswarts petitioned Hofmeyr to allow them to keep 
their branding irons like the whites did. Hofmeyr refused68 In t1ay 1922 
Noothout reported that the branding la\'i's discriminatory treatment between 
black and white was a Bondelswarts grievance69 Major Herbst said 
"they Q30ndelswartsJ feel the s li ght and that they think ' why should 
the white Dian have it and not we".70 
It appears that some Bondelswarts resented the law because they felt that by 
branding their stock they \'iere in some ~Iay transferring ownership of the stock 
to the Government. A Bondelswarts, David Klaas, said that a cause of the 1922 
rebellion 
"came through the Magis t ra te wanting to put the Government brand on 
our catt le, given to us by the Ger;,1an Government". 7l. 
Although Fleck, the Vlarmbad magistrate, reassured Jacobus Christian that 
the stock would still belong to the Bondelswarts, and Jacobus agreed to' bring 
the stock in for branding, the other Bondelswarts refused 72 . 
63. Seep.Li7. 
64. R.P.N.A.C. Report. t1inu tes of Evidence. p.39. Major Herbst. 
65. See p./~7. 
66. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Hinutes of Evi dence. p.43. i~aj or Herbst. 
67. ibid. p.522. Hendrik Jonas. 
ib i d. p.525. Hans Or tman. 
i bid . p.636. Det. Cilliers presents affidavit of David Klaas. 
ibid. p.766. Johannes Boois. 
i bid. p.374. Fl eck. Jacobus Christian to Fleck. 27 July 1922. 
68. ibid . p. 37. i·;aj or Herb s t. 
69. ib i d. p.447. Noothout. 
70 . i bid. p.40. r·lajor HE: rbs t. 
71. i bid. p.636. Det. Cilliers presents affidavit of David Klaas. 
72. Sec p. L! l . 
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All the Bondelswarts informants interviewed saw the branding law as an 
i nfri ngement of thei r ri ghts and, independence. Johannes ' Zwa rtbooi c 1 aimed 
that unbranded stock was liable for confisca t ion, and J.J. Christian said 
that the Bondelswarts felt that the old system of ear-ma rking their stock 
was a good enough form of identification. He was supported in this by a 
white farmer informant, W.J. Adriaanse, who remembered that the Bondelswarts 
had felt strongly that their Reserve was their land and resented the inter-
ference of an alien government in their independence73 
The general attitude of the whites was recorded by the N. R.C. in 1921, Vlho 
found them strongly opposed to blacks being allowed to retain their branding 
irons, since they felt that they would us e them to brand stolen stock74 
The Government claimed that the law was rlesigned to protect blacks from unjus-
tified allegations of stocktheft, and to try and prevent stocktheft generall/ 5 
But their real attitude was revealed by Major Herbst, who to l d the N.A.C. 
that, while it had not been ~roven that the Bondelswarts were stock thieves, 
he felt that it was "generally held" that "the natives in this country were 
cattle thieves". 76 In fact, Hofmeyr in the A.R. B. stated that he felt that 
the Bonde lswarts' opposition to the brandi ng law was based on a desire to 
steal stock undetected?? ~lajor Herbst said that the discriminatory treatmen t 
of blacks and wh ites under the law was because : 
"The allegations are that if you give a nat ive a branding iron he 
will brand anything".78 
However, it is interesting in this light to note that the N.R.C. of 1921 
had fou nd the white allegations of black stocktheft exaggerated, and said that 
in 1920 only 160 blacks in the whole of S.W.A. were convicted for stocktheft79 . 
73. Interview \"/ith J. Zwartbooi, Gabis. 21 July 1977. 
Interview with J.J. Christi an , Gibeon. 26 July 1977. 
Interview with W.J. Adriaanse, Warmba d. 19 July 1977. 
74. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 842. , Lt.Col. Kruger on N.R.C. 
Report. 
75. ib id. pp.44-46. Major Herbst. 
76. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.44-46. Major Herbst. 
77. ib id . p. 66. ~~ajor Herbst on the A.R . B. 
78. ibid. p.38. 
79. ibid. p.844. Lt .Co l. Krug er on f\ .R.C. r ' : f)rt 
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The N.A.C. pointed out that there were only twenty-two cases of stock-theft 
in the Warmbad district from 1 January 1920 to 1 August 192280 . 
In fact, Mgr. Krolikowski told the N.A.C. that he had had more stock stolen 
by whites than by bl ack s Bl , and he is s upported in t hi s by inf ormant 
W.J. AdriaanseB2. 
However , Bondelswarts opposition to the law was so strong that Fleck took 
t . . t t h f t l ' . th . t B3 no ac 10n aga1ns em or no camp y1ng W1 1 
General Lemmer felt tha t there ~I as no reason why the Bondelswarts should have 
felt especially aggrieved by the branding law , si nce it applied to nearly 
all bl acks B4 . But the evidence is oVerylhelming that it was a strongly felt 
grievance for the Bonde lswar ts. The P. M. C. Report stated tha t the law 
"wa s not calculated to diminish the ir ritation known to exist in a 
tribe which I-Ias extreme l y distrustful of any obligation imposed by 
the authorities".B5 
A draft N.A . C. Report concisely sur.lIlled up the f aults of t he branding l aw. 
It found that the Bonde lswarts resented the fact that the Rehoboth Basters 
had been allol-Ied to keep their irons. Furthcnnore, it stated; 
" (iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
The clear implication of the regulations that they (]ondels-
Vlar t0 \'IOr e cattle t hieves in c reased the bitterness of the 
Bonde l ZVlar ts again st the Government. 
Certain of the more i gnora nt Bonde l zwar ts be li eved that the 
brand put on by the po l ice was the Governments' brand, and 
that the cattle noVi be l onged to the Gover~~ en t. 
No pros ecutions tOJk place among the Bondel zwarts for contra-
vention of the branding lalvs. If the la\'I I'las necessary and 
just it shou ld have been enforced; if it was no t necessary 
it shou ld not have bee n made" . B6 
In fac t, the Bonde l swarts may have felt tha t for once their agitat io n had 
had some effec t, and this may have err ouraged them to pursue similar tactics 
BO. N.A.C. Report, p.9, para. 34. 
Bl. R.P.N.A.C. Report. t~inutes of Evidence. p.369 . t~gr. Kroliko\,lski. 
B2. Interviel'l with W.J. Adriaanse, Han ~ bad. 19 J uly 1977. 
83. R.P. N.A. C. Report. r·iinute s of Evidence. p.415. Fleck. 
84. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft C. p.13 . (Gen. Lemmer's draft) . 
85. r.A.p.M.O. Vol. 6. P.t",C. Report. p.ll. 
86. R.P .N .A. C. Report Drafts. D~aft A. pp.15- 16 . 
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against the dog tax. 
The dog tax87 was undoubtedly the 5 i ng 1 e III os t hated 1 aw for the Bonde 1 swarts, 
and a major cause of the 1922 rebellion. It interfered with their traditional 
way of life, and with their economic independence. 
Hofmeyr, in 1921, had greatly increased the dog tax, on a graduated scale88 
He had imposed the tax because on his tour of S.W .A. he had found that bl acks 
kept large packs of dogs. Major Herbst said : 
"these dogs went about hunting game and it would irritate the farmers. 
If they (blacks) could live by hunting they would not work". 
He did not believe, however, that the tax had been imposed because black 
owned dogs attacked sheep89 Herbst admitted that the tax was a heavy one, 
but said that this was done on purpose "to do away with the dogs" , and, besides 
I'lhich, he said that the Bondelswarts could sell firevlOod in \·Jann bad at 
"£2-£3 a load" to pay the tax90 
Hofmeyr felt that the Bondelswarts' grievance against the tax was exaggerated 
and had been whipped up by extremists to incite them to revolt91 He denied 
that the tax wa s meant to force the Bondelswarts to seek work92 , and told 
Srnuts that he hadi\,ipos ed it to 
"minimize the gro',ling evil of the ruthl ess destruction of garne by a 
special class of dog kept for the purpose of Europeans and Natives 
alike, but it was intimated at the time that when the ev il abated 
the tax \'lOuld again be reduced". 
He felt that the Bondelswarts were "not sincere" in bringing up the dog tax 
as a cause for rebellion, s ince other blacks had not objected, and he had 
reduced the tax by 50% just before the May 1922 revolt93 . 
87. See r-LJ'l. 
88. See p.4"1. 
89. R.P.N.A.C. Report. 11inutes of Evidence. p.33. Maj or Herbst. 
90. ibid. p.36. 
91. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An.l. p.5. A.R.B. 
92. R.P. Hofrneyr's r"emorandurn. p.g. 
93. C.A . p.r~ .o . Vol. 6. Hofmeyr to Smuts. 30 Aug. 1923. 
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HOviever, the facts of the ma tter be 1 i e Hofmeyr' s supposed in tenti ons for the 
tax . Major Herbst said that: 
"The Europeans were also discontented (about the dog tax) but 
they kept quiet because they knew that the measure wa s meant to 
destroy the native's dogs".94 
A local farmer, Coetzee, told the N.A.C. that the wh ite farmers had told 
Hofmeyr in 1921 on his tou r of c.W. A. that ; 
"if the Hottentots were not made to pay this tax they would not be 
in a position to get l abou rers •.. The ma in idea was t o get the Hotten 
tots to come out and work". 95 
Fleck told the N.A.C. that 
"The farmers had made re;:;resentations in regard to the numbe r of 
dogs belonging to t he Hottentots - this wa s at a meeting at which 
~l r Drew Ons pecting magistra te for S.W.A.) wa s present and then the 
dog tax was i mposed. The farmer was of the opinion thiit he wou ld 
not have to pay the same amount but he found out t ha t he was mi s-
taken".96 
The Bondelswarts ' fee ling for their dogs seem to have bee n passed on more 
than just commerc ial or utilitarian motives. Herbst felt that the Bondel-
swar ts were "fonder of dogs than we are,,97. But the dogs also pl ayed a n 
important part in the economic life of the Bonde l swarts. Major Manning 
poi nt ed out tha t since the Bond e 1 swarts were not all orled to own ri fl es they 
needed dogs to protec t their sma ll stock f)'om ven,li n l ike jacka ls98 . Lt . Pri ns-
100 also said that the dogs were used for hunting, which gave the Bonde l swarts 
a "cheap and easy" livel ihood . 99 
The tax was a heavy burden for the Bonde l swa rts. They \~ere frustrated by 
the difficulty of rai sing ready cash to pay the tax lOO , and when r'lajor ~1anning 
visi ted them in r·lay 1921 to in Vest i gate reports of Bondelsvlarts L., rest over the 
tax , he found them poor and struggling to ra i se the cash to pay the tax.A s a r ps ul t 
H f t d th t · t' t 101 o mey r gran e em a lme-ex enS lon 0 pay 
---_._- -- _ .. -
94. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . p. 43. Ma jor He r bs t. 
95 . ibid . p.333. F. van R. Coetzee. 
96 . i bi d. p.405. Fl ec k. 
97 . ibid. p. 33. r~ajo r Her bst. 
98 . ibid. p.9 7. r·lajor t1ar,ning. 
99. ibid. p.950. Lt. Prinsloo . 
100. Seep·IS". 
101. R.P.N .A.C . f:e;:>o rt. Minutes of Evidence. p.92. rlajor r·~anning . 
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The tax became a major Bondelswarts grievance. Noothout felt that it 
"caused excitement,,102, and Tim Beukes cited it as a major grievance l03 
But Christian Marcus, a ha lf-breed Bondelswart, said: 
"~Jhen we paid the dog t ax the people prepared for war. They said 104 
they would, rather make war because they were suffering too much" 
Whi 1 e thi s' exaggerates the role of the dog tax as a cause of the 1922 
rebellion, it does show how strong a grievance the tax was. It was yet 
another grievance in a long line of Bondelswarts' complaints, and increased 
their anger and frustration . Nost of the informants felt that the Bondel-
swarts need their dogs to hunt vermin, and that the dog tax was a major 
contributory cause of the 1922 revolt l05 . In May 1921 the Bondelswarts 
had held a large meeting to protest about the dog tax, which led the Wa~lbad 
magistrate to order the police not to destroy any Bondelswarts' dogs on which 
the tax had not bee n paid, for fear of ca using unrest 106. In 1922 Jacobus 
Christian wrote to Le Fl eur via the latter' s agents, complaining that the 
Bonde 1 swa rts coul d not hun t because t hey were not all ol-Ied to own rifl es and 
the dog tax was doing away with their dogS 107 . 
General Lemme r proposed in a draft N.A.C. Report that the dog tax was not a 
justifiable Bondelswarts grievance since it applied to black and white, and 
. 'IOB 
none of the other blacks, in S.W.A. had complained However, the N.A.C. 
Report found the tax "extraordinar ily high" and opposed it as an indirect 
method of forcing the Bondelswarts to seek workl09 . 
102. ibid. p.4l8. Noothout. 
103. ibid. p.490. T. Beukes. 
104. ibid. p.771. Christian r~a rcus. 
105. See AppendixA. 
106. W.A. Adm . File 388/1. Telegram Warmbad r.lag ist rate to Hofmeyr. 14 May 1921. 
107. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.247. Det . -Sgt. Pietersen 
presents copy of letter from Jacobus Christian to Le Fleur . 
108. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft C. p.12. (Leimer's draft). 
109. N.A.C . Report, p.30, para. 6. 
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The P.M.C. Report found the tax "prohibitive", and pointed out that there 
had been 140 prosecutions for non-payment of the dog tax in the Warmbad 
district from September 1921 to January 1922, with fines averaging £2 or 
14 days, a further financial burden for the Bondelswarts llO , which worsened 
their relations with the police and further distorted their conception of 
the law, and increased their distrust of the Government. The P.M.C. Report 
sUiTmed up the situation: 
"Since these people, we are told, could not find money to pay the tax 
or fine, this meant that they had to work for the whites who, moreover, 
could not pay cash to their labourers. In the circumstances described 
such sentences Cfor non-payment of the taxJ could only result in exas-
perating the tribe, already discontented for other reasons". 11 1 
Despite Hofmeyr's denials, it seems clear that the tax had a fourfold pur-
pose - to induce people to seek Vlork to pay it, to reduce black economic 
i ndependence, to gain revenue, and to reduce the number of dogs used to 
hunt game. The tax was far too high, and th is fact, combined with the 
Bondel swar ts' low wages112 , shortage of cash 113 , and the high pri ces of 
foodstuffs, and the branding law, Blade the dog tax a very real and deep 
Bondelswarts ' grievance. To own one dog and a branding i ron would cost the 
equ i valent of the average Bondelswarts' wages for four months. Neither Hof-
meyr nor General Lemmer could legimately deny that the dog tax albeit in-
directly, Vias meant to induce the Bonde lswarts to seek "honest labour" Vlithl14 
the \'Ihites . 
The 50% reduction in the tax i~ 1922115 was a case of "too little, too late", 
for by then the spark had been struck. Jacobus Christian summed up the Bonde l-
swarts feelings about the dog tax whe n he wrote , on the eve of the revo lt, "This 
is how they torture us here in Afri ca". 116 
110. l:A.P.M.O. Vol. 6. P.M.C . RGPort. 
111. ibid. p.10. 
112. See f I"~' 
113. See f-'<;9. 
114. See p. nt;. 
115. See p. $"b. 
116. R.P.N.A. ·" Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.l,112. Lt. Thomas presents 
letter from Jacobus Christian to Le Fleur and Dirk Schas. 
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Like most pastoralist societies the Bondel swa rts preferred to hunt game for 
meat rather than to kill their domestic stock. But the Union Government 
enforced strict controls on hunting, and it was a serious crime to be found 
i n possession of big game skinsl17. 
While this was more of an irritant than a grievance for the Bondelswarts, 
it further reduced their economic independence, and they resented this 
added interference by the Government with their rights on their own land l18 . 
Ev en more frustrating for the Bondelswarts was that large herds of spring-
bucks could now graze unhindered on the l im ited grazing avail ab le in the 
Reserve,spreading the scab diseasel19 . The Bondelswa rts also alleged that the 
wh ite, to add insult to injury, were shooting game on the Reserve120 . 
After the 1906 rebellion the Bondelswarts had been prohibited from possessing 
rifles, and the Union admin istration took this law over 121 . In 1919 Jacobus 
122 Christian had handed his followers' rifles over to the Governme nt ,and 
some Bondelswarts' felt bitter that the Government did not pay compensation 
for the confiscated rifles 123 . Many Bondelswarts were arrested after the 
First World War for bringing rifles into the Reserve without the required 
. 124 d' 1 h f f h' 1 h t' d ff pernll t ,an 1 t vias part y teen orcement 0 t 1 S aw t at n ggere 0 
resistance in 1922, when Sgt. van Niekerk came to conf iscate Morris's rifle 125 . 
The effect of the ban was that when the rebellion did break out the Bondelswarts 
d d h 1 1 h t f 'fl d 't' 126 were unprepare an ope ess y s or 0 rl es an ammu nl 10n . 
117 . Seep.So. 
118. Intervie\', with Johannes Zl-Iartbooi, Gabis. 21 Ju ly 1977. 
119. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Min utes of Evidence. p.843. Lt.Col. Kruger on N.R.C. 
Report. 
120. ibid. p.92. "lajor ',lanning . 
121. See pSI. 
122. R.P.N.A.C. Report. ~linutes of Evidence. p.165. Major Van Coller. 
123. Interview with J , ZVlartbooi, Gabis. 21 July 1977. 
Interview with Isaak Witbooi, \':armbad. 20 July 1977. 
124. R.P .N.A .C. Report. M.nutes of Evidence. p.226 . Oet.-Sgt. Pietersen pre-
sents evidence of Sgt. Naud e. 
125. Seep.b'\. 
126. See fP- %9· qo. 
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The Bondelswarts regarded these laws and taxes as an unwarranted inter-
ference with their independence on their own traditional lands, and their 
discontent grew. They felt threatened, and saw the Administration as 
oppressive and hostile to them . 
- - - 000 - - -
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CHAPTER 9. 
NATIVE POLICY AND RACE RELATIONS 
Gysbert Reitz Hofmeyr's arrival in S.W.A. in 1920 as Administrator heralded 
a new stage of Native administration l and the extension of the Union's 
segregation policies 
Commission of 19212. 
Africa as a DC"~ class 
there under the recommendations of the Native Reserves 
At the same time, S.W.A. was handed over to South 
mandate by the League of Nations 3. 
Major Herbst told the N.A.C. that the main difference between native policy 
in the Union and in S.W.A. was that in "this country the native is regarded 
pure ly as a labourer,,4. Education for blacks was severely li~ited, and was 
restricted largely to mission schools, of which there were only forty-three 
in the Ivhole of S.W.A., with a total enro lment of 2,430 pupils and forty-
seven teachers 5. Obviously, this was inadequa te for any real black educa-
tional advancement. 
Under Hofmeyr's predecessor, Gorges,6 with the fate of S. H. A. sti ll undecided, 
the nat ive policy had been mainly one of ameliorating old German laws and 
there had been a general l axness in Native adl;iinistration. Hofmeyr arrived 
determined to tighten the controls , leading some to remark 
"Gorges gave the native everything - Hofmeyr came along and introduced 
another system". 7 
This probably spurred the discon tent of blacks in S.H. A., recovering as they 
were from their disillusionment at the non-material i zation of their hopes for 
Union rule. 
1 . See f."4. 
2. See p.55'. 
3. See p. 5'3. 
4. R.P.N.A . C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . p.84. Major Herbst. 
5. R.P. Hofmeyr's r~emorandum. p.6. 
6. See p.so.. 
7. R.P.N.A.C. Report. r·1inute s of Evidence. p.502. C. Heidner. 
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Black opposition made itself felt, but the Administration in S.W.A. tended 
to regard the black's grievances against Hofmeyr's native policy as not being 
sincere, and merely the work of agitators8. However, the truth of the matter 
was, somevlhat surpr isingly, stated by Major Herbst, the Secretary for S.W .A., 
when he said that he felt that the S.W.A. Administration was "not in touch 
with the Hottentot mind"g. In general, the attitude of the Government to 
black unrest was summed up by Sir Edgar Walton, who told the League Assembly 
10 during his "Comments" on the P.M.C . Report , that : 
"the outb reak among these unfortunate people and their rebellion afford 
an illustration of the revolt, perhaps natural revolt, of the barbarian 
against the restrictions which interfere with the wild life to which 
he had been accustomed". 11 
The Union administration in S.W.A. saw, or said it saw, its role as that of 
the "civilizer" by inculcating in t he blacks an appreciation of the "dignity 
of labour", by maintaining law and order, and by encouraging white economic 
development. The result was reflected in Herbst's expressio n of surp rise at 
the Bondelswarts' 1922 revolt, when he sa i d 
"It was never apparent to me why these people should go into 
rebe 11 ion" . 12 
It was apparent to others, however. With regard to t he pass and work l aws 13 
in operation in S. W.A. a N.A .C. draft report stated that the 
"freedo, to work or not to work Vlhi ch we regard as fund amental to 
native po licy and administration " 
was l ack ing in S.W.A.14. The draft stated that it wa s felt that, in general, 
the 
" peaceful occupation of the country I"lh ich the Administrator desires 
will not be advanced by hasty and irritating legislation and by sub-
sequent severe and lasting lessons but by sound and well-thought out 
Native po licy whi ch will be to the advantage of all sections of the 
cornmun i ty" . 1 S . 
8. ibid. p.66. Major Herbst on the A.R. B. 
9. ibid. p.?l. Major Herbst. 
10. See p.13~ft· 
11. T.A.P.M.O. Walton' s "C.)r:"lents" on the P.M.C. Report. p.2. 
12. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 21. Major Herbst . 
13. Seep.l+O. 
14. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Drafts. Draft A. p.16. 
is . ibid. p.44 
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The N.A.C. Report stated that, as far as the Bondelswarts were concerned, 
no adequate attempts had been made either to improve or to build up their 
position. Instead, they had merely been given back their Reserve as in 
German times 16 , and had been given some stock17 and a Superintendent18 
The admin i stration's vacillations, such as changes in the amount of the 
dog tax 19, non-enforcement of the branding law20 , and the lack of a firm 
policy for dealing with Bonde l swarts returning from exile21 also came under 
criticism from the N.A.C. A draft N.A.C. report stated that these vacillations 
in the face of Bondelswarts protest might have encouraged the Bondolswarts 
to think that they could achieve their ends in 1922 by a bluff or show of 
force 22 . As for the branding law, it was said that: 
"Careful consideration of t he situatio n and consultation with the 
natives should precede Native legislation but when once the law has 
been made it shou ld be strictly enforced".23 
Hofrneyr's much vaunted Reserve proposals for S. W. A. blacks 24, primarily 
the Hereros, ~re also open to question. Wellington points out that the 
area on the eastern side of the Gobabis and Waterberg districts, and 
abutting on present-day Botswana , which was chosen by Hofmeyr for blacks to 
buy land, is in fact Kalahari sandveld, arid and desolate. The Hereros 
protested saying that it was fit only for wild animals. In fact, as Vielling-
ton caustical ly states: 
"In applying the mandate the white man's first acts r eveal him 
using the screen of "vested interests" to conceal his decision 
to put the \'Ihite's interests first and forel1ost and to fob off 25 
onto the Native the poor land that the whites scorn to occupy" 
16. See (".37, 
17. Seep.l4~. 
18. N.A.C . Report, p.29, para. 1. 
19. See p.!.;"I. 
20. See p./.J~. 
21. See p.34, 
22. R.P.N.A.C. Re port Drafts. Draft A. p.9. 
23. ibid. p.16. 
24. See f· ')b· 
25. Wellington , p.280. 
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He pointed out the irony of the Union administration allowing Germans to 
retai n the 1 ands "whi ch on South Afri ca' s showi ng 26 they wrongfully wrested 
from the Natives".27 
To Hofmeyr the native question was largely synonomous with the labour question, 
as the terms of reference of the N. R.C. so clearly show 28 . The N.R.C. pro-
vided the framework for Hofmeyr's native policy, and concentra ted on the 
prob lems of utilizing black labour to the best advantage. In fact, this 
approach was inevitable, for, as Goldblatt points out, 
"there \'las the obvious dilemm a of entrusting a manda te, vlhich emphasizes 
the primary interests of the Natives, to a ma r 'a tory whose Government 
was dependent upo n the votes of its own white e lectorate, which was 
concerned primarily with white interests".29 
And, in this sense, f~arquis Theodolis' comment that the Union administration's 
policy in S. W.A. had 
"always been conceived and appl ied in the interests of the colonists 
rather than in the interests of the natives" 30 
was correct. Although S. W.A. \vas a mandated territory, the Union did not 
treat it as such. Indeed, if anything the 1922 rebe llion highlighted the 
faults of the Union's native policy in S.W.A., dramatizing 
"In the light of glaring pub li city the shortcomings of pol icies and 
directives which were ill-conceived either to alleviate the conditions 
of some of the most poverty-stricken people in the territory or. to 
gain their confidence',.3 l 
The Union defended its pol i cies to the P.t,1.C. by saying that the only \vay to 
civilize the blacks in S.W.A. was to do it indirectly, by developing the 
white economy32 In addition, the Union had not been the Mandatory power 
long enough for any major beneficial effects to be felt in S.W.A.33. But 
a study of the Administration's reforms concerning the Bondelswarts shows 
that 1 itt 1 e was done except to appoi nt a Reserve Superi ntendent and to a 11 ow 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
See Gorges Report, passim. 
Wellington , p.280. 
See pSI). 
Goldblatt, p.2l7. 
CA.P.M.O. Vo]. 6. P.:1.C. Report. p . 19. 
Swanson, p.655. 
r.A.p .f~ .O. "Ialton's " Co~::;-; ents" on the P. t1.C. RepJrt. p.2. 
N.A.C. Repo rt , p.5. para. l6a). (Gene ra l l.e" i:,er's cor.;',ent). 
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the Bondelswarts sell grass, firewood or lime34 to raise cash to pay the dog 
tax. 
In fact, native policy in S.W.A. was influenced in almost every sphere of 
action by white pressure-groups, who were intent on bending it to their own 
advantage35 Col.de Jager, a leader of local white opinion in S.W.A., told 
the N.A.C. that "the only thing that will put these people (the Bondelswarts) 
right is powder and lead,,36. This sort of attitude did not lend itself to 
compromise or negotiation, and highlighted the 
"prob lems of concerning and administering any native policy in the 
presence of a vociferous and sel f- centred white community. ... . "37 
t~ajor Herbst told the N.A.C. that Hofmeyr had been under constant pressure 
from white farmer s in S.W.A. for increased local powers for police, like the 
return of the powers of flogging 38 . 
White feeli ngs about native policy were largely dictated by the labour shortage 
experienced by farmers in S. W.A . 39. In addition to the shortage of black 
l abourers, partly due to Van Trotha's extermination policies in the 1904-6 
rebellio n40 , Herbst stated that "the great difficulty in this country is tha t 
the native does not wish to work" .41 The labour conditions and wag e levels 
prevailing in S.W.A. did not exactly provide an incent i ve for bl acks to seek 
34 . See p. l("q. 
35. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.310-328. Col. de Jager. 
One such white pressure group was the "Zuid Hest Afrika Vereen ig ing" . 
Co 1. de Jager was cha i rman of its centra 1 Execut i ve . Su pposed ly non-
party, it ai med to promote co-operation in S.W.A. , presumably between 
Germans and South Africans. It supported the segregation pol icy, and 
"anted blacks settled i n unified , demarcated reserves under t he contro l 
of experienced magistrates and Native Affairs Commissioners. In 1920 
the Z.W.A.V. asked Smuts to set up a Comm i ssion of Enquiry into S .~1.A. 
native po licy, and asked for stricter pass laws, spec ial Justices of the 
Peace, and brand ing of black-owned cattle under supervision. 
36. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.324. Co l . de Jage~ 
37. Swanson, p.656. 
38. CA.P.t1.0. Vol. 6. I"ajor Herbst 's 11emorandum. p.7. 
39 . N.A.C. Report, p.10, para. 40. 
40. See Bley , German Rule,D.lb3. 
41. R.P. N.A .C . Report. Mln~tes of Ev idence . p.84. Major Herbst. See p. I~~. 
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42 
work . The alternative was to pressurise them, directly or indirectly, 
into seeking work, and this aim was reflected in the pass and work laws 43 
affecting blacks. It was white pressure which led the N.R.C. to recommend 
that, in order to prevent stocktheft, blacks should not be allowed to keep 
their branding irons 44 . 
Hofmeyr in his Memorandum stated that Jacobus Christian could not be ap-
pointed as the Bondelswarts' Captain45 bf' cause it "was well known that 
Christian's return would create a scare" among the whites46 . The N.A.C. was 
told that it was the pressure of white farmers on Hofmeyr that had induced him 
to greatly increase the dog tax, so that blacks would seek work to get money 
to pay the tax 47 Herbst himself admitted that the tax was introduced "in 
defence to public (i.e. white) opinion" 48 
~10re ominous was Herbst's statement that 1·10nis could not have been pardoned 
in 192249 , since it would have made a poor impression on the whites, because: 
"(}lie AdministrasieJ is ieder jaar beledig oor die naturelle politiek 
wat hier gevolg word. Die wibnense dink dat ons nie weet hoe om die 
naturelle te behandel".50 
Col. de Jager was more specific about what the white reaction to the pardoning 
of Morris would have been: 
"I say now that if the Administrator had compromised with the 
Hottentots he "lOuld have had the European population up in arms" .51 
Hofmeyr himself stated that he was supported in his decision to strike a 
swift, "severe and lasting" blow to the Bondelswarts in 1922 by "public 
opinion" 52 Indeed, this opinion was reflected in local newspapers at the 
42. See r·3"l. 
43. See p.4D. 
44. R. P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.842. Col.de Jager on N.R.C. 
Report. 
45. Seep.;;).I. 
46. R.P. Hofmeyr's Ilemorandum. p.l. 
47. R.P.N.A.C . Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.33s. F. van R. Coetzee. 
48. ibid. p.34. Major Herbst. 
49. See p. <l.o'? . 
50. N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.68. Major Herbst. 
51. ibid. p.320. Col de Jager. (Chairman of the Zuid-West Afri ka Vereenisi ns)· 
52. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An . l.p.5. A.R.B. 
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time. One such article read that: 
"Die Hotnots was in volle opstand een daarna was dit dwaasheid en 
nadelig vir die prestige van die witman in die land om hulle te gaan 
soebat om gehoorte to gee aan die wet". 
and also that: 
"Die Hotnots moes eens en vir altyd geleer het dat geen verset t een 
die gesag van die witman geduld sal word nie".53 
Another weakness in the system of Native a(L'ilinistration in S. H.A . wa s 
that the offices of magistrate and superi ntende nt were merged 54 after the 
Bondelswarts had been resettled, and in addition the magistrates were, for 
reasons of economy, in control of the police55• This inevitably led to a 
conflict of interests, and the Bondelswarts resented it. In 1917 a depu-
ta t i on of Bonde 1 swarts reques ted the appoi ntment of a Comm i ss i oner "to 100 k 
after the interests of the Bonde l swarts". Hhen the magistrate told them tha t 
he was the Native Commissioner as well, the Bondelswarts rep l ied: 
"Our custom is that the magistrate is the Judge and therefore 
we want a C~Rmissioner over us".56 
After Major Manning's visit to the Bondelswarts in 1921, Noothout was ap-
pointed Superintendent of their Reserve, and they welcomed this57. The dis-
advantage of the arrange,nent of putting the mag istrate in charge of the police 
was pointed out by Lt. Prinsloo, when he said that the only real channel for 
Bondelswarts grievances, the magistra te; was also in charge of the police, 
wh~R the Bondelswarts greatly disliked and feared 58 . An identification of 
the one with the other l'las inevitable, and, as Herbst told the P.t~.C. , one 
could 
"understand a native nursing a grievance rather than incur the 
enmity of the police by cor,'plaining to superior authorities".59 
53. Die Suid-Vlest. p.2. 2 Ju ly 1922. It is of interest to note that Die Suid-
nest, ":lich I'ias the official ol'gan of the Z.H.A .V . (see p. 1'114· ) had -
itseditor sacked by the Central Executive of the Z.t'!.A.V. for his 
criticism of Hofmeyr's handling of military operations 'in the rebellion. 
See 9 July 1922 issue. 
54. R.P.N.A.C . Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.91. Major Manning. 
55. ibid. p. 502. C. vleidner. 
56. H.A.Adm. Vol.51. File 599. Bondelswarts deputation to t<Jajor Herbst, 
Secretary for the Protectorate. 
57. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . p.93. :',ajor ["anning. 
58. ibid. p. 997. Lt. Prinsloo . 
59. C.A.P.M.O. Vol. 6. Herbst's :': ,_~,o r, ;nd' o. ;:; .4, 
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In fact, when it came to the crunch, the Administration used the police to 
the exclusion of the magistrate, as was shown in the 1919 and 1922 incidents 60 . 
The relations between the Bondelswarts and the police were poor, to say the 
least. The N.A.C., with G( neral Lemmer in disagreement, found that relations 
between the two were "unsatisfactory", with the police regarding the Bondel-
swarts as "insolent and lazy" and the Bondelswarts seeing ; Ie police as 
"unnecessari ly severe and harsh" .6l 
Relations between the Bondelswarts and the police had got off to a bad 
start almost immediately after the Union takeover in S.W.A .• German rule 
had left a legacy of Bondelswarts mistrust of the police62 , and in 1916 their 
old animosities were aroused against the Union police. ' The Warmbad military 
magistrate wrote to the Secretary for the Protectorate in connection with 
the Bondelswarts unrest led by Adam Christian63 (alias Pienaar) and said 
that he had : 
"succeeded in getting all the culprits into llarmbad without the inter-
vention of the Pol ice, who were hm·/ever too eager to do their duty, 
and had I not succeeded in dis suading the D.C. from sending out Police 
to capture the armed natives, bloodshed would have been the conse-
quence .... "64 
The situation described is reminiscent of the sending of Sgt. van Niekerk to 
arrest Morris in 192265 . 
Relations were further worsened during the period of martial law with cases 
of the police taking the law into their own hands 66 , and ma tters were not 
helped by the police having to enforce the ha ted dog tax and pass and work 
laws. Unfortunately, these l aws probably identified the magistrate and Govern-
men t with the police actions too closely. Indeed, the blacks in the Warmbad 
district seened to have had particularily bad relations with the police. for 
60. R. P. Hofmeyr' s t~emorandum. p.8. See p1"l, pb"'. 
61. N. A.C. Report, p.30, para. 5. 
62. See p.IU&. 
63. See ( . bOo 
64. W. A. Adm. Vo1.l06. File 3353. tlilitary Magistrate to Secretary for Protec-
torate, Ref. 4/3353. 21 Dec. 1916. 
65. See p.b"I. 
56 . ~.A.P.M.O.Vol. 6. Herbst 'i Menorandum. p.4. 
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in 1917 the Administrator Gorges, wrote 
"Our Native Regulations, as I mentioned in my last Minute, provide 
that every Native without visible means of support must seek work; 
but I am informed that in the Warmbad area the Constabulary have been 
exercising too much severity in enforcing the Regulation" .67 
Conflict with the police also arose \~hen they had to move Bondelswarts 
squatters off Crown lands adjoining the Reserve which the Bondelswarts 
claimed were within the Reserve boundaries68 . 
There were Bondelswarts complaints that the police, in their search for 
illegal kaffir-beer, entered huts with their rifles and without warrants 
or care forthe damag e they did69 . What vestiges of goodwill that remained 
were destroyed in 1919 with Lt. Jordaan 's breach of faith in arresting 
Jacobus Christian's emissaries 70 , and the distrust this imbued in the Bondel-
swarts was to have tragic repercussions in 1922. 
The situation was summed up by a N.A.C. draft report which stated: 
"it is certain t ha t the latter (the police) had a good deal to 
put up with and often had good cause for their severity and 
strictness. Yet the judgement formed by the Commission was that 
they were lacki'ng that sympathy and understanding which is so 
essential in the government of native people".71 
Lt. Prinsloo sai d that the Bondelswarts rega rded the police as their "worst 
enemy" 72 . 
The Bondelswarts seem to have been in cons tant conflict with the law. The 
often excessively severe punishments of German ti mes for minor infringements 
of the law had inspired in the Bondlesl'Iarts a view of the law as being S()lle-
thing to be feared, rather than as a protector of individual liberties. 
67. W.A. Adm . Vol. 106. File 3353. Gorges to Secretary for Defence, Pretoria . 
16 Jan. 1917. 
68. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.421. Noothout. See 
69. R.P. "Papers Connected with the Bondelzwar ts rebellion" MS 14787/A/(ii). 
Jacob~s Christian's co;np laints to Dr. Robert s. 
70. N.A.C. Report, p.6, para. 20. 
71. R.P.N.A.C. Re port Drafts. Graft F. p.15~ 
72. N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.950. Lt. Prinsloo. 
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Their conflicts with the game, vagrancy, pass and work, and branding laws, 
and with the dog tax, meant that many Bondelswarts were constantly fleeing 
the law, and as Lt. Prinsloo pointed out, they consequently gained a 
"distorted conception" of it73 
There were provisions for the protection of the rights of blacks, but there 
\'ias often a difference between theory and practice. Unfortunately, as a 
draft of the N.A.C. report stated, "The qual ity of some of the men used as 
.. instruments of the Government left much to be desired". 74 Gorges had com-
plained of the incompetence of some of the local officia l s as early as 1917, 
and, in particular, felt that the Warmbad district needed well-trained 
officials, since, he said; it would need no elaboration on his part to 
show how'highly necessary' it was to have proper ly trained officia l s , 
especially in a border district "of the importance of Warmbad" which was 
"attracting a steady flow of settlers"from the Union75 
In 1918 Col. de Jager had complained that the magistrates in S.W.A., who 
were also the Native Commiss i oners, often disp l ayed "lamentab l e ignorance and 
incompetence" in their dealings with blacks 76 . 
The I'eas on for the presence of untrained and often incompetent local offi ci a 1 s 
in S.W.A. was due, as Hancock pOints out, to General Botha's strengthening 
of his political position by opening up S.W.A. to Afrikaners in search of 
land and jobs. Unfortunately, many of the men who got the jobs, especially 
in t he police, were unsuitable for them,as is sho',m in the letters written to 
Smuts by Gorges 77 
73. ibid. 
74. R. P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft D. p.65. 
75. W.A. Adm. Vol. 106. File 3353. Gorges to Secretary for Defence, Pretoria. 
p.9. 16 Jan. 1917. 
76. R. P.N.A.C. Report. 1,1inutes of Evidence. p.285. Col. de Jager. 
77. Hancock, p.103. 
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But this policy was followed: 
"both for the sake of conciliating the Germans and pro-German 
Boer settlers of South-West and for the political gains it would 
promote amongst the Afrikaners of South Africa .... "7e ' 
The effect of this was unfortunate, for 
"the policy who intensified at the very outset what was to be a serious 
weakness in the future - the poor quality of administrative and police 
personnel, especially in the sensitive areas of native administration 
and public service under the mandate".79 
The Bondelswarts' channels for their grievances were l imited. ' The magistrate 
also controlled the ,police,. which made them wary of him as a med i ator. The 
Superintendent, whe n he arrived, proved to be ineffectua1 80 As a result, 
the Bondelswarts often resorted to petitioning the Administrator , bypa ssing 
local officials. But this had very limited success, increas ing the Bo ndel -
swa rts feelings of fru stration and alienation. 
This wa s reflected in their attitude to the whites as a who le . The N.A.C. 
found them to be "antagonistic and susp i ci ous"in their relat ions with whites81 
This antagonism was increased by the Bondelswarts feeling that the white 
farmers \1ere encroaching on their land, by the exploitation they suffered at 
t he hands of the traders, by the discrimination in laws li ke the branding lew, 
and by the 10\>1 \'Iages and poor master-servan t cond itions that preva iled . In 
addition, the extremes of German rule had left a l eg acy of distrust for the 
U · d " t t' ' h' 82 nlon i mInIs ra Ion to I n erlt . 
The N.R.C. found that the blacks attitude 
"was to a great extent one of stoical indifference. They seemed to 
us to be suspicious and reticent about di cussing questions relat ing 
to labour, and gave the impression that nothing they could say "Iould 
alter any law the white man proposed to make" . 83 
78. SI'lanson, p.648. 
79. ibid. 
80. See p.).o3 . 
81. N.A.C. Report, p.12, para. 48. 
82. ibid. p.29. para. 2. 
83. W.A. Adm. Private and Semi-Off. Docs. p.2. N.R.C. Report of 1921. 
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The general attitude of the whites to the Bondelswarts was reflected by 
-
Major Herbst's statement to the N.A.C. that: 
"There is not a lazier native on the face of the earth than the 84 
Hottentot. When the sun comes up then he is fi ni shed for the day". 
Col. de Jager, a respected figure in the white community, told the N.A.C. 
that he felt that the evidence of blacks given under oath shou ld not be 
regarded as reliable as that of a white, since the blacks "did not understand 
the solemnity of the oath". 85 Lt. Col. Trew felt that the S. VI.A. blacks were 
"an indolent, truculent lot" who "compared very unfavourably with the South 
African native". 86 
The N.R .C . found in 1921 that while the whites complained strongly about the 
- blacks' laziness and reluctance to work the complaints were mostly one-sided, 
with no regard to black interests87 . A missionary at Steinkopf, Fr. Meyer, 
held a more bal anced view t han most whites. He felt that the Nama people 
were not inherently lazy, but were simply unu sed to ma nual labour, and could 
not be expected to change overnight. He recommended more agricultural training 
in the schools as a remedy88 
Part of the "ihi t es' dislike of the Bo ndelsl'.'arts seems to have been based on 
fear. Indeed, it wa s this as much as their direct influence on Native policy 
in S.W,A. which helped to cause confrontations, with an almost hysterical 
reaction on the part of the wh i tes at any sign of Bondelswarts defiance, and 
with constant ly circulating rumours of rebellion which were invariably proved 
incorrect and unfounded. 
84. R.P . N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.6. Major Herbst. 
85. ibid . p. 293. Col. de Jager. 
86. Tre\'/ , pp.1 40-141. 
87. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.84l-842. Lt.Col Kruger on N. R. C. 
88. ibid. p.649. Fr. Gottli eb Heyer. 
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A typical case of this \~as the small-scale unrest of 1917 led by Adam 
Christian (alias Pienaar)89, which led the Warmbad Magistrate, Major Van 
Zyl, to call for "at least" 100 police . Lt. Col. Kruger arrived to investi-
gate, and found that the whole incident had been "greatly exaggerated by 
various farmers in that area", and condemned the unfounded "alarmi st" rumours 
among the whites 90 
The white overreaction to Jacobus Christian's arrival in 19 1991 was similar 
but much more harmfu 1 in its effects. ~lr. Mei ntj i es, who was mag i stra te at 
the time in Viarmbad, reported that on the night of Jacobus's arrival the 
principal of the \-Iannbad school had come to him and told him that 3,000 
Bondelswarts had crossed into S.W.A., some armed, and that an attack on Warm-
bad was iminent. He said a local farmer, Rocher, had arrived and confirmed 
this. The vJannbad police set up arT,led sentries around the town, and, against 
Meintjie's advi ce, an armed patrol \~as sent out under L t. Jordaarl to arrest 
the "invaders". ~leintjies felt that the whole affair had been "greatly 
exaggerated" .92 No doubt it helped to cause the subsequent overreaction and 
the serious consequences thereof. 
The rUolOurs continued unabated, hO\'Jever, and in 1921 t1ajor ~lanning investigated 
rumours of 80ndel S\,iarts unrest over the dog tax and found them to be unfounded. 93 
Nevertheless, it was partly this white overreaction that limited the options 
open to Hofmeyr in 192294 , and, to say the least, it did not contribute to a 
peaceful resolut i on of the cri si s. The whites remembered the Bondel swarts' 
successes in the 1904-6 rebellion95 , as well as the spectre of the whole black 
population of S. W.A. combining in revolt as they had done under German rule. 
89. See p. bOo 
90. I':. A. Ad rn . Vol. 106. File 3353. Tel egram milital'y magistrate to Secretary for 
Protectorate. Letter Gorges to Secretary for Defence, Pretoria, enclosing 
Lt.Col. Kruger 's report on Bondelswarts unrest. 16 Jan. 1917. 
91. See fl. d- "I.. 
92. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An 12. t'leintjies to military 
magistrate, l-Jar.i1bad. 15 August 1919. 
93. N. A.C. Report, p.12, para. 45. 
94. See p.!,>$". 
95. See P' lb. 
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Their imagination did the rest . 
If the Bondelswarts had any white friends, they were the missionaries, mainly 
Roman Catholic96 . But the missionaries wielded little or no political power, 
and their strict neutra lity, as shown byM~ · . Krolikowski's conduct the 
negotiations before the 1922 rebellion, incurred the displeasure of the 
Administration, and especially of Hofmeyr97 
Thus, although the intentions of the Government in S.W.A. may have been good, 
as shown by the reductions in police powers, these intentions I"ere not always 
put into practice. In addition, the emphasis of the Union adm ini stration's 
policies was on developing the white economy and interests. As far as the 
Bondelswarts were co ncerned , things had largely remained unchanged since Ger:nan 
times, and their hopes for British rule remained unfulfilled. In fact, in 
many ways the situation seemed worse, for under Hofmeyr's missionary zeal, 
the theory and practice of segregation was put into effect, together with its 
concomitants of pass and work laws , and enforced with a higherto unprecedented 
thoroughness and strictness. The Bondelswarts, frustrated, angered and hu~i-
liated by the new laws and the increase in whi te settlenent, fe lt threatened in 
their Dlvn land. In ter-racial tensions mounted , and unrest \>las inevitable. 
- - - 000 - - -
96 . R.P .N.A .C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.349 . Hgr . Krolikows ki. 
He told the N.A.C. that 1,300 to 1,400 of the Bond "lslvarts \"ere Ror:lan 
Catholics. 
97. W.A. Adm. Vol. 145 . File C 301. "Statements. Bondelzwarts and extra 
copies of Annexure~' Draft of A.R. B., ~.15, para .7. 
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CHAPTER 10. 
THE BUILD-UP TO REBELLION 
General Lemmer felt that the Bonde l swarts revolt was partly due to: 
"ever increasing preaching, emanating from America, of the motto 
"Africa for the Africans", meaning 'Africa for the natives' ." 
r,lajor Herbst sai d that there was a branch of the Garveyites at Luderitz-
bucht, and that they 
that the whites were 
had held a meeting in Windhoek at wh ich they had stated 
. . 2 
to be driven out of S. W.A. by the blacks. There was 
one letter found that had been sent in April 1922 from the "African Political 
Organization" in Cape Town to J acobus Christian, offering to try and help him 
3 
redres s his grievances and asking for full narticulars about them. But there 
is no evidence of any sort of outside influence as a cause of the 1922 
Bondelswarts rebellion4. 
It was alleged that the Bondelswarts r iS ing wa s only part of an abortive plot 
for a general ri sing in associat i on with the Union Nama in the Ri chte rs ve ld5 
ar ea. However, the N.A.C. found no organized or extensive support for the 
Bondelswarts from the Union 'Nama6,although some indivi duals did cross the 
Oranse River to assist their Bondelsvlarts relatives. Thus the N.A.C. con-
cluded t ha t the 1922 rebellion was not caused by Unio n influences7 But at 
the same time, as the Rev. Steenkar,;p told the N.A.C., "if a chord is struck 
in S.W.A. i t vibrates here".8 
Det.-Sgt. Pietersen of the S.W.A. C.I .D. sa i d that among those who surrendered 
after the Guruchas battle9 were fifteen Nama who said that they had come from 
the Union in answe r to Jacobus Chri sti an ' s call . A final tally of captured 
1. R.P .N.A.C . Repo rt Draft s. Draft C. p.9. (General Lemmer ' s draft). See p.II3;. 
2. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 87. Major Herbst. 
3. ~~.A. Adm . Vol. 158. File W. 60 A.P.O ., Cape Town to Jacobus Christian. 
8 April 1922. 
4. See p. b4· 
5. See f' 104· 
6. See f'b4 . 
7. N.A.C. Repo rt. p.32, para. 20. 
8. R.P.N.A . C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.579. Rev. Steenkamp. 
9. See p.C!,'J- . 
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rebels showed that sixteen came from Port Nol loth and twelve from Stink-
fontein in the Union lO , which was hardly indicative of extensive outside 
support. Zwartbooi Links, the Richtersveld Captain, told the N.A.C. 
"(Jacobus) Christian did not send to the Richtersveld, but some of 
hlS people were across the (9rang~ river and he sent for these men 
to join his ranks".ll 
In add i tion , Lt. Prinsloo found that the Bondelswarts had got some rifles 
f rom the Richtersveld12. Undoubtedly the Richtersvelders felt some sympathy 
for the Bondelswarts cause l3 , for they themselves were suffering from similar 
disabil ities. 
The N.A.C. found Le Fleur and his Richtersveld organization to be a disruptive 
infl uence in th e Union, and recommended that his activ iti es be curtailed14 . 
General Lemmer felt that Morris had been greatly influenced by Le Fleur15 . 
But the N.A.C. could f ind no evidence that Le Fleuc had organized any exten-
sive support for the Bondelswar ts rising16 
Le Fleur probably did influence the Bonde lswarts in an indirect way, by 
helping to crystall ize their desires by his own exarnple. But is seems 
cel' t ain that his influence did riot extend much further, for as late as 
16 May 1922. the Bondelswarts wrote to Abram Watt, a Le Fleur agent , asking for 
Le Fle ur's he lp in redressing t heir grievances 17 . 
But the extent of real influence exerted by Le Fleur on the Bondleswarts rising 
is i .llus trated by the fact that only one informant reniembered hirn . Le Fleur's 
Nama name was" !gai !hoab", rnea ning "smooth talker", for, according to the 
10. R.P.N,A.C. Report . Mi nutes of Evidence. p.259. Det.Sgt. Pietersen. 
11. ibid. p.668. Zwart boo i Links. 
12. ibid. p.984. Lt. Prinsloo. 
13. ibid. p.710. R. H. ChenOl'leth. 
14. fLA . C. Report. p.36, para. 124 . 
15. ibid. p. 13, para. 55a). 
16. ibid . p.27, para. 129. 
17. ibid. p.15, para. 62. Jacobus Chris tian to Abram Watt. 16 May 1922. 
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informant, Le Fleur had eventually absconded with the funds he had collected18 . 
The Bondelswarts unrest on the eve of the 1922 revolt was more symptqmatic 
of a general feeling of discontent among blacks in S.W.A. at the time19 . 
Acting Inspector H.C. de Preez was fired on by Veldschoendrager Nama near 
Keetmanshoop in July 192220 . Sgt. Naude told the N.A.C. that the Beersheba 
and Keetrnanshoop Nama also regarded Jacobus Chri s ti an as thei r 1 eader2l . 
Indeed, in May 1922 the Keetmanshoop Nama Captain, Manasse, wrote to Jacobus 
askingfor advice on wha t to do about the intolerablys'trict pass )aws 22 . 
Thus, when Hofmeyr came down to Kalkfontein-South 23 to deal with the Bondel-
swarts revolt he told Col. de Jager and Andries de Wet to keep a careful 
24 watch on blacks in central and northern S.W.A. . He feared that the Bo n-
del swarts revolt wou ld stir up unrest in other tribes in S.W~A., .as had 
happened in the 1904-6 rebellions 25 . 
Abraham Morris thus arrived in 1922 at a tension-filled time 26 . General 
Ler.lmer felt that Jacobus Christian had asked r·1orris to come, that the Bondel-
swarts leaders were all under Le Fleur's influence, and that Jacobus and 
Beukes were inciting the Bondelswarts at the time of Morris's arrival. Lemmer 
said that Morris knew the consequences of breaking the l aw, and had come to 
1 ead the Bonde 1 swarts in revolt because of hi s mi 1 itary abil i ty and ex peri encl7 
18. Interview with Captain Frank Basson, Gibeon, 25 July 1977. 
19. ' ee rb4. 
20. R.P.N.A. C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.220-22 l. Major du Preez. 
21. ibid. p.823. Sgt. Naude. 
22 . W.A. Adm. Vo l. 158. Fi le ,)60. Manasse to Jacobus Christian. 4 May 1922. 
23. See p. ~5'. 
24. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.59. Major Herbst on the A.R.B. 
25. Freislich, p.18. 
26. See p. b~. 
27. N.A .C . Report. , p.14, para. 55a). 
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Hofmeyr felt that it was : 
"perfectly clear that Morris was invited by Christian and the 
people to come over to take command of the fighting men and 
conduct military operations."28 
But Lt. Prinsloo felt that it was more likely that Morris knew he was an 
outlaw in S.W.A., and that the Government action taken against him on his 
arrival had persuaded him to fight 29 . The majority of the N.A.C. felt ~ hat 
it seemed probable that t~orri s' s arri va 1 was used by some Bonde 1 swarts ' 
extremi s ts to urge the tri be to revo 1t30 . I n some way ~10rri s' s arri va 1 7 
crystallized the Bondelswarts' discontent, for his prowess in the 1904-6 
rebellion had made him a legendary and heroica1 figure for many of them31, 
and a reminder of the tribes' "golden age" of the past. 
Unfortunately , the lessons of 1904 32 and 191933 were lost on the Warmbad 
mag ist rate, Fleck, when he heard of Morris's arrival. He sent a policeman, 
Sgt. van Niekerk , and Native Constable Gert Kraai to arrest Morris, if 
necessary34. 
The Bonde1swarts knew Sgt. Van Niekerk well. He had dipped a total of 18,000 
sheep to enforce the hated scab disease35 1aws36 . He had fought against Morris 
in the Anglo-Boer War, when Morris had been a scout for the British, and again 
in the 1904-6 rebellion, whe n van Niekerk had fought with the Germans against 
the Bonde1swarts . Indeed , as a draft N.A.C. report pointed out: 
"one hazards the view that it would have been wiser, if police must 
be sent , to have made use of an officer who had not been an antagonist 
of ~iorris in previous wars. We are quite convinced that this fact had 
no influence on the mind of Sergean t van Niekerk - but it may have had 
on .the mind and attitude of Morris".37 
28. R.P. Hofmeyr's {~emorandum. p.9. 
29 . Freis1ich, p.9. 
30. N.A.C. Report. p.13, pa ra. 55. See p.l~l. 
31. See p.I'). 
32. See p. 14. 
33. See fl· 3D. 
34. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.405. Fleck. 
35. Seep. 170. 
36. ibi d. p. 1 ,003. Sgt. van Ni ekerk . 
37 . R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft B. p.43. 
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Several incidents stand out in the controversial accounts of the attempted 
arrest of Morris by Sgt. van Niekerk3S. Whe n van Niekerk arrived at 
Guruchas he did not say that he was coming to arrest Mor ris. He had taken 
Morris's rifle and the Union rifle pennit and the names of those who had 
crossed into S.W.A. with Morris, and then gone to Us to count the stock 
the returning exiles had brought with t~em39. Before he left for Us, 
Adam Pienaar (alias Christian) had come to Native Constab le Kraai and asked 
him whethe r van Niekerk had come to arrest ~lorris . Kraa i replied that he had 
heard nothing about that40 . 
When Sgt. van Niekerk re turned to Guruchas and announced that he was going to 
arrest Horris, Jacobus Christian offered instead to bring t10rris to Warmbad 
the next day. van Niekerk rode ahead to Haib to wai t for them, much as Lt. 
Jordaan had done in 1919 41 . When he got Jacobus 's letter saying that the 
tribe refused to let Horris go, van Niekerk went back to arrest Morris. 
Jacobus said later that the people had refused to let Morris go since he had 
stolen nothing42. When van Niekerk arrived the Bondelswarts asked him why 
he wanted to arrest Morris, since the latter had handed over a rifle and 
't43 pe rr,ll . Morris sa id that he was willing to go to Warmbad, but that the 
Bondelswarts objected to him being arrested 44 . He asked Sgt. van Niekerk 
why he had wanted to wait at Haib for them. Remembering 1919, Adam Pienaar 
said to van Niekerk : 
"Daardie ding wat jy wil he dat die mense moet weggaan en jy vo orui t 
gaan en half-pad wag om die mense to vang om hulle aan to jaag \'!arm-
bad toe dit zal nooit gebeur nie." 45 
3S. Seep· b'\. 
39. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.779. Jafta Christian. 
40. ibid. p.Sll. Gert Kraai. 
4l. See p' 1. 
42. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. ~p.3S0-3S1. Fl eck. Jacobus Chris-
tian to Fleck. July 1922. 
43. ibid. p.762. Johannes Booi s. 
44. ibid. p.779. Jafta Christian. 
45. ibid. p. S14.Gert Kraai. 
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The breach of faith of 1919 had been recalled by the Bondelswarts, and, with 
their suspicions thoroughly aroused, they r efused to let Morris be arrested. 
The Bondelswarts claimed that Sgt. van Niekerk threatened them and said that 
"die lood van die Goevernment zal now up julle smelt" , which they regarded 
as a declaration of war. Pienaar turned to Kraai and said: 
"Jy het gehoor wat hier gepraat is en jy het die gezien loop se dit 
net so as dit is".46 
Both Kraai and van Niekerk denied later that they had made this threat. Kraai 
says that van Niekerk told the Bondelswarts, with Kraai translating i t into 
Nama, that: 
"Ik zal now na Vlarmbad gaan en gaan rapportereen aan die mense n 
die groter zijn dat ik ben en ik weet niet wat Sgt. Naude hiervan 
zal zeggen en die groot baas zal zeker plannen maken om Morris to 
a rres teren" . 
To which Kraai said Pienaar rep li ed : 
"Julle hoor nou dit is klaa r oorlog daar is niks meer om te se nie". 47 
Kraai said that Pienaar then warned him that no police would be allowed on 
the Bondelswarts' reserve, and told him to warn Sgt. van Niekerk not to lay 
a hand on r~orris , and that it would be bes t for them to get off the Reserve48 . 
Vlhat is clear is that Sgt. van Niekerk did threaten the Bondelswarts with 
the use of greater force to arrest Morris. The N.A.C. Report points out that 
the Bondelswarts believed that the Gove rnment, via Sgt. van Niekerk, had 
declared \,ar on them49 , and from now on their mood was one of defiance. 
46. ibid. p.763. Johannes Boois. 
47. ibid. p.815. Kraai. 
48. ibid. p.814. 
49. N.A.C. Report, p.15, para. 61. 
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They were all accomplices in resisting t10rris's arrest. The evidence for 
the Bondelswarts belief that the Government had declared war on them is 
over-whelming 50 . They were determined to resist. In a letter to Le Fleur 
of 16 May 1922, Jacobus Christian said that the Bondelswarts had collected 
at Haib because Sgt. van Niekerk had promised that they would be"extermi-
nated" by the Government51 . On the eveni ng of van Ni ekerk' s departure Morri s 
made the military appointments and called all the Bondelswarts into Haib52 . 
An informant, Johannes Zwartbooi, recalled how the Bondelswarts had resented 
the attempted arrest of thei r hero, Morri s, on Bondel swarts terri tory. They 
suspected that the police would kill Morris because of his reputation gained 
from the 1904-6 revolt . Zwartbooi was supported in this by another informant, 
Isaak Witbooi 53 . 
General Lemmer felt that the Bondelswarts had been planning to revolt all 
along, and used the negotiations to ' play for time until they were ready54 
While thiS was highly unlikely~5 a draft N.A.C. report pointed out that: 
"Whatever may have been the intent i on of the people with regard to 
armed resistance it is clear ... that at the time of van Niekerk's 
visit they were unprepared. They had not one rifle for four men."56 
11ajor Van Coller told the N.A.C . that Jacobus Christian \Vas guilty of not 
assisting the police in arresting Morris , when called upon to do s057 Besides 
the fact that this was an unfair expectation since the' Government had con-
sistently refused to recognize Jacobus as the Bondels\Varts Captain, it may 
have induced Jacobus, who as an intelligent man wou ld have realized the re-
50. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.460. Jacobus Christian. 
ibid. p.486. T. Beukes. 
ib id. p. 520. H. Jonas. 
ibid. p.727. A. t·1atroos. 
ibid. p. 781. Jafta Christian. 
ibid. p.786. K. Matthebus. 
ibid. p. 788. J. Prens. 
51. N.A.C. Report. p.15, para. 62. 
52. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.383. Fleck. 
53 . Interview with J . Zwartbooi, Gabis. 21 July 1977. 
Interview with I. \,itbooi, v:armbad. 20 July 1977. 
54. R.P.N.A . C. Report Drafts. Draf t C. p.19. (Gen. Lemmer's draft). 
55. Seep. '10. 
56. ibia. p.68. 
57. R.P.N.A.C. Report. ~linutes of Evidence. p.131. ~1ajor Van Coller. 
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percussions of Sgt. var. Niekerk's failure to arrest Morris, to make a stand 
once and for al1 58. Jacobus told Mgr Krolikowski that he had collected his 
people at Haib to die together, Mgr. Krolikowski told the N.A.C. that, in 
any case ; 
"Christian was powerless against the younger men and he was 
against this war "59 
The Bondelswarts had turned to Morris , and only three members of the Raad 
60 
supported Jacobus's attempts to keep the peace . The N.A.C. Report found 
that after van Niekerk's visit, 
"Jacobus ceased to have influence and the direction of affairs 
appears to have passed to Morris."61 
Morris mobilized the tribe to prepare for possible resistance62 . As for 
Morris's determination to resist force with force, a draft N.A.C. Report 
stated ; 
"Possibly his public arrest may have contributed to this. I~orris 
was a proud man. He was a hero to the people".63 
In any case, as Hofmeyr pointed out 
"I~orris, on the other hand lJIs compared with Jacobus Christiaij), 
had gained a very high reputatio n in the Hottentot war against the 
Germans , and would in the event of any trouble be at once accorded 
the leadership". 64 
Lt. Prinsloo felt that the Bonde l swarts' regard for Morris was so high that 
he easily persuaded them to resist65 - if indeed they needed any persuasion. 
Nonetheless, while some extremist Bondelswarts might have used Morris's 
arrival to urge revolt, the N.A.C. found that the Bondelswarts as a whole did 
not intend to assume hostilities at the time of Morris 's arrival. Jacobus 
58. Seep./l. 
59. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.350. Mgr. Krolikowski. 
60. ibid . pp. 385-386. Fleck. Jacobus Christian to Fleck. July 1922 . 
61. N.A.C. Report. p.15, para. 63. 
62. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.475. Stephanus Christian. 
63. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft F. p.84 . 
64. R.P. Hofmeyr 's 11er.1oralidum . p.9. 
65. R.P.N.A.C. Report. 1'1inutes of Evidence. p.953. Lt. Prinsloo. 
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had reported Morris's arr ival to the Administration, and at first the Bondel-
swarts had been willing that Morris shoul d go to Warmbad66 . But with the 
attempted arres t the situation changed. The N.A.C. Report stated: 
"Apparent ly the turni ng poi nt in the a tti tude of the (§onde 1 swartf) 
people was the visit of !'ergt. van Niekerk - after the events of 67 
Sunday 7th May , the whole tone and disposition of the people changed". 
Morris's arrival and the attempted arrest had "bound the Bondelswarts together 
as an active resisting force".68 
The N.A.C. found that Morris was an intelligent man, experienced in warfare, 
and thus must have realized the futility of revol t against the Government. 
Certainly the Bondelswarts did not rush into it. But Morris may also have 
felt that thjngs could not get any worse, and that the Bondelswarts would be 
able to put up a lengthy resistance as they had done in the 1904-6 rebellion69 . 
On io may 1922 Fleck sent a messenger , Johannes Bezuidenhout, to ask Jacobus 
Chri sti an to come to I·Jarmbad. Bezu -j Jenhout deli vered the message, but defec-
ted to the Bondelswarts and warned Jacobus that he would be arrested if he went 
to fJannbad 70 . This no doubt confirmed the Bondelswarts suspicions, and, 
rel;;e'il bering 1904 and 1919,they wen t into laage r. 
After Jacobus Christian had refused Major Van Coller's invitation of 14 May 
1922 to come to Driehoek, Van Coller decided to send Noothout and Mgt'. Kro-
1 i kowski to vi s it the Bonde 1 swart/ l . A controversy subsequently arose out 
of ~Ihat, if anything, had been promised to the Bondelswarts by these two if 
66. N. A.C. Report. p.31, para. 8. 
67. N.A.C. Report. p.16, para. 68. 
68. R.P.N .A.C. Report Drafts. Draft D. pp. 66-67. 
69. N.A.C. Report. p.16, para. 69. 
70. Seep.i3. 
71. See p_7~. 
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Morris and the five men who had crossed with him surrendered to the Warmbad 
magistrate72 
Jacobus Christian had requested that the Bondelswarts Reserve Superintendent, 
Noothout, come and seen them73 . The N.A.C. had found Noothout to be an 
" t' 11 't' ,,74 dh 11 dd b' excep lona y senSl lve man, an e was genera y regar e as elng a 
pleasant, but ineffectual person, inexperienced in dealing with blacks 75 
Noothout had been a magistrate in the Transvaal, had served in the Union 
Defence Force in the First World War, and had been appointed officer in charge 
of Native Affairs under the Keetmanshoop magistrate before he was appointed 
to be the Bondelswarts' Reserve Superintendent76 Major Van Coller observed 
that the Blacks were: 
"very fond of Mr. Noothout. He mixed fairly freely with them and he 
talked to their women and children".77 
Noothout regarded himself as a "good friend" of the Bondelswarts, and he had 
been so confident that a solution to the Bondelswarts unrest on the eve 
of the rebellion would be found that he felt he no longer required a police-
man to guard his house at Driehoek in the Reserve 7S . He was indeed 
"kind-hearted and well-meaning but nervous, emotional and gullible ,,79 
t.l'1"' Krolikowski told the N.A.C. that on his visit to the Bondelswarts with 
NoothoutSO , Noothout had been frightened and had weptSl . During their visit 
the Bondelswarts' extreme distrust and suspicion of the Government Vias shown 
by their demand for a written statement, signed and sealed by Hofmeyr, before 
they would believe Noothout's promises. 
72. Seer'-)~' 
73. See p.7b. 
74. N.A.C. Report, p.19, para. S2. 
75. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.325. Col. de Jager. 
Interview with informant vJ.J. Adriaanse, Warmbad. 19 July 1977. 
76. R. P. Hofmeyr' s r~emorandum, p.l. 
77. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.134. Major .van Coller. 
7S. ibid. p.452. Noothout. 
79. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft A. p.1S. 
SO. See p.7b. 
81. N.A.C. Report. p.18, para. 76. 
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Major Van Coller himself, in a telegram to Major Herbst on 18 May 1922, 
stated : 
"I have every reason to believe that desire of Bondels to have 
letter Administrators signature is inspired by the Jordaan incident82 
091~ particulars of which are known to yourself and Drew and on ac-
count of what took place at that time no reliance is placed in promises 
or arrangements of subordinate officers. "83 
The controversy arose as to what exactly Noothout had meant by saying that 
"everything wi ll be forgiven and forgotten,,84 Noothout claimed that he had 
said that if Morris and those who crossed with him reported to the magistrate, 
"everything would' be forgiven and forgotten", but that they should first go 
to the ~Jarmbad magistrate to get their punishment. He also said that he and 
Mgr. Krolikowski would be there to see that Morris and the others had a fair 
tria1 85 . 
i'lgr. Krolikowski, however, reported that Noothout had told the Bondelswarts 
that if Morris and the five men repor ted to the magistrate everything \vould 
be forgiven and forgotten, and that they would only be tried for being without 
a pass and there would only be an enqui ry about the rifles86 . Noothout had 
"told the men @ondelsvlartD that if those four men reported 
themselves no further steps would be taken against them".87 
Thus Mgr. Krolikowski wrote to Noothout immediately after the ir visit, asking 
him to telegraph Hofmeyr to ensure that if t10rris and the five men repor ted 
to the Warmbad magistrate they should not be heavi ly punished, because they 
\vould "certainly look upon that as a broken promise". To mak.e doubly sure, 
Mgi". Krolikowsk i also wrote a letter to Hofmeyr himself in the same vein. 
82. See p.30. 
83. 11.A. Adm. File A. 338/1. ~1ajor Van Coller to Secretary for S.W.A. 
18 May 1922. 
84. See p.I,/;. 
85. N.A.C. Report. p.18, para . 78. 
86. ibid. para. 79. 
87. ibid. para. 80. 
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As for Noothout's later denial that he had made any promises of leniency 
for Morris. j\1gr . Kro1 ikowski was prepared to swear that Noothout had88 
Noothou t. however. had agreed to convey t1gr . Kro1 i kowsk i' s request to Hofmeyr 
because. although he said that he had not promised Morris and the five men 
that they would not be punished if they surrendered. he was of the same 
opinion as Mgr. Krolikowski that they should only get light sentences89 . 
~Ihen Hofmeyr. receiving i~gr .. Kro1ikowskis' request. telegraphed Major Van 
Co)ler to ask what promises Noothout had made the latter said that while 
Noothout had denied making any promises. he. Van Coller. had information that 
in fact Noothout had exceeded his instructions90 . 
Fleck said he had told Noothout before he went to visit the Bonde1swarts 
with r1g r. Krolikowski that: 
"he had no right to give any promises to the people or make any 
conditions with them unless he got these from a Superior Officer ... .',91 
General Lemmer felt that Noothout would not have exceeded this "strict 
injunction". and had merely seen the statement he had drawn up for the Bonde1-
swarts to sign92 as a li st of the conditions upon which the Bonde1swarts 
would be willing to treat with Hofmeyr. While Noothout out saw the letter as 
meaning that if t·lorris and the five men gave themse lves uP. the actions of 
the rest of the tribe in preventing Sgt. van Niekerk from arresting Norris 
would be overlooked. Mgr. Kro1ikovlski. possibly as a result of his private 
93 
talk with the Bonde1swarts. saw it as meaning that Morris and the five men 
would also be forgiven. 94 HOlvever. it seems clear that the Bonde1swarts saw 
88. R.P . N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.360. Mgr. Krolikowski. Seep-,el. 
89. ibid. p.444. Noothout. Letter No. 2/5/22. 18 May 1922. 
90. ibid. p.142. 11ajor Van Coller. 
91. ibid. p.394. Fleck. 
92. See fl'/:' 
93. See p.17. 
94. N.A.C. Report. p.19. par ~ . 82a). 
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it in the light of Mgr:. Krolikowski's interpretation, and, as the N.A.C. 
Report pointed out, when the promise failed to materialize, the Bondelswarts 
would have felt deceived and threatened95 . 
,fi)gr. Krolikowski refused to accompany Major Van Coller on another visit to 
the Bondelswarts, since he did not wish to be identified with the police by 
the Bondelswarts 96 - a vi ew point which had some substance97 He had off ered 
to go alone instead and deliver Hofmeyr's message, but when he saw that the 
message was a list of the terms of surrender98 , instead of the expected pro-
r,ljse --af amnesty , he refused to prejudice either his Church's or his own name by 
associating with it . However, he did agree to go and try and arrange a meeting 
between the Bondelswarts and Van Coller, or failing this, between the Bondel-
swarts and the Administrator himself. 
When he got there, Ngr. Krolikows ki was told by Jacobus Christian that the 
Bondelswarts were afraid of Major Van Coller. but wanted to meet with Hof meyr, 
and they asked Mgr. , Krolikowski to be present as a witness 99 . 
"<lgr " Krolikowski later told the N.A.C. that he felt if Hofmeyr had visited the 
Bondelswarts personally, the matte' would have been settled. However, he 
felt that for the Bondelswarts the non-materialization of f~o o t h out's 'prom ise' 
had been "the last drop in the bucket".lOO Their distrust and suspicion 9l' ew 
even greater. Mgr', Krolikowski himself would have nothing more to do with 
the negotiations after his visit on 20 ~lay 1922. Hi s l ast advice to Major 
Van Coller, after conveying the Bondelslvarts' request for a meeting with the 
Administrator, was that he did not think it wise for either Van Coller or 
Fleck to visit the tribe lOl . 
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
See p,l"" 
Seep,<;rO, 
See p. 1'l7, 
See fl. 'l f. 
N.A.C. Report. p.20, para. 90. , 
R.P.N . A. C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. 
ibid. p.158. Major Van Coller. 
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However, Van Coller, Fleck and Noothout visited the Bondelswarts on 21 May. 
What must particularily have galled the Bondelswarts was Noothout's re-
appearance without the expected proolise from Hofmeyr , but with a list of 
demands instead l02 . 
Major Van Coller was inexperienced in dealing with blacks l03 . This led a 
draft N.A.C. report to state that it was an error of judgement to have sent 
Major Van Coller as the chief n~gotiator, because he had 
"had no experience in dealing with natives but was first and last 
a police officer, an "oorlogsman" as the Bondels called him".104 
General Lemmer disagreed with this view, saying that the sending of Major 
Van Coller was useful to show that the Administration wa s serious, and as a 
show of force, because he felt that the Bondelswarts had already prepared 
for war105. Major r'1anning , however, felt that it would have been better to 
use civil officials rather than the police in negot iations, but Manning, the 
obVious person for the job, was on l eave in the Union at thetimel06 . 
The armed Bondelswarts escor t for ~1ajor Van Coller, Fleck and Noothout to 
Jacobus's camp infuriated Hofmeyr ~Ihen he heard of it, and partly caused his 
decision not to visit the Bondelswarts on their own territory in case he 
should be submitted to a similar indignityl07. Th is was to prove a major 
stumbling block for a meeting because the Bondeldswarts, mindfu l of the events 
of 1919, would not venture out of their Reserve. 
Hajor Van Coller delivered Hofmeyr's message l08 which said that while the 
Bondelswarts tribes' resistance to the arrest of Morris would be overlooked 
if Morris and the five men surrendered l09 , he woul~ deal with Morris and the 
f · h' lf 'th t . fl' f th 110. lve men lmse Wl ou any promlse 0 en lency or em. 
102. 
103. 
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109. 
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This was unacceptable to the Bondelswarts, for it was to prevent Morris 
being imprisoned that they had gone into laager in the first place. 
On 23 May 1922 the Bondelswarts Raad sent their reply to Hofmeyr's demands . 
They were fu lly aware of its imp 1 i ca ti ons, and a 1 as t mi nute bi d by Hofmeyr 
to arrange a meeting with the Bondelswarts was ignored by themlll . They had 
made up their minds \'ihen Noothout's promise as they saw it failed to materia lize. 
As early as 19 /'1ay Major Van Coller had reported to Hofmeyr that he was 
" satisfied" that the Bondelswarts intended to resist any attempt to arrest 
I~orris and the five men112 . Major Herbst surrmed up the Bondelswarts' attitude 
when he told the N.A.C. that they 
"were in 1 aager with the idea tha t 'we wi 11 not interfere wi th them 
but if they come we wi 11 res is t them '" . 113 
Hofmeyr had tried for a peaceful solution, as General Lemmer pointed out1l4 . 
He had instructed Major Van Coller to "take care that every possible care 
was exercised" and to show patience with the Bondelswarts and to try and reach 
a peaceful solutionllS Hofmeyr told Mgr. Krolikowski on 19 May that he 
would "give every consideration" to clemency if Morris and the five men sur-
rendered 116 . If Hofmeyr meant what he said, it seems strange that he refused 
to put the promise in writing as the. Bondelswarts had requested. He probably 
feared public opinion and loss of dignity and wanted to create an impression 
of toug hnes s. 
111. N. A.C. Report. p.22. para. 9S. See p.i3. 
112. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evdience . p.SS. Major Herbst. 
113. ibid. p.22. Major Herbst. 
114. N.A.C. Report. p.22, para. 97a). 
llS. R.P.N.A.C. Report . t~inutes of Evidence. p.S3. ~1ajor Herbst. 
116. ibid. p.148. Major Van Coller. Telegram Hofmeyr to Van Coller. 19 t·1ay. 
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Many witnesses felt that if Hofmeyr had met the Bonde1swarts personally 
things would have been peacefully reso1ved l17 But Hofmeyr said that while 
he had made offers to meet them he would not go to them in their Reserve, 
especially after the armed escort given to Major Van Coller, Fleck and 
Noothout on their visit. Hofmeyr said: 
"In the face of this action CJ;he armed escor1J the Commission <B.A.C.] 
has the temerity to suggest that I personally should have gone to Haib 
to see Jacobus Christian".118 
Considering what was at stake , this seems to be a weak reason, and is revealing 
of Hofmeyr's character generally. There were many precedents of greater men 
than he who had humbled themselves in order to avoid b100dshedl19 . 
Hofroeyr felt that nothing he could have done would have averted the conflict120 . 
He felt that the Bonde1swarts resistance was only part of a wider Nama plot 
spreading into the Union, to revolt. Swanson pOints out that the Bonde1swarts 
were truculent, and Hofmeyr had his know ledge of the disaster of the 1904-6 
rebellion in S.W.A. in his mind, as well ~s the fresh horrors of the Rand 
Revolt of 1922, and the Bu1hoek massacre, where delay and inaction had led to a 
-greater tragedy. "The times," says Swanson , " were ripe for violent unrest", 
to Hofmeyr's mi nd 121. 
Hofmeyr later came in for some criticism for his collecting of volunteer 
forces at Ka1kfontein-South during the negotiations with the Bonde1swarts 122 . 
117. ibid. p.512. C. Weidner. 
ibid. p.451. Noothou t. 
ibid. p. 495. T. Beukes. 
ibid. p.792. J. Prins. 
N.A.C. Report. p.22, para. 96. 
118. R.P. Hofmeyr's t~emorandu1l1.p.9. 
119. The parallels of the Rhodes meeting the Ndebe1e leaders in the Matopos 
in 1896 or Smuts and Botha braving a hostile crowd to talk to strike 
leaders in 1913 suggest themselves. 
120. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.67. Major Herbst on the A.R.B. 
121. Swanson, p.656. 
122. N.A.C. Report. p.16, para. 67 and p.24, para. 112. 
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Yet it is difficult to see, as ' indeed ' he pointed out, what else he could 
have done. Nevertheless, the Bondelswarts were aware that troops were 
collecting, and it increased their suspicions of the negotiator's motives 
and sincerity, and confirmed their belief that Sgt, van Niekerk had been 
right and that the Government had dec la red war on them123. 
General Lemmer, defending Hofmeyr as usua l, stated that the calling for 
volunteers during the negotiations was an essential precaution, and he felt 
that it had made no difference since the Bonde l swarts, he said, were intent 
on revolt anyway and had to be shown that the Administration was ready to 
use force 124. 
The Bondelswarts were well aware that troops were collecting at Kalkfontein-
South. On :·lgr. Krolikowski 's second visit Jacobus Christian had told him 
that the Bondelsl1arts did not want war if the Government did not. As an 
example of their peaceful intentions, Jacobus pointed out that they were 
all owi ng armed wh ites who .Jere cros sing the Reserve to j oi n the Government 
forces to pass unhindered 125. Jacobus later told the N.A.C. : 
"When the negotiations took place between Mr Noothout and the others 
I had heard that the police were concentrating". 126 
Right at the start of the negotiations the messenger, Bezuidenhout127 , had 
warned the Bondelswarts that the police were collecting. T. Beukes said later 
that 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. 
"The Bondelswarts had heard that the police had gathered at Driehoek. 
They thought it was in connection with what van Niekerk has said". 
See fl ''6''5· 
N.A.C. Report. p.31, para. 11a). 
R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence . p.159. Major Van Coller. 
It is interesting in this respect that on 25 May 1922 the trader, 
Vi ljoen, was still dispensing his wares at Guruchas, and chatted to 
Jacobus Christian about the impending conflict. 
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He said the Bondelswarts had therefore looked to Morris "to protect them 
against this war van Niekerk had spoken of" .128 Jantje Prins, a Bondelswart, 
told the N.A.C. : 
"Wat de Sergt. CYan Niekerk) gezegd had gebeurende wan t de troopen 
kwamen".129 
Indeed, Jacobus Christian, in the reply to Hofmeyr's demands, sent on 
23 May, wrote : 
"Further, I see, as pointed out by Sarg. van Niekerk that the troops 
are assembling in Warm bad and Kalkfontein and I see no chance of 
surrendering the rifles and the five men".130 
In addition, a draft N.A.C. report pointed out that: 
"The relations between the Police and the Bondels were such that 
successful negotiations by the Commandant of the Police could not 
be expected. To the Bondels the sending of Major van Coller meant 
war and nothing else". 131. 
The Bondelswarts had learnt from experience that the police were a law unto 
themselves . Klaas Matthebus , a Bondelswarts, told the N.A.C. : 
"Van Niekerk is een konstable en wat hy zegt is waar en wa t die 
Kommissaris WoothouD zegt ge loofd en wij niet" . 132 
In additi on to thei r memori es of the pas t, the Bonde 1 swarts were faced I'li th 
the breaking of Noothout's promise, and the collecting of troops at Kalkfon-
tein-South. In all, as a draft N.A.C. report stated: 
"The Bondels raid for arms was not the answer to the Administrator's 
invitation (?3 MaY.] but was the act of a people wno feared to trust 
themselves to the hands of the Administrator, who had not received the 
expected reply to assurances given by an official and who believed war 
was bei ng forced on them". 1:J3 
The Bondelswarts had had enough , and they were determined to go down fighting. 
128. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.493. T. Beukes. 
129. ibid. p.788. J . Prins. 
130. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An. 1. p.15. Report of Major 
Van Coller to Secretary for S.W.A. 
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133. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft A. p.42. 
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They said that they: 
" were tired of talking to white people and of the Government now 
in the country and all their nonsense they would rather suffer one 
death at Haib together than the slow death they are now suffering".134 
The N.A.C. felt that it would have been wiser if Hofmeyr had not used the 
police to negotiate with the Bondelswarts135. General Lemmer, however, 
felt that the Bondelswarts were not afraid of the police but were insolent 
and were merely using delaying t act ics wh ile they prepared for revolt137 . 
136 
Sir Edgar Walton told the P.M. C. that not only Major Van Coller, but also 
Noothout, Mgr. Krolikowski and Fleck had failed to placate the Bondelswarts, 
and so the use of police in negotiations had made no difference138 . Hofmeyr 
defended himself by saying that a crime had been committed and that therefore 
the whole issue was a police matter139 
However, ;~ajor Van Coller told the N.A.C. that he thought 
"it was in the back of Jacobus Christian's mind that he preferred to 
negotiate with the civil authorities rather than with the police 
authorities".14D 
Lt Prinsloo agreed with this141, and "gr. Krolikowski was well aware of it, 
as is shown by his refusal to accoolpany Major Van Coller on a visit to the 
Bondelswarts and his advice to Van Coller not to visit the tribe 142 . 
Jacobus Christian told Van Coller's messe nger on 14 May: 
"Noothout has been appointed Commissioner to watch over the interests 
of Bondels but his authority is apparent ly only nominal and Police 
appear to be in power". 
• 
134. W.A. Adm. File A 388/1. Telegram Harmbad magistrate to Secretary for S.W.A. 
15 May 1922. 
135. N.A.C. Report. p.7, para. 26. See p . I~/. 
136. ibid. p.8, para. 27a). 
137. ibid. p. 17, para. 73a). 
138. T.A.P.M.D. Vol. 6. Walton's "Comments"on the P.M.C. Report. p.3. 
139. R.P. Hofmeyr's Memorandum. p.8. 
140. R.P.N . A.C . Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.134. Major Van Coller. 
141. ibid. p.l,121. Lt. Prinsloo. 
142. See p,~ \. 
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Jacobus had requested that Noothout and not Major .Van Coller, come to see 
h. 143 1 m • The Bondelswarts told Mgr . Krolikowski that "Van Coller is een 
oorlogsman en ons is bang".144 
It seems strange that the Administrator did not recall Major Manning, from 
his leave in the Union and use him to conduct negotiations. He had known 
the Bondelswarts since 1915145 , had negotiated with them over the dog tax, 
had plenty of experience, and was, after all, Chief Native Commissioner for 
S.W.A .. Indeed, a draft N.A.C. report directed on attack of the failure of 
Hofmeyr to use Major Manning, stating that it seemed 
"r emarkable that this officer @anninQ] who had already in the 
Kaokoveld demon strated his ability to disarm natives without 
display of force and who himself had resettled the Bondels on 
their reserve after the exodus caused by the war was not called 
into deal with the situation when matters became critical in 1922". 
Manning had been 
"still withi n the border of the territory on May 10 when the 
magistrate at Vlannbad wired to the Administrator that Abraham 
Morris and others had resisted arrest and the Bondels were 
assembling at Haib". 146 
Even when the Bondelswarts did go on raids to local farmers for arms, 
ammunition, supplies and horses, the N.A.C. report remarked on the 
"absence of murder, arson and other forms of viol ence which have 
been a featur e of most kaffir wars and in the fo rmer dealin'gs of 
these Hottentots with the Europeans".147 
General Le~ler agreed that the Bondelswarts had been non-violent in their 
raids, but felt that this was only because the farmers had offered no resis-
tance. 148 
Freislich149 sees Lt. Prinsloo and Abraham ~10rris as the two opposing heroes 
143. R.P.N.A.C, Report. Exhibits and Annexures . An. 10. p. 10. ' Major Van 
Coller's report on military operations . 
144. R.P.N.A . C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.364. Mgr. Krolikowski. 
145. See p.';).4. 
146. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft A. p.19. 
147. N. A.C. Report. p.3l, para. 12 . 
148. ibid. para . l2a). Seep,~b, 
149. Freislich, passim. 
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of the saga of the 1922 revolt . While both, and particularily Lt. Prinsloo, 
had sterling qualities and were very able military· leaders, it would seem 
that, if there are any heroes, Jacobus Christian had at least the ma kings of 
one, in a quiet and unassuming way. 
Hofmeyr saw Christian as a timid individual, ignoring the fact that he had 
been one of the diehards of the 1904-6 rebellion 150. But Major Manning , who 
had had more contact with Jacobus, and who had perhaps more perception than 
Hofmeyr, sa i d : 
"(Jacobus) Christian is all a man should desire to be. I was very 
much surprised that he had gone into rebellion".151 
Major Van Coller admired Jacobus as being "intelligent" and with a "fair 
152 education," Before the 1904-6 rebellion Jacobus had gone to school 153 . 
Advocate I. Goldblatt, who defended Jacobus at the latter's trial after the 
1922 rebellion described him as being "a quiet, well-mannered man, ~nasser­
tive and sincere" 154 Well ington points out that at Jacobus's trial the 
court had paid tribute to his character and conduct155 . 
An informant and local white farmer, W.J. Adr iaanse , had great admiration for 
Jacobus, describing him as highly intelligent, courteous and educated, and 
said that when Jacobus died the local white farmers had contributed towards 
th t · f f h . 156 e erec lon 0 (). gravestone or 1m . 
Yet, the question arises as to how an educated, intelligent man could support 
a rebellion whose end was inevi tably disastrous for his tribe. 
Hofmeyr felt that Jacobus Christian had been collecting and organizing his 
people for rebellion since his return in 1919, and had invited Morris to come 
150. R.P.Hofmeyr ' s t·1emorandum . p.9. 
151. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.114. Major Manning. 
152. ibid. p.163. Major Van Coller. 
153. Interview with Izaak Witbooi, Warmbad. 20 July 1977. 
154. C. A. File A 106. (Retroactive). A. Davey to l. Goldblatt. 5 July 1962 . 
155. Wellington, p.286. 
156. Interview with H.J. Adriaanse, Harmbad. 19 July 1977. 
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and lead them in their revolt157 . Indeed, amo ng those who surrendered after 
the rebellion were Nama who said that they had crossed the Orange River at 
Jacobus's call 158 . 
But in fact. Jacobus had consistently tried to keep his tribe within the 
bounds of the law. He had made them comply with the dog tax, and had tried 
unsuccessfully with the branding law159 . This was in the face of a Government 
who held him responsible for his tribes' actions without officially acknow-
ledging him as the Captain160 
Sgt. Naude saw Jacobus as the root cause of the 1922 rebellion. and recom-
mended that he be deported 161 . It is important. however. to remember that 
the Bondelswarts had a Raad , and that the Captian had to abide by the majority 
decision of that Raad. Thus Jacobus's first action on hearing of Morris's 
arrival had been to call a meeting of the Raad and summon all the Bondelswarts 162 
and before the final defiant reply to Hofmeyr's demands on 23 May. it was 
the Raad that decided to throw down the gauntlet163 . 
General Lemmer felt that Jacobus Christian under Morris's direction, ·: used 
delaying tactics throughout the negotiations. in order to give the Bondel-
swarts time to organize for revolt164 . Yet vlhen the revolt came it was 
clear that the Bondelswarts had no in-depth organized plans, despite the 
fact that they had had plenty of time to .prepare. This can largely be as-
cribed to Jacobus's opposition to a revolt. 
157. N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. An.l. p. 5. A.R .B. 
158. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.259. Oet.Sgt. Pietersen. 
159. ibid. p. 636 . Oet. Cilliers presents evidence of David Klaas. Seep-Ill. 
160. Seep.6L.,. 
161. R.P.N.A.C. Report. ~linutes of Evidence. p.823. Sgt. Naude. 
162. Seep.b'l. 
163. See p. "'3· 
164. N.A.C Report. p.17, para. 73a). 
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Even before Morris returned to S.W.A., Jacobus had apposed Tim Beukes's call 
to revolt at a Bondelswarts protest meeting held at Haib in April 1922, and 
he suggested petitioning Hofmeyr instead165 This was despite the 
contunued ineffectiveness of Bondelswarts protests through this channel. 
In fact, after Jacobus's attempts at co-operation with Sgt. van Niekerk's 
arrest of t·lorris, Adam Pienaar, a Raad member, accused Jacobus of being a 
G t th ' 166 overnmen sympa lser 
167 But Jacobus could not oppose the majority decision of the Raad , and vlhen 
the Raad refused to comply with Hofmeyr's demands 168 , Jacobus Christian 
told the Bondelswarts to prepare for war169 Noothout later told the N.A.C.; 
"Christian was standing alone and all the others were against him".170 
Jacobus felt that: 
"the Government was the guilty party and he could not complain 
to the guilty party because the Government always pretends that 
it is the innocent party". 171 
NDnetheless, Jacobus only reluctantly supported the rebellion . He said he 
feared to surrender in case he was shot by the Government172 . A Bondelswart 
rebel, J. Laberlot, said that: 
"de man die wyvolgden was Tim (]leuke0 doch hy bracht al deze 
moelikheid oor ons en wy behoordern achter Christian aangegaan 
to hebben." 
He also said that Jacobus had always opposed the revolt: 
"Christian radde ons altyd om het te laten staan. Toen wy zag en dat 
Christian recht was was het te laat".173 
Even one of the Bondelswarts extremists, Klaas Isaac (alias Babab), said 
after the revolt: 
165. 
166. 
167. 
168. 
169. 
170. 
171. 
172. in 
"als my Christian gevolgd hadden zonden wy niet verkeerd gaan zyn".174. 
R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.374. Fleck. Jacobus Christian 
to Fl eck. 27 July 1922. 
ibid. p.381. 
See p.,5 . 
See p. '(,'3 . 
R.P.N . A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.235. Oet.Sgt. Pietersen 
presents evidence of J. Prins. 
ibid. p.407. Noothout. 
W.A. Adm. File A 388/1. Affidavit by John Brown 15 May 1922. 
R.P.N.A.C. Recort. Minutes of Evidence . p.467. Jacobus Christian. 
ibid. p.471. J. Laberlot. 
ibid. p.473. Klaas Isaac. 
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Most informants spoken to during field work supported this view, and said that 
Jacobus Christian, while not suppo r ting the r evolt, felt that as Captain of 
the Bo ndelswarts he had to stand by his people regardless of the consequences . 
One informant, Isaak Witbooi, said that Morris had told Christian that he 
had to support the revolt because, he said: 
"Jy sien die mense dood en jy kannie anderste nie".175 
And indeed, as Jacobus himself put it : 
"The aeroplanes did not ask whether one had anything to do 
with it or not, they simply fired" .176 
Tim Beukes seems to have been a clever and scheming manipulator among the 
Bondelswarts. Some Bo ndelswarts felt that he was a Gover.nment agent, and 
indeed, he himself told the N.A.C . , 
"whenever I hear anything I tell it to the Europeans" .177 
Being an ambitous man, Beukes may have seen Morris's arrival as a chance 
to regain some prestige and status after Jacobus's arrival as the officially 
unrecognized but generally acknowledged chief of the Bondelswarts178 . 
Certainly, it is interesting t hat Beukes escaped prosecution after the 
rebellion by turning King's eVidence, an act which infuriated Jacobus 
Chri stian. J9. A draft N.A.C. r eport comme nted on the unreliability of 
Beukes's evidence, but this was excised from the final draft at General 
L , . . t 180 emmer s lnS1S ence . 
Jacobus had persistently opposed Beukes' attempts to incite the Bondelswarts 
175. Interview with J.J. Christian, Gibeon. 26 July 1977. 
Interview with W. J. Adriaanse, Warmbad. 19 July 19 77. 
Intervi ew vlith L. Schneeuwe, Wortel. 22 July 1977 . 
Interview with J. Zwartbooi, Gabis. 21 July 1977. 
Interview with I. Witbooi, Warmbad. 20 July 1977. 
176. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of ~ v idence . Jacobus Christian. 
177. ibid. p. 490. T. Beukes. 
178. See p.34. 
179. See p. loa. 
180. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draf t A, p.67. 
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to revolt before Morris's arrival 181. Beukes himself told the N.A.C. that 
he had drawn up the reply to Hofmeyr's demands on 23 May 1922182 . 
Beukes had gone with Morris at the head of a Bondelswarts force to Warmbad, 
while Klaas Isaac and Adam Pienaar (alias Christian) had gone to set up an 
ambush for the Governn.2nt forces at Driehoek183 . But Jacobus Christian was 
left at Gurucha s , and was not involved in the revolt until after the flight 
from Guruchas 184. 
Another Bondelswarts leader and radical was Adam Pienaar (alias Christian). 
He had been involved in the 1904-6 rebellion185 against the Germans, and 
was a nephew of Willem Christian, the old Bondelswarts chief who died in 
1896. He had fought under Morri s in the 1904-6 revolt186 . Pienaar had had 
reputation as an agitator in German times, and had led Bondelswarts unrest 
in 1917. 187 
Jacobus Christian claimed that Beukes, Morris and Pienaar had framed the 
reply to Hofmeyr's demands, and pressurized him into signing it188 . Pienaar 
also took a prominent role in disarming Noothout189 , and in preventing Sgt. 
van Niekerk 's attempt to arrest t~orris 190. 
t·iorris himself is something of a dark horse , and little can be found about 
his character or personality, except that he was courageous and an exceptionally 
expert guerrilla leader191 . He met his match in Lt. Prinsloo, however, who, 
i8l. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.461. Jacobus Christian. 
ibid. p.474. Stephanus Christian. 
182. ibid. p.481. T. Beukes. 
182. ibid. p.472. Klaas Isaac. 
184. See ~.qO . 
185. See p./b. 
186. Gorges Report, p.98. 
187. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Exhibits and Annexures. Ex. 2. Drew's report. 1917. 
See p.bo. 
188. Seep.~b. 
189. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.484. T. Beukes. 
190. ibid. p.761 ff. J. Boois. 
191. See f- ,~. 
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aided by the invaluable reconnaissance conducted by the aeroplanes, 
and well-versed in Bondelswarts methods of warfare, managed to outwit them192 . 
It does not seem, from the evidence given, that Morris came from the Union 
expressly to lead the revolt. More likely is that his arrival and the 
Governments' heavy -handed and tactless handling of it, was the last straw 
for the rising tide of Bondelswarts ' discontent, the spark that ignited 
the blaze of the revolt. Once revolt had been decided ,on, in the face of 
Jacobus's opposition, it was Morris who sen t out raiding parties to collect 
firearms from local farmers 193 , and made military appointments and organized 
military strategy194. 
This was quite natural, since r10rris had proved his ability in the 1904-5 
revolt, and his almost legendary status in Bondelswarts eyes inspired them 
with hope, confidence and a sense of history. However, from the state of 
the Bondelswarts ' unpreparedness when the first clash with the Government 
forces came at Driehoek195 , it seems clear that they had not and were not 
prepared for revo It, as is shown by their hopelessly inadequate supply 
arms and alMlunition195 . Some of the rifles had been buried and hidden 
the 1904-5 revolt197 . 
The Government's attitude to the Bondel swarts defiance vla~ summed up 'by 
Major Herbst, who told the P.M.C. : 
of 
since 
"He always endeavour to be perfectly just to the native, to treat him 
with every consideration, but when he opposes himself to the law, it is 
necessary in a country like South Africa that the law should be v.indicated. 
He still have natives who are only impressed by a show of force".198 
- 0 0 0 - - -
192. See p.cll. 
193. R.P.N.A.C . Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.252. Det.-Sgt. Pietersen 
presents evidence of J. Prins. 
194. ibid. p.383. Fleck. Jacobus Christian to Fleck. 27 July 1922. 
195. Seep.ql. 
196. See p.i"l. 
197. Interview with Frank Basson, Gibeon. 25 July 1977. 
Interview with J. Zwartbooi, Gabis. 21 July 1977. 
Interview with W.J. Adriaanse, Warmbad. 19 July 1977. 
Interview with Isaak Witbooi, Warmbad. 20 July 1977. 
See AppendixA. 
198. [.A.P.M.O. Vol. 5. Herbst's Memorandum. p.l3. 
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CHAPTER 11. 
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REBELLION 
An article in the New Statesman attacked the way military operations against 
the Bonde 1 swarts were conducted 1, s ta ti ng 
"Upon this tribe descended a well-equipped military expedition, horses 
fl eet of foot, cannon and machine-guns raining shot and shell, aeroplanes 
under knightly command hovering overhead dropping their bombs, maiming 
and killing babe and mother".2 . 
Strong, if melodramatic,language indeed. Hofmeyr came under much fire, 
publicly and privately, for the manner in which he conducted the military 
operations. The Union's English press was particularily virulent, and was 
led by the Star newspaper, which had sent Capt. William Urquhart on 26 May 
1922 to follow the campaign as a special correspondent, with the photographer, 
Richardson3. 
The N.A.C. found that the aeroplanes had inspired terror amongst the Bondel-
swarts, and had foiled their attempts to escape to the impregnable mountains 
of the Fish and Orange rivers, as they had done in the 1904-6 rebellion4. 
However, the N.A.C. felt that before the bombing at Guruchas5 some warning 
demonstration of the aeroplane's capabilities should have been given to the 
Bondelswarts, and a formal demand for surrender should have been made by Hof-
meyr. This, thE N. A.C . felt, might have led the Bondelswarts to separate the 
women and children from the fighting men. General Lemmer disagreed, however, 
feeling that a demonstration would have made no difference, and pointing out 
the vital role the 'pl anes had played in suppressing the revolt6• The pilots, 
1. See p.<!7f5fJ. 
2. New Statesman. p. 131. 12 t·lay 1923. 
3. Freislich, p.37. 
4. N.A.C. Report, p.24, para. 116 . 
5. Seep . q~. 
6. Seep.'lll' 
I 
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Lenmer said, had been unaware that women and children were mixed up with 
the stock and fighting men, and besides which the Bonde1swarts could have 
surrendered after the fi rs t bcxnbs had been dropped7. 
Major Herbst justified the use of 'planes by saying that since military opera-
tions were costly, it was preferable to use "any weapon" which might shorten 
8 them. He felt that the Nama would be less likely to revolt in the future now 
that they had witnessed the effectiveness of the 'planes, and claimed that the 
low casualty rate of the Government forces was "entirely due"to the 'p1anes9 
Major Van Coller agreed with General Lemmer, and further stated that the 
'planes had bombed the stock at Guruchas and had caused little loss of human 
life, while playing an invaluable role in demora1izing ·the Bonde1swarts10 . 
Hofmeyr supported this view too,ll and privately told Smuts: 
" I n country such as th i safford i ng good cover 
physical damage by air-force is negligible. 
i.s enormous". 1 2 
for enemy direct 
~lora 1 effect however 
Indeed, this was not the first time bombers had been used to suppress a 
tri ba 1 revolt. In 1920 the R.A.F. had used bcxnbers against the "~lad Mullah" 
in Soma1i1and13 . Freis1ich points out that the 'planes' most important role 
was that of reco nnaissance14 after the Guruchas battle, although they did also 
occassiona11y strafe the Bonde1swarts rebels in the riverbeds 15 . During the 
Guruchas bcxnbing one Bonde1swarts woman and two children were killed, and twelve 
women and children were wounded by bomb shrapnel 16 . The P.M.C. in its Report 
7. N.A.C. Report .. p.25, para. 116a) . 
8. ~.A.P.ti.O . Vol. 6. Herbst's ~lemorandum. p.11. 
9. R:P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.74. Major Herbst. 
10. ibid. pp.184-186. Major Van Coller. 
Some informants cou1 d remember the Bonde 1 s~!a rts' terror at the aeroplanes, 
whi ch they had never seen before. 
ILterview with J. Zwartbooi, Gabis. 21 Ju ly 1977 . . 
Interview with W.J. Adriaanse, I-rarmbad. 19 July 1977. 
11. R.P. Hofmeyrs' Memorandum. p. 9. 
12. W.A. Adm. File A388/1. Telegram Hofmeyr to Smuts. 
13. Davey, p.14. 
14. See p.%. 
15. Freis1ich, p. 61. 
16. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.274-276. 
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stated that: 
"The question has been raised whether a prelimi.nary demonstration of 
the destructive power of aeroplane bom bs might have brought about the 
submission of the natives, 'but it must be admitted that, when once 
open resistance has been offered, it is difficult to suspend opera-
tions or to abandon them before complete surrender" .17 
In all, it seems that the 'planes played a vital role in speedily suppressing 
the revolt, and thus preventing a .drawn-out and even more 'bloody guerrilla 
war from developing. The bombings were more demoralizingthan destructive, 
and their main contribution was to reconnaissance. 
On the whole, Hofmeyr was congratulated for his swift action in putting down 
the revolt18 , and preventing a 
venting its possible spread to 
guerrilla war from developing, as well as pre-
19 . 
other disaffected blacks .. The P.M . C. 
Report found that : 
"As r egards the conduc t of the military operations it is not di spu ted 
that the Administrator, when it became apparent that hositlities were 
inevitable, acted wisely in taking prompt and effective steps to 
uphold Government authority, and to prevent the spread of disaffec-
tion."20 
However , Hofmeyr did come under fire for his assumption of personal command 
over military operations, with the temporary rank of Colone1 21 . A draft 
N.A.C . Report stated: 
"Without in any way impug ning the Administrator's conduct of the 
campaign it is felt that is would have been a wiser and more seemly 
course for the Administrator to have appointed a sol dier of standing 
to the military command. There seems to have been considerable friction 
throughout the service .... "22 
In addition, as the P.M. C. Report pointed out 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
2l. 
22. 
23. 
"The practice appears unfortunate, not only because it excludes in 
the eys of the native the possib ility of a supreme appeal to the 
highest au thority, but also, as a consequence the Administrator is 
deprived of his capacity as an impartial critic and judge of the 
conduct of operations".23 
C.A.P.M.O, 
See p.'{l. 
R. P.N.A.C. 
C.A.P .M .O. 
See p.~?;. 
R.P . N. A. C. 
t:.A.P.M.O. 
Vol. 6. P.M.C. Report. p.l3. 
Report. Minutes of Evidence. p. 1,122. Major Prins. 
Vol. 6. P.M . C. Report, p.12. 
Report Drafts. Draft B. p.71. 
Vol. 6. p.r~.c . Report, p. 13. 
f 
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Hofmeyr defended himself by saying that the need for swift action had forced 
him to take personal command 24 . But Lt. Prinsloo pointed out that this could 
have increased the blacks' suspicion of the Government: 
"now that the natives grasp the fact that the highest Civil Official 
in the country - the Administrator, is also the highest military officer, 
legally exercising the fUnctions of a Commissioner of Police, and that 
the second highest , the Secretary for S.W.A. @ajor Herbsf), is second 
in the Military Command i.e. legally functioning as the Deputy Commis-
sioner of Police". 
Lt. Prinsloo felt that this would further harm black-white relations, because 
"in the ordinary course of events it is calculated to disturb the 
principles of Justice, as in this system it is possible that the 
prosecutor and the Judge, the man who works up the charge and the 25 
man who sits in judgement over the charge, can be rolled into one". 
The use of local untrained vOlunteers 26 for the Government forces also had 
some undesirable aspects: 
" In dea 1 i ng wi th th i s armed defi ance of authori ty where the matter 
at stake is the enforcement of law it is desirable that the forces 
used shou ld be canposed of men subject to discipline and restraint. 
The youth, inexperience and irresponsibility of some of the lads who 
took part in the suppression of the Bondelzwarts rebellion is very 
obvious. "27 
However, Lt. Jordaan said that although his troops were undisciplined, as 
. far as he knew they had followed instructions 28 . 
While Hofmeyr's military operations were ultimately successful, thanks largely 
to Prinsloo and the aeroplanes, his own military performance was less so. In 
the only battle of the campaign in which he took an active part, the cordoning 
off of Guruchas and its bombing, ' the Bondelswarts fighting men managed to 
break through gaps in the cordon and escape under cover of darkness 29 . 
24. See P,qt. 
25. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minu tes of Evidence. p.997. Lt. Prinsloo. 
26. Seep.~':). 
27. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft D. p.57 (Left out at Gen. Lemmer's in-
sistence). 
28. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.806. Lt. Jordaan . 
29. See r'l3. 
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Hofmeyr blamed Commandant Schoeman for this, but a draft N.A.C. Report found 
that, while one group of Bondelswarts did escape near Commandant Schoeman's 
section 
"the other and larger company got away from the hill where the head-
quarters staff Qncluding Hofmeyu had their station" .30 
Commandant Schoeman himself left the campaign after the Guruchas episode, 
saying that he was "fed up" and wou ld only fight under a sOldier31 . Privately, 
Major Prins, the Union liason officer, reported that the commandants were 
"bitterly" cri tical of the disorganised and "amateur" way Hofmeyr was conduc-
ting military operations. He himself felt that Hofmeyr was showing "doubtful 
and inaccurate" judgement. In the light of the Guruchas fiasco, Major Prins 
recommended that Hofmeyr be replaced by a "military man" : 
"In my opinion campaign carried on in a haphazard way and no hope 
for speedy success. Enemy underesti ma ted and too optimistic view 
being taken by Administrator".J2 
However, the gloomy prediction did not take into account Prinsloo's skilful 
and solitary campaign with his small force in the riverbeds of S.W.A. 
As for the Tatasberg incident33 , Hofmeyr said that he had given strict 
instructions to his officers not to cross the Orange River34 . If anything, 
the incident illustrates the problems of using an ill-disciplined, untrained 
volunteer force. 
Another controvers i a 1 aspect of the mi 1 itary opera ti ons was the cor,lparati ve ly 
low numbers of Bondelswarts wounded 35 , and rumours of the shooting of Bondel-
swarts prisoners in the field were rife. But all references to this were left 
30. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts . Draft B. p.59. 
31. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.l, 121. Major Prins. 
32. (.A.P.M.D. Vol. 4. Major Prins, Kalkfontein-South to Col. Mentz, Cape 
Town. pp.1-2. 6 June 1922. 
33. Seep.I1'i5. 
34. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.949. G. R. Hofmeyr. 
35. Seep. 131. 
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out of the final N.A.C. Report, although some attention was given to it in the 
drafts. Major Prins also mentioned in a private dispatch that the 
II Shooti ng ofpri soners by Commanders of detachments in my vi ew very 
bad policy in view of the fact that according to prisoners there 
is a reluctance on part of certain numbers of followers to desert 
from ~lorri s but if i nformat i on re shoot i ng pri soners wi 11 be known 
no desertions may be expected". 36 
Several Bondelswarts rebels reported that when they had surrendered they 
had been shot by the Government forces. Some, like Abraham Matroos, said 
that the Government forces called on the Bondelswarts to surrender and then 
shot them as they came out. He was supported in this by other witnesses 37 . 
Major du Preez agreed that the ratio of Bondelswarts dead to wounded was 
abnormally high38. A farmer who served the Government forces, Coetzee, felt 
that Bondelswarts fatalities were high because they were poorly armed39 . 
Lt. Prinsloo said that another cause was that: 
II It is very seldom that Hottentots are not shot through the head 
when sniping takes place. He exposes his head from behind stones". 40 
This seems to be a reasonable explanation. Also, _ Major H.B. Porteus, who 
was present when the Bondelswarts surrendered, said that he had seen about 
fifty wounded amongst them41. 
A draft N.A.C. Report postulated several reasons for the low number of Bondel-
swarts wounded. The superior weaponry of the Government forces, the nature 
of the terrain, where often only the combatants' heads were visible amongst 
the boulders - strewn kopjes, which meant that every bullet that hit was 
invariably fatal, and natural confusion in the heat of battle, were all seen 
36. t:A.P.M . O. Vol. 4. Major Prins Kalkfontein-South to Col . Mentz, Cape Town. 
6 June 1922. 
37. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.524-525. Hans Ortman. 
ibid. pp.728-729. Abraham ~latroos. 
i bi d. p. 777. Jan Laberlot. 
48. ibid. p.206. Major Du Preez. 
39. ibid. p.344. F. Van R. Coetzee. 
40. ibid. p.946. Lt. Prinsloo. 
41. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidonce. p.l,124. Major Porteus. 
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as possible reasons. However, the draft report concluded: 
"the extraordinary disparity between the casualties on the two 
sides had not been properly e~plained to the satisfaction of the 
Commission, who are unable to deliver a finding on this matter".42 
The New Statesman, strongly criticized the N.A.C. for not giving an answer 
to these allegations in the final Report, and called on the League of Nations 
to demand explanation of the matter and to demand ' casualty figures 43 . 
The prevalence of such rumours, and fiascos like the Tatsberg incident44 , 
reflected the lack of detailed organization amongst the Government forces, 
especially when it came to supplies and medical treatment. Capt . 45. Prinsloo 
fought in the Haib river-bed without a supply-line or readily accessible 
medical facilities, although the presence of the two aeroplanes at Goodhouse 
did help matters somewhat. This sometimes caused needless suffering 46 , such 
as, the incident where David Klaas, a Bondelswarts rebel, was severely wounded, 
and lay unattended for five days, only receiving proper medical attention at 
Port Nolloth nineteen days after he had been wounded. He died from blood 
poisoning, since he was too weak by then to be operated on47 One wonders 
what might have happened if one of the Bondelswarts' ambushes on Capt. Prins-
100 had succeeded, and large-scale med ical treatment had been needed. 
For the rest, the treatme nt of prisoners was generally goOd 48 However, some 
of the· rebels were beaten by police at Warmbad49 , in which Det. Sgt. Pietersen, 
via junior policemen like Constable Struweg, seems to have had a hand 50 . 
42. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft F. pp.61-62. 
43. New Statesman, p.137. 
44 . See e-q~-
45 . Prinsloo was appointed temporary Captain for the duration of the campaign. 
46. See the Tatasberg incident . r·'1~ · 
47. R.P.N .A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. p.560. J. Coetzee. 
ibid. p.673. Dr. M.W. Cowan. 
48. Seep.loO. 
49. See p,?-~b. 
50. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.469-470. J . Laberlot. 
ibid. p.782. Abraham Christian. 
ibid. p.792. J. Prins. 
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What is significant about this is that Pietersen had been instructed by 
Hofmeyr to co 11 ect "evi dence" that the revo It had been planned for some 
time and influenced by outside agitators. This evidence was to be used to 
prosecute the ringleaders, and for Hofmeyr's report on the rebellion 51 . Con-
stable R.A. Lottering of the S.W.A. police told the N.A.C. that Constable 
Struweg had flogged Bondelswarts rebels under the instructions of Det.-Sgt. 
Pietersen. He said 
"The thrashings were given in connection with the taking of 
statements. This took place on several occasions".52 
Struweg , who was fined and dismissed from the police for his part in the 
beatings 53 , told the N.A.C. : 
"Many Hottentots were sent to me to give strokes because they did 
not make the right declaration". 54 
Det. -Sgt. Pietersen denied these allegations, saying that what beatings 
there were were "disciplinary" ones 55 . 
However, a 11 reference to these unsavoury i nci dents \~ere exci sed from the 
final N.A.C. Report, including a statement in a draft report which pointed 
out that : 
"When one considers that Det. Pietersen's name is freely mentioned 
in connection with the flogging of Bondelswarts prisoners, there 
is the grave possibility of the view that the prisoners were flogged 
in order to obtain evidence that the Hottentots had made organized 
preparations and were determined not to ma ke peace. This witness im-
pressed the Commission very unfavourab ly both with regard to the content 
of his evidence and his manner of giving it".56 
It must be stated that these cases were limited in number, and most of the 
Bondelswarts' rank and file prisoners were left unharmed 57 . 
51. ibid. p.733. Det. Sgt. "Pietersen. 
52. ibid. p.724-726. Const. R.A. Lottering. 
53. See p. lOa.. 
54. R.P.N.A.C. Report. Minutes of Evidence. pp.742-746. P.J. Struweg. 
55. ibid. p.733. Det. Sgt. Pietersen. 
56. R.P.N.A.C. Report Drafts. Draft B. p.20. 
57. See p. /00 . 
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Thus while under the circumstances Hofmeyr's military operations had been 
very successful, and the strategy well thought out, at the local level 
things did not run smoothly, and it was largely due to the aeroplanes and 
Capt. Prinsloo and Lt. Jordaan that things went well at all. Had it not been 
for them, things could have been far more serious . 
The Bondelswarts had surrendered unconditionally58, and their last vestiges of 
independence and unity were broken. Their surviving leaders were tried and 
sentenced to prison terms. The rebellion had failed. 
- -- ' 000-
58. See p. rOd... 
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CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 12. 
Hofmeyr had two basic premises about the 1922 Bondelswart revolt. Firstly, 
he regarded it as being only part of a "sinister" plot among the Nama, linked 
with Le Fleur's movement in Little Namaqualand l • and with the influences of 
20 
outside agitators, mainly American negro movements, as its source. Secondly, 
because he felt the revolt had been organized and planned for some time, he 
felt that nothing he could have averted the conflict. The Bondelswarts' al leged 
grievances were in his view, exaggerated and insincere, a pretext to revolt. 
But the evidence shows that Hofmeyr's premises were wrong. There was little or 
no influence on the 1922 revolt from either Le Fleur or American negro political 
movements~ The Bondelswarts entered the rebellion unprepared~ Had they been 
prepared, they would have fled to the inaccessible mountain regions of the Orange 
and Fish rivers, as they had done in 1904-6, there to carry out I'lith far better 
chances of success the type of warfare at which they had already proved them-
selves so adept. 
The rebellion was the result of many and varied Bondelswarts grievances, accumu-
lating into discontent. The attempted arrest of Morris and the bungling of sub-
sequent negotiations was the last straw. Their distrust, fear and suspicion of 
the Government,built up from German times, made any negotiations doubly difficult. 
They were a proud people, proud of their history and traditions, and proud of 
their tribal identity. Their days of complete independence were not long gone, 
and only in the early 1920's was there any apprec iable white settlement in their 
areaP It was then,while they watched their lands being irrevocably divided up 
amongs t wh ites, that wi th the increased wh i te sett lement came s tri cter and more 
b~rde~scille laVis. In some respect, the rebellion was the last stand of a people 
driven to frustration and poverty. It was indeed, as Freislich calls it, the 
1. See p.bd... 
2. See e·('14. 
4. See p. d.-O O. 
5. See p. ~b. 
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last tribal war. They fought a futile battle against the inexorable advance 
of white technology and civilization, and in this sense their ultimate revolt 
was perhaps inevitable. 
The Bondelswarts were fully aware of what was happening to them6. Their protests 
had gone unheard, and they felt threatened and deceived by a hostile, unsym-
pathetic and alien Government on their own land. They were not an easy people 
to negotiate with being stubborn, truculent and suspicious. Hofmeyr, was also 
burdened with incompetent officials l i~e Noothout, and strong, reactionary white 
public opinion, epitomised by the actions and po licies of the Zuid-West Afrika 
V .. 7 ereenlglng . The whites had political power, the blacks did not . Also hampering 
the achievement of a peaceful settl~lent was the deep-rooted white fear of the 
numerically superior blacks rising in unison to drive them into the sea - a fear 
common to whites in Africa, and for which there were precedents like the 1904-6 
revolt in S.W.A. Hofmeyr's task was thus not an easy one, and he did not shirk 
his responsibility at any stage. He was well-meaning, sincere and paternalistic 
in his attitude to the blacks. But he was also too stubborn, too proud and over-
hasty in his dealings with the Bondelswarts. His unfounded criticisms of Loram 
and Roberts and the P.M.C. are revealing of his character8 . He was too proud and 
unbending in his assertion of white "dignity" to unde rgo the possib le humiliation 
of an armed Bondelswarts escort into Guruchas9. The white Government was too much 
obsessed with upholding its dignity, and too little concerned with humanity and 
understanding . The revolt was a pathetic one, symbolizing the last flicker of a 
bygone era. 
S.W.A. was a "c" class mandate, to be administered as an integral part of the 
U . 10 mon . But, as Marquis Theodoli pointed out in the appendix to the P.M . C. 
Report, the interests of the black peoples were to be paramount ll It was a 
"sacred trust". But it was not treated as such. White economic interests were 
paramount . The country was opened up for white settlers from South Africa~2The 
blacks were 
6. Seep.I €1. 
7. Seep·I~. 
8. See p. pS. 
9. Seep.I~4. 12. See p. sb. 
10. Seep.5""s. 
11. See f · Is~ . 
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to be labourers. not masters, and the economic and native policies, as epitomised 
by the terms of reference of the Na ti ve Reserves Commi ss i o~ 3; were geared towa rds 
white economic dominance. Blacks were not consulted over legislation affecting 
them. Their freedom of movement and action was curtailed by laws benefitting 
the white economy. Indeed, Theodoli14 was correct in saying that the role of the 
S.W.A. Administration in the suppression of the Bondelswarts revolt was B departure 
from the principles of the mandate, 
" a departure which instead of appearing to be a demonstration of 
strength and superiority, might be considered an indication of weak-
ness, and incapacity in the exercise of a mission which is a lofty one 
only if its tcue spirit is respected". 15 
Both the Bondelswarts and the S.W.A. Government were at fault . But the Govern-
ment's actions are all the more shameful because of its greater strength and 
technological prowess. It had departed from the "sacred trust" which it had 
undertaken to fulfill. 
The unity and independence of the Bondelswarts tribe was shattered by the revolt. 
Defeated and impoverished, their loss of pride led to increased demoralization and 
abuse of alcohol, so that the Bondelswarts people today are a mere scattered 
semblence of their former greatness. 
On the whole, the official reports on the rebellion were unsatisfactory in the 
conclusions they reached. The Native Affairs Commission's report was thorough 
and well-researChed, and covered all the major grievances of the Bondelswarts l~ 
But the Report was hampered by the conflict of opinion between Roberts and Loram 
on the one hand, and Lemmer on the other. 17 It was at the latters' insistence 
that all the really contentious points, such as Hofmeyr's handling of the military 
operations and the high ratio of Bondelswarts killed to wounded, were excised 
from the final report. Whatever value the N.A.C. Report had was lessened by 
this,and by Major Herbst's comments on the Report to the P.M.C.18 . Herbst's 
13. 
14. 
It 
17. 
18. 
See p.I~3. 
See p. '~'i: 
C.A.P.~1 .0. Vol. 6. P.M.C. Report. p.19. 
See p.' \ ll'.f. 
See f" 15 a . 
See fl· 13 d, . 
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remarks that the N.A.C. Report was unsatisfactorily researched and was the 
work of persons ignorant of local conditions is a typical example of the deep-
rooted subb~orness of the S.W.A. Administration. It was this refusal by the 
Government to believe or concede that it might occasionally be at fault which 
had driven the Bondelswarts to such a pitch of frustration and anger. 
But the divergence between Roberts' and Loram's opinions and those of Lemmer did, 
as Herbst pointed out to the P.M. C., reflect the basic difference in views of 
the liberals and the majority of white South Africans or SouthWest Africans. 
Lemmer spoke for the latter group. 
By contrast to the thoroughness of the N.A.C. Report on which the P.M.C. had 
remarked Hofmeyr's report on the rebellion was overhasty and simplistic l~ His 
fixed ideas on the causes of the rebellion are reflected in his instructions to 
Oet. Sgt. Pietersen to find "proof" that the revolt had been plotted for some 
t · d h db' fl d b t' d . t t 20 1me an a een 1n uence y ou S1 e ag1 a ors 
The lack of consensus in the N.A.C. Report, Herbst' comments on it to the P . t~.C . , 
and the nonexistence of a report officially recognized by the South African Govern-
ment as representing the true state of affairs, all helped to hinder the P.M .C. 
Report. Nevertheless, the P.M.C. covered the essential causes of the 1922 
revolt, as well as the post rebellion treatment of the Bondelswarts, and some of 
the more contentious points were raised. But the P.M.C. had no access to Bondel-
swarts opinion, and this greatly hampered its work21. However, Theodoli's 
22 annexure to the P.M.C. Report pointed out the essence of the problem - had the 
Mandatory fulfilled its "sacred trust" in S.W.A. and in its dealing with Bondel-
swarts? The answer was that it had not, for if it had many of the Bondelswarts' 
grievances would have had no real foundation. And the N.A.C. and P.M.C. reports 
had shown beyond doubt, that the Bondelswarts' grievances were well founded. 
19. See f' \34 ' 
20. See f' ?-i>.I . 
21. See p.I%. 
22. See p. 137. 
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Si r Edgar Wa Hon' s defence of South Afri ca in the League As semb 113 ~ coul d 
not alter these basic facts, and highlighted the determination of the whites 
to subjugate the interests of the blacks to their own economical and political 
dominance, and to brook no opposition to this. The position of the white 
Government in S. W.A. had to be vindica ted at .all costs - even at the cost of 
a "sacred trust". 
It should be remembered that the Bondelswarts rebellion of 1922 took place in 
a violent age in southern Africa. In the Union there had been bloody confron-
tations in 1922 during the Witwatersrand strike and in 1921 in the Bulhoek in-
cident. The world had just been through the most violent and extensive war 
in mankind's history, tearing the old fabric of society apart. In S.W.A. 
itself black and w nte alike could remember vivdly the wholesale slaughter 
of the 1904-6 rebellion. To Hofmeyr it must have seemed as if violence was in 
the air, and the whole atmosphere of public opinion seemed to work towards 
violence. Violence was not unusual in 'southern Africa. What made the situation 
different in the handling of the Bondel sViarts rebellion was that it t ook 
place under new circumstances , under a mandate which stressed the "sacred 
trust" of protecting black interests. 
The 1922 revolt and the manner of its suppression had .a lasting effect on the future 
history of 'S. H.A. and South Afri ca. As far as S. W.A. was concerned it left a legacy 
of deep bitterness and disillusionment and a strong sense of grievance among the 
Nama. This was very evident from discussions with informants. The revolt and 
its suppression furtner polarized and embittered race-relations in the country, 
the effects of which are felt today and which hamper reconciliation between 
white and black. The legacy of distrust and bitterness has thus left its ) 
mark on contemporary politics. 
23. See p.13'6. 
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For South Africa itself the effect was no less harmful. Black Pan-Africanists, 
'like George Padmore of Trinidad, an associate of Dr.Nkrumah revived the Bondel-
24 
swarts affair in the 1940's to attack South Africa's race policies But what 
was more serious as far as South Africa was concerned was that the Bondelswarts 
rebellion resulted in the start of a long and vociferous campaign first in the 
League Assembly, and then in the United Nations General Assembly . .In 1949 
the Rev. Michael Scott spoke on behalf of certain Herero, Damara and Nama 
interests in the General Assembly, attacking South Africa's role in the sup-
. 2~ presslon of the Bondelswarts revolt . 
In 1956 George Padmore condemned South Africa's handling of the Bondelswarts 
rebellion as part of a general attack on colonial policy in Africa26,: . As 
Davey says, 
"In many quarters the Union was thenceforth suspect as a ruler 
over non-white peoples; a climate was created in which lookers-
on, especially the non-whites, would be on the alert for any signs 
of 'oppression'. 
In retrospect, it must be concluded that the Bondelzwarts affair 
was a grave setback for South Africa" .27 
Thus the Bondelswarts rebellion and the manner of its suppression cast 
a long shadow over the international reputation of South Africa. 
---000 
24. Davey, p.23. 
25. ibid. p.25. 
26. ibid. p.25 . 
. 27. ibid. p.28. 
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APPENDIX A. 
(i) FIELD-WORK TECHNIQUES. 
The Bondelswarts today are scattered over a wide area in the south 
of South West Africa, from Warmbad northwards to Gibeon. The arid 
nature of the countryside means that grazing is poor, and thus outside 
the towns the Bondelswarts live in scattered family groups. 
About 300 Bondelswarts reside at Warmbad, working for whites in the 
ar ea. In the early 1960's there was a severe drought in the south of 
S.W.A. In order to alleviate pressure on grazing, the Government 
offered to remove those Bondelswarts who wished to go to Gibeon. 
In 1964 the Odendaal Report was formulated and put into effect, 
creating black homeland areas in S.W.A. One of these homelands is 
Namaland, a home l and for all the Nama tribes, including the Bondel-
swarts. However, the southern boundary of Namaland starts just north 
of Keetmanshoop, which means that the old Bondelswarts Reserve given 
to them by the German g9vernment after the 1904-6 rebellion no longer 
exists. But some Bondelswarts returned to their old Reserve after 
the drought had broken. Thus there are three main groups of Bondel-
swarts - at Warmbad, in the old Reserve area, and at Gibeon. 
Hence tracking down informants is both costly and time-consuming . 
In addition, some of the tracks in the area are only accessible to 
a four wheel drive vehicle,which I did not possess. 
The splitting up of the Bondelswarts tribe over such a large area has 
also led to a lack of strong tribal organization. The Captaincy was 
allowed to lapse in the early 1950's, owing to a succession dispute . 
It was revived by the tribe in 1972, with Government encouragement, 
as part of the political awakening which started then. But only now 
is there beginning to appear an interest in and an attempt to sys-
tematically record tribal history and tradition. 
The geographical split of the Bondelswarts tribe had led to deep 
political divisions. The Bondelswarts living in the old Reserve area 
have appointed Anna Christian as their Captain, and Hannes Rooi as 
Under-Captain, and they demand the restoration of the traditional lands 
to the tribe. The Gibeon group have their own under-Captain, Frank 
Basson . Each group opposes the other. Contemporary politics, more 
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specifically the opposing factions of followers of the South West 
Africa People's Organization and the Government-sponsored Turnhalle 
group, have been drawn into Bondelswarts inter-tribal rivalries. This 
affects research, since there is much tension and suspicion of strangers, 
particularily whites, for fear that they may be policemen. The suspi-
cion was easily noticeable, and on several occasions a highly-recom-
mended informant would, at first, pl ead deafness, old age or a failing 
memory, or all three. 
Political awareness is beginning to stimulate an interest in tribal 
history, and to influence it to specific ends. For instance, those 
Bondelswarts who wish for the return of their 'old Reserve turn to the 
tribe's past history for justification for their claims. 
Fieldwork lasted for about two weeks, from 15 July 1977 to 30 July 1977. 
Warmbad, Gabis, Wortel, Driehoek, Keetmanshoop and Gibeon were visited . 
I visited informants privately in their own homes. Where possible, 
I visited white farmers who could remember the rebellion . During the 
interview the outline was written down in point form, and written up 
fully as soon as possible after the interview. 
The Nama language is still widely spoken. Unfortunately I cannot speak 
it, but nearly all Bondelswarts can speak Afrikaans. German is also 
often spoken, but English is almost never heard. Informants were not 
paid or rewarded for information in any way. I worked on my own, 
carrying only lette rs of introduction or identification from the 
different headmen, although it was seldom necessary to use them . 
. While it is obvious that the limited period of time spent on field work 
meant that only a fraction of the available evidence was gathered, the 
evidence was collected from a wide range of informants, white and black, 
with different political aspirations and differing wealth, and separated 
by large di s tances. The evidence obtained varied only in minor pOints 
of detail from informant to informant, and was almost completely in 
agreement with documentary evidence gathered. Thus ·the evidence was 
mostly of confirmatory or explanatory value, although, of course, no 
less important for this. 
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APPENDIX A. 
(ii) lIST OF PRINCIPAL INFORMANT~ 
a) War mba d 
19 July 1977 . W.J. ADRIAANSE, a white farmer, aged 69 years old, 
who arrived in the Warmbad district from South Africa in 1916. 
Regarded as a local white expert on the history of the area in his 
lifetime, he had a good memory for details, both of the whites and 
the Bondelswarts. He claimed to have known Jacobus Christian well, 
and had very great respect for him. He joined the Government forces 
under Hofmeyr to help suppress the 1922 revolt. 
20 July 1977~ NOlS ISAAK, a poor white ex-farmer, who lives in a 
garage in the town. He arrived in the Warmbad district as a child, 
and is now about 76 years old. He had a poor memory for details, but 
had many interesting anecdotes. He took part in the suppression of 
the 1922 rebellion, and was in Captain liebenberg's commando. He 
remembered the Tatasberg incident well. 
20 July 1977. GERT JOSEPH, a Bondelswart, about 84 years old. He 
was working on a farm at the time of the 1922 rebellion, and could 
remember little about it. However, he was a useful guide to other 
Bondelswarts more proficient in tribal history. 
20 July 19.77. ISAAK vlITBOOI, a Bondelswart. He vias born in 1894 and 
baptised at the Heirachabis mission in 1918 by I~gr. Krolikowski. 
He "had his baptism card as proof. He claimed to have had no part 
in the rebellion . He was very ill and was bedridden , but was com-
pletely mentally alert. One of the best and most reliable informants, 
he had an excellent memory for detail, and remembered the build-up 
to the 1922 revolt clearly in all its aspects. He held a deep sense 
of grievance at the l osses suffered by his tribe under the whites. He 
was regarded by other Bondelswarts as a local expert in the tribe's 
history. 
244. 
' b} Gab i s. (A Roman-Catholic Mission Station) . 
21 July 1977. JOHANNES ZWARTBOOI, a Bondelswart born in about 1900. 
Recognized as one of the chief authorities on Bondelswarts' tribal 
history, tradition and genealogy, he was old but still active and very 
alert mentally, and he had an excellent memory and grasp of the details . 
At first he was extremely suspicious and reticent, but once satisfied 
with my credentials, he displayed a vociferous and acute sense of injus-
tice at the loss of the Bondelswarts' old Reserve and traditional tribal 
lands. He was certainly the most valuable and reliable informant inter-
vi ewed. 
c) W 0 r teL (A small stock-post in the old Reserve). 
22 July 1977. LUDWIG SCHNEEUWE, who se uncle was Hendrik Schneeuwe, the 
Government-appointed Bondelswarts Captain who was deposed for allegedly 
defrauding the tribe, in 1920. Ludwig is a councillor on the reconstructed 
Raad of the Bondelswarts under Captain Anna Christian. However, he was an 
unreliable i nformant, strongly prejudiced by contemporary politics in his 
interpretation of the tribes' past. He could remember , few details, and 
tended to mix up the 1904-6 and the 1922 rebellions. 
d) G i b eon. 
24 July 1977 . GERT ZWARTBOOI, a Bondelswart, born in 1918. His father 
had been one of the rebels killed in the 1922 rebellion . While lacking 
in detail, his account, as told to him by his mother, was good on the 
causes of the Bondelswarts' dissatisfaction. 
24 July 1977. WILLEM JAER, a Bondel swart , born around, and probably before, 
1900. Slightly senile, he could remember some of the basic details of the 
1922 revolt . 
25 July 1977. Combined evidence of SARA ORTMAN and her son, CAPTAIN FRANK 
BASSON. Neither of them was a pure Bondelswart. Basson is only acknow-
ledged as under Captain by the Gibeon Bondelswarts . Sara Ortman's uncle 
was Jacob Marengo, the famous Bondelswarts rebel leader in the 1904-6 revolt . 
Neither Sara Ortman nor Frank Basson was very well-infonned about the tribe's 
history, but between the two of them some interesting information with regard 
to Le Fleur and Morris was obtained. Basson himself was very helpful in 
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suggesting informants. 
26 July 1977. JOSEPH JACOBUS CHRISTIAN, who was born in 1911. He 
was Jacobus Christian's cousin. He was involved in the rebellion, and 
had an excellent memory of it. A member of the Bondelswarts' royal 
family, and as such a claimant to the Captaincy, he was greatly embittered 
by the inter-tribal rivalries of th e Bondelswarts today. Proud of his 
tribe's past , he was a sincere and very useful informant. 
27 July 1977. NOLS KENNEOY, who was born in 1889. His father was an 
Englishman and his mother a Bondelswart. Very senile, old and bed-ridden. 
He was an interesting informant for his snatches of memory of the 1904-6 
rebellion, the First World War, and Morris's role in the 1922 rebellion, 
although he sometimes tended to mix things up. Unfortunately the inter-
view was terminated by his daughter, who suspected that I was a policeman. 
- - - 0 0 0 - - -
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APPENDIX B. 
SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF HOFMEYR AND THE NATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSIONERS 
i) GYSBERT REITZ HOFMEYER. b 12 Feb. 1871. d. 12 March 1942. 
In 1897 Hofmeyr became the clerk assistant to the House of Assembly. 
From 1900 to 1902 he was registrar to the Special Tribunals of Court. 
He was the Transvaal Secretary to the National Convention, and was 
clerk of the Transvaal Legislative Assembly. From 1910 to 1920 he 
was clerk to the Union House of Assembly. From 1920 to 1926 he was 
Administrator of South West Africa, and he served on the 1926 Ango1a-
S.W.A. Boundary Commission. 1 
ii) BRIGADIER-GENERAL L.A.S. LEMMER 
He was the South African Party M.P. for Marico, and was a prominent 
parliamentary speaker on matters concerning Africans. 2 
iii) DR. CHARLES TEMPLEMAN LORAM. b. 10 May 1879 d. 9 July 1940. 
Loram became assistant inspector of schools in Natal in 1906. In 
1910 he was appointed Inspector of schools for Natal, and obtained 
his Ph.D at Columbia University in 1914, studying negro education. 
In 1917 he bacame Chief Inspector of Native Education in Natal. In 
1920 he was appointed to the Union Native Affairs Commission, and he 
helped formulate the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. In 1929 he 
was appointed as the first chairman of the South African Institute of 
Race Relations. Loram was an authority on Black education. In 1931 
he became Sterling Professor of Education at Ya1e. 3 
iv) DR. A.W. ROBERTS . Born in Scotland. 
Roberts joined the staff of the Native College at Loveda1e, and was 
a specialist in black education. He became a Senator, and from 1920 
to 1930 served on various commissions of enquiry into Native Affairs. 4 
In 1913 he had been appointed President of the South African Science 
Congress, and in 1928 of the South African Astronomical Society.5 
His papers, which are stored in the Cory Library at Rhodes UniVersity, 
Grahamstown, form the basis for this thesis. 
1. Dictionary of South African Biography, Vol . 3. Ed. in chief. 
C. J. Beyers. (Cape Town, 1977). p.403. 
2. Smurthwaite, p.72. 
3. Dictionary of South Africa Biography. Vol. 3. p.537. 
4. Smurthwaite, p.71. 
5. Hancock, p.93. 
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APPENDIX C. 
GENEALOGICAL STUDY. 
THE BONDELSWARTS ROYAL FAMILY. CIRCA 1917 
CAPT. WILLEM CHRISTIAN. d. lB96. 
Sons from fir~ Sons-rrom second wife 
. CAPT. JAN ABRAM CHRISTIAN 
i 
WILLEM CHRISTIAN 
olJ Mol dU"l'it. 
CAPT. JOHANNES CHRISTIAN 
CAPT. 
WILLEM CHRISTIAN 
d. 1918. 
K 
HENDRIK CHRISTIAN 
age 13 yrs. 
JOHANNES CHRISTIAN 
age 10 yrs. 
From W.A. Adm. Vol. 51. File 599/2. Compiled by Det. Christiansen . 29 July 1917 . 
JACOBUS CHRISTIAN 
248. 
M PD. (~e.e. rolj~y .. t bP-tk of iieMsJ 
BONDELSWARTS RESERVE. 
The boundary shown as a dotted line is as appears on the German maps 
according to original sketch before a rigid survey was made. The 
boundary shown as an unbroken line is according to the final survey 
carried out under the German Government in June - Nov. 1911 and 1911 
by Surveyor- General. 
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